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Abstract 
 
The emergence of a neoliberal mode of governance in the 1970s occurred in tandem with the 
advent of new reproductive technologies. These two developments have fundamentally altered 
social life, and have resulted in the emergence of new governable subjects. In the case of 
neoliberalism the new subject is the neoliberal citizen, a responsible, self-sufficient individual 
free to make choices in the context of the free market. In the case of assisted reproductive 
technologies, donor-conceived people, egg donors, surrogates, and LGBTQ parents using 
reproductive technologies have emerged as new reproductive citizens to be governed in public 
policy and law.   
This dissertation traces the confluence of these developments and the emergence of 
neoliberal and (assisted) reproductive citizens in the policy process leading to the 2004 Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act. Drawing on policy documents, parliamentary debates, interviews with 
key actors, media coverage, and the “grey literature” from interest group actors (i.e., pamphlets, 
websites, flyers, brochures), this dissertation argues that federal governance of assisted 
reproductive technologies occurred in ways that reflect the imperatives of a neoliberal 
citizenship. At the same time, infertile people, LGBTQ people, donor-conceived families, egg 
donors and surrogates emerged differently in the policy debates, media, and jurisprudence as 
important subjects in the governance of ARTs, and at times, there were attempts to protect the 
interests of the vulnerable in the legislative process. In the end, however, concerns about the 
interests of reproductive citizens, including women’s health and autonomy, the kinship ties of 
children born of these technologies, and the need to prevent infertility on a large scale were 
supplanted by a continuation and indeed, an escalation of practices in assisted reproduction that 
embrace commercialization and individual choice above all. 
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Chapter One: Controlling Conception 
If the state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation, it maintains a stronghold in its nurseries. 
From the filles du roi who dutifully left their homeland to populate New France, to the ongoing 
debate on a national, publicly funded daycare program, governments have long been concerned 
with how parenting takes place, and who does the job. The longstanding idea that “mothers of 
the nation” would raise and provide civic education to their children and (re)produce potential 
soldiers, workers, and parents, has an exceptionally long academic history that has given rise to 
particular understandings of the relationship between parents and the state; a reproductive 
citizenship rooted in entitlements and duties, long tied to heterosexuality, whiteness, and 
“traditional” family structures.1 
This relationship—between parents and the state—has changed substantially over time. 
Historic notions of civic duty and the propagation of a viable citizenry have largely been 
replaced by contemporary understandings of parenthood as both a social imperative and an 
individual choice. The filles du roi and “mothers of the nation” who were charged with the duty 
to produce citizens in the name of Empire gave way to a model in which the obligation to bear 
children came with associated rights. The establishment of a social safety net in the twentieth 
century included family-based provisions such as baby bonuses, mothers’ allowances, and child-
care subsidies that linked social entitlements to parenthood. With the weakening welfare state 
and the decline of social service provisions tied to parenting, today Canadians are building their 
families less with the expectation of state support, and more with the understanding that only 
those who are self-sufficient and employed can and should raise families.  
The decline of the welfare state and its effects on reproductive citizenship have coincided 
                                                   
1 Bryan S. Turner, “The Erosion of Citizenship,” British Journal of Sociology 52, no. 2 (2001): 189. 
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with an important change in the nature of reproduction itself. Since the 1978 birth of Louise 
Brown, the first “test-tube” baby, assisted reproductive technologies like in-vitro fertilization, 
assisted insemination, gamete donation, and surrogacy have become increasingly available to the 
public. The procreative model of a heterosexual couple deciding to have a baby has been joined 
by another model wherein doctors, nurses, embryologists, sperm donors, egg donors, surrogates, 
and intended parents might work together to create a pregnancy, to have a child. Although 
childrearing has long been a site of state intervention (as with the parental provisions of the 
welfare state), the advent of assisted reproductive technologies marks an even more explicit entry 
of conception into the public sphere. Indeed, if the welfare state established a “cradle-to-grave” 
social safety net, in the time that this social safety net has been coming undone, assisted 
reproduction and attempts to govern it have extended public interventions into parenting 
backwards from the cradle to the womb.  
Assisted reproduction raises new questions about reproductive citizenship. If reproduction 
and citizenship are intrinsically linked, then what rights and entitlements should citizens engaged 
or seeking to engage with assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) have? Who is entitled to 
use these technologies, and on what grounds? What is the role of would-be parents, surrogates, 
sperm and egg donors, and children born of these technologies in establishing how the state 
manages these new technologies? That is to say, if reproduction is an important part of 
citizenship, how have assisted reproductive technologies changed the citizen-state relationship? 
What are the implications of the simultaneous emergence of a neoliberal citizenship regime and 
assisted reproductive technologies? How have these two major shifts collectively altered the 
ways that Canadians reproduce?  
This dissertation addresses these questions by examining the nature of reproductive 
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citizenship in the age of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). More specifically, this 
dissertation identifies how, through the development of public policy governing assisted 
reproduction in Canada, LGBTQ people,2 egg donors, surrogates, infertile people, and donor-
conceived people (and their families) have come to be understood as subjects of public policy, 
that is, reproductive citizens for a new age. It emphasizes the ways that certain groups have been 
validated as legitimate actors within the policy process, and further, how others have been left 
out. Although these new reproductive citizens have been engaged in forming the parameters of 
debate to varying degrees, the reality in the lives of Canadians has been a continuation and 
indeed, an escalation of practices in assisted reproduction that embrace commercialization and 
individual choice above all. In short, this dissertation explores how citizens engaged in the 
debates over ARTs in Canada have been conceived of, and have conceived of themselves as 
autonomous reproductive citizens or conversely, as constrained in relation to their reproductive 
lives. 
 
Changing Citizenship Regimes 
This dissertation begins from the premise that recognition matters. The extent to which groups 
and individuals are recognized—by the state, by the market, and by one another—is integral to 
establishing a sense of belonging and to having a robust experience of citizenship. This broad 
                                                   
2 Throughout this dissertation, I describe the ways in which LGBTQ people and related interest groups engaged in 
(and contested) the policy process leading to the Assisted Human Reproduction Act. The dissertation, however, 
focuses largely on the experiences of lesbians in Canada, with some mention of implications for gay men. To limit 
the scope of the dissertation, bisexual people, trans people and others are largely absent from the analysis, although 
this is an important area for future research. See for example, Michelle Walks, “Stratified Reproduction: Making the 
Case for Butch Lesbians’, Transmen’s, and Genderqueer Individuals’ Experiences in BC,” in Fertile Ground: 
Exploring Reproduction in Canada, eds. Stephanie Paterson, Francesca Scala, and Marlene Sokolon (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014);  Stu Marvel, “‘Tony Danza is My Sperm Donor?’: Queer Kinship and the 
Impact of Canadian Regulations around Sperm Donation,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 25, no. 2 
(2013); Lori E. Ross et. al. “Sexual and Gender Minority Peoples’ Recommendations for Assisted Human 
Reproduction Services,” Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 36, no. 2 (2014). 
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conception of citizenship draws on the work of T.H. Marshall, and is found, in the Canadian 
context, in the work of Brenda Cossman,3 Jane Jenson,4 Janine Brodie,5 and Wendy McKeen,6 
amongst others,7 reaching far beyond notions of national boundaries and passports, marking who 
is included and excluded within a polity. There is something fundamental about being included 
in the protections, entitlements, and responsibilities within the purview of the state, validating the 
array of identities that make up the citizenry and the potential legitimacy of rights claims. The 
recognition of women, for example, has occurred through measures to establish universal 
suffrage, pay equity, non-discrimination laws, and court decisions articulating the importance of 
women’s bodily autonomy. This robust conception of citizenship has not translated to perfect 
models of inclusion—marginalization and inequities continue—but the acknowledgement of 
women’s interests as legitimate, and the understanding that women are citizens of the state, has 
occurred in part through the recognition of women as important subjects of public policy and 
law.  
It is important to note from the outset, though, that while the starting assumption of this 
dissertation is that recognition matters, there are important objections to this claim. The most 
                                                   
3 Brenda Cossman, “Sexual Citizens: Freedom, Vibrators, and Belonging,” in Gender Equality: Dimensions of 
Women’s Equal Citizenship, eds. Linda C. McClain and Joanna S. Grossman (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
4 Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada,” International 
Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (1996): 110–35; Jane Jenson, “Fated to Live in Interesting Times: Canada’s 
Changing Citizenship Regimes,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 4 (1997). 
5 Janine Brodie, “Restructuring and the New Citizenship,” in Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Social Change 
in Canada, ed. Isabella Bakker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Janine Brodie, “Citizenship and 
Solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian Way,” Citizenship Studies 6, no. 4 (2002). 
6 Wendy McKeen, “The Politics of the National Children’s Agenda: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary 
Neoliberal Social Policy Change,” in Public Policy for Women: The State, Income Security, and Labour Market 
Issues, eds. Marjorie Griffin Cohen and Jane Pulkingham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
7 Alexandra Dobrowolsky, “Interrogating ‘Invisibilization’ and ‘Instrumentalization’: Women in Current Citizenship 
Trends in Canada,” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 5 (2008); Judy Fudge, “A Question of Scale: Justice, Citizenship, and 
Gender,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 22, no. 1 (2010); Amber Gazso, “Gendering the ‘Responsible 
Risk Taker’: Citizenship Relationships with Gender-Neutral Social Assistance Policy,” Citizenship Studies 13, no. 1 
(2009); Joyce Green, “Canaries in the Mines of Citizenship: Indian Women in Canada,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 34, no. 04 (2001); Candace Johnson Redden, Health Care, Entitlement, and Citizenship (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
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significant objection is that making claims on a state that many understand to be capitalist, 
imperialist, heteronormative, sexist, ablest, racist (and so on), may work to legitimate the 
longstanding systemic inequities and marginalization on which that state was founded. Seeking 
recognition from an imperialist state, for example, might validate its authority. At the same time, 
there might be reasons to do so as engagement does not need to signify approval and support. To 
paraphrase scholar and activist Viviane Namaste, recognition is in part about the “banality of 
buying some bread, of making photocopies, of getting your shoe fixed. It is not about 
challenging, it is not about making a critical intervention every waking second of the day.”8 For 
those whose interests are not recognized, formal recognition in law and public policy may be 
necessary in order to make life within contemporary constraints, more livable. This is not to 
preclude more radical or liberatory projects, but simply to establish that rights claims within the 
framework of the state are important as well.9  
 Works that theorize citizenship as a matter of inclusion and exclusion have emphasized, 
in particular, the relationship between the state, the market, and civil society sometimes 
described as a citizenship regime.10 Following Jenson, a citizenship regime is comprised of “the 
institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape state policy; problem 
definition employed by states and citizens; and the range of claims recognized as legitimate,”11 
effectively marking the boundaries of which problems count for the state, how they will be 
                                                   
8 Viviane K. Namaste, Sex Change, Social Change: Reflections on Identity, Institutions and Imperialism (Toronto: 
Women’s Press, 2005), 20. 
9 David Rayside, Queer Inclusions, Continental Divisions: Public Recognition of Sexual Diversity in Canada and 
the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 16. 
10 Jenson and Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada,” 112. 
11 Jenson, “Fated to Live in Interesting Times,” 631. See also Jenson and Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship 
Practices in Canada”; Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, “Challenging the Citizenship Regime: The James Bay Cree 
and Transnational Action,” Politics & Society 28, no. 2 (2000); Alexandra Dobrowolsky, “(In)Security and 
Citizenship: Security, Im/migration and Shrinking Citizenship Regimes,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 no.2 
(2007).  
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solved, and who will be included in the debate. The nature of a given citizenship regime is 
defined by four key elements.12 First, citizenship regimes include the “responsibility mix,” that is 
the values and boundaries that differentiate the responsibilities of the state from those of other 
actors (i.e., markets, families, and communities). Second, citizenship regimes involve the 
recognition of rights (i.e., civil, political, social, and cultural), identifying who is formally 
recognized by the state and entitled to full citizenship status, and who is not. Third, to analyze a 
citizenship regime, one must identify the nature of democratic life for a polity, that is, the 
practices and institutional mechanisms that enable citizens to access the state, and the ways that 
participation and claims-making are made possible.13 Finally, citizenship regimes comprise the 
limits of belonging—the ways that inclusion and exclusion are made possible beyond formal 
mechanisms, extending to cultural and psychological sense of belonging. Here, “belonging 
encapsulates the idea that citizenship involves more than the narrow passport-holding sense of 
citizenship, and encompasses broader understandings of inclusion, acceptance, attachment and 
connection.”14   
Thinking about citizenship regimes enables an understanding of citizenship in context, in 
terms of the institutions, discursive practices, socioeconomic conditions, and other factors that 
shape the experience of belonging, and of being recognized as such. Analyses of citizenship 
regimes provide insight into who belongs and is recognized within a state, which citizens 
represent the “‘national’ as well as the ‘model citizen,’ the second-class citizen’ and the non-
citizen,” as well as the “proper and legitimate social relations among and within these 
                                                   
12 Jane Jenson, “Redesigning Citizenship Regimes after Neoliberalism: Ideas about Social Investment,” 
(paper presentation at the International Sociological Association, Florence, IT, September 2007). 
13 Jane Jenson, “Social Citizenship in 21st Century Canada: Challenges and Options” (Timlin Lecture, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, February 5, 2001). 
14 Dobrowolsky, “(In)Security and Citizenship,” 657. 
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categories.”15 Taking citizenship regimes as a point of analysis is a particularly useful approach 
to the study of recognition and belonging as it allows for an analysis of the relationship between 
citizens, the state, the family, and the market, as well as the processes by which certain 
individuals and groups come to be viewed as legitimate and deserving of recognition.  
 In the Canadian context, citizenship regimes are most often explained through the 
historical evolution of a social citizenship regime to a neoliberal one.16 These works begin by 
describing the nature of social citizenship in the 1950s entrenched with the establishment of 
national state-supported social programs. Although access to social citizenship in the post-war 
welfare state was not wholly universal and certainly excluded some already marginalized 
groups,17 the social citizenship regime relied heavily on the consensus that citizens could 
generally access certain rights protections and social programs on the basis of their status as 
citizens. These rights were not equally distributed between men and women, and the collective 
social project espoused by the welfare state included the promotion of motherhood as an 
important contribution to the state. The mother-citizen was seen to play an important role in the 
life of the state, entitled to social supports because of their role as mothers.18 The commitment to 
                                                   
15 Alexandra Dobrowolsky and Jane Jenson, “Shifting Representations of Citizenship: Canadian Politics of 
‘Women’ and ‘Children,’” Social Politics 11, no. 2 (2004): 156. 
16 Jenson, “Social Citizenship in 21st Century Canada: Challenges and Options”; Dobrowolsky, “Interrogating 
‘Invisibilization’ and ‘Instrumentalization’”; Gazso, “Gendering the ‘Responsible Risk Taker’”; Brodie, 
“Restructuring and the New Citizenship”; Brodie, “Citizenship and Solidarity”; Dean Hoxsey, “Debating the Ghost 
of Marshall,” Citizenship Studies 15, no. 6-7 (2011); Sylvia Fuller, Paul Kershaw, and Jane Pulkingham, 
“Constructing ‘Active Citizenship’: Single Mothers, Welfare, and the Logics of Voluntarism,” Citizenship Studies 
12, no. 2 (2008). 
17 Janine Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women’s Movement (Halifax: Fernwood 
Press, 1995); Janine Brodie, “Putting Gender Back In: Women and Social Policy Reform in Canada,” in Gendering 
the Nation-State: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Yasmeen Abu-Laban (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2008); Fuller, Kershaw, and Pulkingham, “Constructing ‘Active Citizenship;’” Jenson, 
“Fated to Live in Interesting Times”; Ruth Lister, “Dialectics of Citizenship,” Hypatia 12, no. 4 (1997); Jane 
Pulkingham, “Remaking the Social Divisions of Welfare: Gender, ‘Dependency,’ and UI Reform,” Studies in 
Political Economy 56 (1998); Sylvia Walby, “Is Citizenship Gendered,” Sociology 28, no. 2 (1994). 
18 Amber Gazso, “Moral Codes of Mothering and the Introduction of Welfare-to-Work in Ontario,” Canadian 
Review of Sociology 49, no. 1 (2012): 33.  
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state intervention to improve the lives of Canadians meant that the citizenship regime in the post-
war period “accepted a guiding role for the state in economic development” and generated a pan-
Canadian understanding of social solidarity that tied citizenship to the new relationship between 
the state, market, and community.19 
By the early 1970s, economic crises were leading to uncertainty about the sustainability 
of the Keynesian economic model. Social spending was seen as problematic, “dampening 
economic growth, protecting inflexible labour markets, hindering labour force participation, 
[and] fostering welfare dependency.”20 The expansive welfare state was increasingly viewed as 
untenable, and in need of replacement by a model that would facilitate the re-entry of citizens 
into the labour force, allowing them to achieve self-sufficiency rather than rely on entitlements. 
The privileging of the unrestricted market came to be seen as fundamental to everyday life, as 
the private life of the individual was increasingly understood as an important site of governance, 
providing “individual solutions to social problems.”21  
The model of neoliberalism advanced in these analyses of citizenship regimes is one that 
extends an approach to public policy premised on the rolling back of the welfare state and the 
retrenchment of social policy.22 Downsizing, deregulation, and privatization are indeed integral 
to a neoliberal approach to policymaking, but neoliberalism is, more broadly constitutive of an 
extension of market-based logic to novel areas of political and social life. In her “Neo-liberalism: 
Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” Wendy Larner makes this distinction, identifying the ways 
                                                   
19 Jenson, “Fated to Live in Interesting Times.” 
20 Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin, “New Routes to Social Cohesion,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 28, no. 1 
(2003): 81–2. 
21 Alexandra Dobrowolsky, “Introduction,” in Woman and Public Policy in Canada: Neo-Liberalism and After?, ed. 
Alexandra Dobrowolsky (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
22 Wendy Larner, “Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” Studies in Political Economy 63 (2000);  
Miriam Smith, A Civil Society? Collective Actors in Canadian Political Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2005), 15. 
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in which neoliberalism has been theorized as a policy framework, as well as an ideology. As a 
policy framework, neoliberalism may be understood through the conscious and relatively 
cohesive shift in policy agendas from favouring a Keynesian welfare state to “the relatively 
unfettered operation of markets.”23 As an ideology, neoliberalism encompasses the policies, 
practices, and values that have come to emerge as “the core arguments of a society,”24 including 
individualism, freedom of choice, commodification, the privatization of once-public services, 
self-sufficiency, and marketization.25  
 This view of neoliberalism as ideology also assumes that it is not a cohesive approach to 
making public policy, but rather that it is an abstract ideological approach with contradictions in 
practice as different actors are privileged at different times. Looking to the work of a number of 
Canadian scholars—Brodie, Jenson, and Dominique Masson—Larner points to the ways that 
collective interests, including social movements and advocacy groups participate in the project of 
restructuring, contributing to its discursive framework in opposition, or negotiating new roles 
within the realities of a changing state. Larner writes here that the claims-making of interest 
groups makes evident the contested and “messy” nature of neoliberalism as an ideology as those 
who might make claims on the state inform new governing arrangements; governance under 
neoliberalism is a contested terrain. For Larner, understanding neoliberalism as an ideology 
means that neoliberal restructuring is always already a site of contestation, made up by the state 
as well as the interest groups, stakeholders, and others who engage. Neoliberalism as an ideology 
offers a view of how the values of neoliberalism that emerge in policymaking are negotiated. As 
                                                   
23 Larner, “Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” 6; Dobrowolsky, “Introduction,” 7. 
24 Wenshu Lee, “For the Love of Margins: Neoliberal Classrooms, Neoliberal Institutions and Repoliticizing 
Education” in Transformative Communication Studies: Culture, Hierarchy and the Human Condition, ed. Omar 
Swartz (Leicester, UK: Troubador Publishing Ltd, 2008), 129. 
25 Larner, “Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality”; Smith, A Civil Society?. 
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Larner writes: 
[U]nderstanding neo-liberalism as an ideology means that we are alerted 
to the possibility that there are different configurations of neo-liberalism, 
and that close inspection of particular neo-liberal political projects is more 
likely to reveal a complex and hybrid political imaginary, rather than the 
straightforward implementation of a unified and coherent philosophy. […] 
[W]e are forced to explore the notion that power is productive, and that the 
articulations between hegemonic and oppositional claims give rise to new 
political subjectivities and social identities which then enter into the 
discourse of restructuring.26 
 
The input of interest groups, social movements, and others contesting and supporting new state 
forms means that the evolution of the state is informed by more than a mere policy agenda 
enacted by the government of the day. This dissertation takes neoliberalism, following Larner, to 
be an ideology that informs governing practices, that creates new subjects, and that results in a 
politics of contestation, understanding that “power is not constituted and exercised exclusively 
on the terrain of the state.”27  
What is important here is the way that the rise of neoliberalism from the 1970s onward 
has translated into a shift in citizenship regime. The move away from social service provision has 
meant, in one sense, a loss of pan-Canadian identity,28 but also a new iteration of citizenship 
based around an altered “responsibility mix” increasingly distributed between citizens and the 
market with the state taking a lesser role. From this view, the ideal neoliberal citizen is one who 
takes responsibility for their actions, their body, and their self, most often through engagement 
with a free market economy that allows them to sustain themselves and their family through 
employment and consumption without putting demands on the state. Matched by a decline in 
social rights and new restrictions on claims-making, the sense of belonging that results is limited, 
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complicated by a moral imperative bound up with neoliberal citizenship insofar as it has been 
through market participation that citizens become deserving and undeserving of full citizenship 
in new ways. The inability to engage in the labour force and to enact the scripts of “active 
participation” in the economy are now seen as moral failings, that is, as ineptitude and 
inadequacy undeserving of social rights.29 Social concerns are reframed as private matters to be 
addressed by the self-sufficient citizen and the private sphere—the market and the home—is left 
to fill in the gaps where the welfare state has contracted. This privatization of what was once 
public has meant increased care work in households, and any failure to “pick up the slack” has 
come to represent a moral failing on the part of those who do not or cannot meet the standards of 
the “good” citizen. 
 Importantly, this shift in citizenship regime has important implications for the 
governance of assisted reproduction, by offering the framework in which legitimate practices of 
conception, childbearing, and childrearing are possible. The privatization of public life has meant 
a shifting of support for both social and biological reproduction, to the home and to the private 
marketplace, where childcare, gametes, and “cures” for infertility are competitively priced. As 
reproductive technologies have made possible new and previously unimaginable means for 
conception and pregnancy, the market-based and moral imperatives of neoliberal citizenship 
have followed. In the new marketplace of assisted reproduction, a good reproductive citizen is 
one who either reproduces with their own genetic material, or seeks out the capacity to do so 
through the medical marketplace. The possibility of alternative models of thinking about family, 
reproduction, and childrearing are outside of this framework of reproductive citizenship, which 
privileges the capacity of worker-citizens to reproduce, but to do so in self-sufficient ways that 
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replicate existing social structures. 
 
Interest Articulation and Participation in a Neoliberal Citizenship Regime 
While neoliberal values have been at the core of attempts to govern assisted reproduction, policy 
in this field has not been entirely made from the top-down. Interest groups and others have 
emerged to engage with, contest, and at times, support privatization, marketization, and 
individualization related to assisted reproduction. At the outset, women’s groups, religious 
groups and others contested the emergence of a private-for-profit infertility industry and the 
related lack of regulatory oversight. However, in the work of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive and subsequent attempts to develop a policy framework, a host of other actors 
emerged, informing and negotiating the discourse and limits of potential public policy in the 
field. Throughout the long policy process that would eventually lead to legislation, approaches to 
making policy on assisted reproduction that espoused the values of neoliberalism were addressed 
by the voices and experiences of citizens.   
 It is important to note, however, that while the view of neoliberalism as ideology 
understands the interactions of top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance, in a 
neoliberal citizenship regime there may be new constraints on what kind of democratic processes 
are possible. This includes profound shifts in the legitimacy of interest groups and their capacity 
to organize to represent the positions of Canadians, and particularly those excluded or 
marginalized in various ways. What interest groups and stakeholders contribute to policy debates 
is increasingly shaped by the pressures of a neoliberal ideology, including a contracted state, 
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individualism, consumerism, privatization, and ever-expanding markets.30 The shift in the work 
of interest groups under a neoliberal citizenship regime has not only meant a change in the nature 
of “who counts” in policy processes, but also the changing of the “responsibility mix” that tasks 
interest groups with service-delivery as once-publicly provided programs are offloaded from the  
state to individuals, the market, and importantly, to civil society. As state obligations are 
displaced, political opportunities for advocacy have been disappearing.31  
The history of interest groups in Canada is extensive and longstanding, demonstrating the 
changing nature of Canada’s citizenship regime.32 An important part of this history has been the 
expansion of these groups in the post-war welfare state, and an integration of some social 
movement and interest group initiatives into the apparatus of the state, particularly through 
granting schemes. In the post-war state, commitments to the integration of immigrants and the 
need to shore up Canadian citizenship gave way to new funding for a range of initiatives under 
the auspices of a “citizenship training program” funded through the Secretary of State.33 
Immigrant groups, women’s groups, labour unions, universities and others received funding in 
the 1950s under this new program, firmly embedding the federal government in the ongoing 
activities of a range of institutions and interest group actors. By the 1970s, the funding of interest 
groups was a regular activity of federal line departments, establishing in a way that the 
cultivation of interest group actors, including those which may present positions different from 
that of the government of the day, are integral to ensuring social solidarity, and to cultivating a 
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sense of recognition, of belonging within the state. Women’s groups provide a notable example 
of interest groups well-supported by the state in this period as not only were there a number of 
local and national women’s groups that received federal funding, but also state agencies were 
established to address the specific concerns articulated by women following the Royal 
Commission on the Status of Women, most prominently the Office of the Status of Women (now 
Status of Women Canada), and the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. 
 By the 1990s, however, there were significant changes to the strong relationship between 
the state and interest group actors that had been cultivated since the 1950s. This change came in 
part because “the state had begun to reconsider the wisdom of funding its critics,”34 and because 
a shift in the federal approach to government was working to offload responsibility for social 
welfare to individual Canadians. One such restructuring initiative in 1993 reduced the size of the 
federal government considerably and saw the elimination of the Secretary of State Department, 
resulting in the cancellation or reassignment of longstanding programs that had funded interest 
group activities.35 Further, throughout the 1990s, the validity of certain groups as legitimate 
stakeholders in public policy debates were undermined as they were alternately described as 
service providers rather than advocates, and as “special interests” with goals too niche to be 
taken seriously.36 As funding was increasingly contingent on groups defining themselves as 
service providers, groups were left in a double-bind, unable to operate without prioritizing 
services, but unable to engage in policymaking because of the primacy of service provision (to 
the exclusion of advocacy). These groups were viewed as “special interests,” including women’s 
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organizations, and compared against populist interests of “real Canadians” suggesting both that 
women’s interests are not real and that the very real work of lobbyists, businesses, and others 
should continue. 
The erosion of the capacity of longstanding interest groups to engage in policymaking 
has often meant that the private sector has filled the gaps in the policy process once filled by 
service organizations, not-for-profits, and the voluntary sector. Market-based actors take up an 
increasingly important role in the legislative and policymaking process, occupying the literal and 
figurative spaces once held by interest groups. Canadian citizens remain engaged in the 
legislative process, however as individuals, on their own terms, without the engagement of 
embedded, well-resourced interest-group actors. Following Jenson and Phillips, under a 
neoliberal citizenship regime “individuals are charged with representing themselves, through 
referenda and petitions and during public consultation, in addition to elections.” 37 In policy 
consultations this trend is apparent, as certain groups with a long history of participation in a 
range of public debates have simply been shut out of the policy process, replaced by individuals 
each telling their own story.  
The declining role of interest groups in the public policy process has occurred in tandem 
with greater consideration given to public consultations, the aim of which was to extend 
consultations with “real” Canadians participating on their own behalf, rather than those of 
organized interest groups. Active citizens have been enabled to participate in democratic 
processes of deliberation, representing their own experiences. This model positions citizens as 
responding to already-established policy approaches, that is, as consumers and decision-makers  
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on public policy, rather than as policy actors.38 A number of consultations in the 1990s were 
used, for example, to validate the position that citizens could independently speak to their own 
interests. The Spicer Commission’s quest to consult with one million Canadians—individuals not 
groups—in three months provides an early example of the move toward individual 
consultations.39 The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies would follow soon 
thereafter, hearing from more than 40,000 Canadians through (as described in chapter three of 
this dissertation) a number of public hearings, a toll-free telephone line, and national surveys, in 
addition to consultations with invited experts and stakeholders.40 
 The shifting nature of public consultations in the 1990s onward has worked to limit 
opportunities for longstanding interest groups to engage by privileging the voices of a much 
broader range of citizens, balancing organized interests with the views of “ordinary” citizens. 
Following Jenson and Phillips, this trend towards consulting individuals as well as groups works 
to ensure that there is no longer a “strong coordinated voice from any particular sector,” that 
those participants in agreement with the government’s position are easily validated, and the 
positions of dissenters are easily dismissed as a too-small minority of views. The nature of these 
consultations, including things like public hearings, telephone lines, focus groups, public opinion 
surveys, and feedback on “workbooks” provide the opportunities for public consultation in 
contexts where the policy agenda is already set.41  
In the examination of the governance of ARTs in Canada, the ways that the doors have  
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closed to conventional interest group actors in the legislative process are of particular import. As 
this dissertation will demonstrate, the consultations held with Canadians during the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies were the first of many public engagement 
exercises that would occur throughout the policy process. As time went on, conventional interest 
group actors, including women’s groups were shut out of the process,42 or as in the case of 
religious groups, seen to be relatively marginal. There was a “growing emphasis…on hearing 
from individuals rather than representatives from advocacy groups”43 as conventional interest or 
advocacy groups were often displaced by individuals, small self-funded groups, large patient 
groups deeply intertwined with commercial interests, and any number of professional 
associations, fertility clinics, and other stakeholders with financial stakes in the policy outcomes.  
 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Neoliberal Turn 
As the welfare state began to unravel and a neoliberal logic was emerging, so too was 
reproduction itself in flux. The rapid expansion of fertility clinics in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, the United States, Canada, and elsewhere in the 1980s was embedded in the market-
based logic of the neoliberal citizenship regime. To borrow from Sarah Franklin, consumers 
“were able to take advantage of the many clinics eager to establish themselves in this rapidly 
expanding sector,”44 and the physicians and clinics that were moving into the sector were able to 
benefit from the incentives provided to entrepreneurs. Fertility clinics, sperm banks (not to 
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mention the biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical companies involved) were lucrative, largely 
unregulated, and operated in the name of giving citizens the opportunity to make the 
reproductive choices that they desired. Prominent scholars argued that access to reproductive 
technologies was a negative right, and that so long as women freely consented to the use of 
ARTs, and were made aware that the technologies were largely untested, any restrictions on their 
use would be unfounded. Calls for “procreative liberty”45 resonated with those eager to use 
reproductive technologies and to make them more accessible through the expansion of the 
infertility industry and mirrored Shulamith Firestone’s historic call to use reproductive 
technologies to emancipate women from the “tyranny of reproduction.”46  
For each promise of gendered liberation that might come with reproduction without sex, 
and conception outside the womb, there were many more concerns about how these technologies 
might limit women’s autonomy and potential for self-governance by creating a world in which 
women might be seen only as “egg farms”47 and walking wombs for hire.48 Critics identified 
how the rhetoric of choice49  was undermined by “structured constraints, depending on a 
woman’s race, class, age, marital status, sexuality, religion, culture, and sometimes disability,” 
limiting to whom such choices were available.50 From this perspective, the choice to partake in 
the newly available technologies was not a free one, but rather was dependent on who was 
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considered a good reproductive citizen, that is to say, whether one was heterosexual, middle-to-
upper class, and white. Caution needed to be taken in part because it was unclear that ARTs were 
safe for women’s bodies and moreover because they were problematic to the status of women as 
a group.51 This scholarship identified the relationship between patriarchal control of women’s 
reproductive capacities and the advent of new reproductive technologies, asserting that assisted 
reproduction was a new and insidious means to control women’s bodies and to divorce women 
from the embodied practices of conception and childbearing, particularly through the 
intercession of the state, the clinic, and the laboratory.52 In short, the predominant view amongst 
feminist scholars was that “the domination of so much reproductive technology by the medical 
profession and by the state has enabled others to have an even greater capacity to exert control 
over women’s lives.”53 No matter the potential for reproductive choice that it offered some 
women, the disadvantages presented by ARTs to women as a group were too great to ignore.54  
As the market in assisted reproduction expanded, and technologies like in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) and intrauterine insemination become a relatively commonplace manner of 
conception, a small but important subset of feminist scholarship on ARTs developed to identify 
how liberal discourses imbued with a market-based logic, work to privilege individual consumer-
citizens seeking out assisted conception.55 Sarah Franklin’s Embodied Progress, for example, 
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includes analyses of how British couples seeking fertility services have theorized their family 
building projects in terms of their capacity to engage in consumer activities. In her study of 
women and couples undergoing IVF in the UK in the 1990s, Franklin found that her research 
participants articulated their experiences in terms of their capacity to partake in consumer 
culture, identifying that engaging in IVF was a choice that they were making rather than, for 
example, purchasing a house or decorating it.56 Within the context of Margaret Thatcher’s 
“enterprise culture,” Franklin asserted that IVF in this context was one means to contribute to the 
new economy by consuming “on behalf of the family.”57  
Deborah Spar’s The Baby Business provides another compelling example of the 
relationship between the language of choice and the market in fertility treatments. Spar argues 
that the debate over the use of ARTs is founded in a moral conundrum; access to ARTs requires 
paying large sums of money to access the services provided by (most often) private clinics, while 
there is a fundamental aversion to thinking about “baby-making as a business.”58 This is not true 
for all countries, but in most parts of Canada (as elsewhere), reproductive technologies are a 
lucrative, private business. Even when services are offered through or in conjunction with 
publicly funded health care services, there is still much money to be made through additional 
procedures, “add-ons” to care, and increasingly, fertility preservation techniques like sperm, egg 
and embryo freezing. Not wanting to think about reproduction as a commercial enterprise, 
despite its (most often) privately funded, business-oriented mode of delivery, often pushes the 
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infertility industry outside of the public purview. Largely symbolic commitments to non-
commercialization, non-commodification, and the protection of women’s bodies render invisible 
the actual practices of an industry that remains largely unregulated today.59  
Some of this scholarship on the infertility industry has also focused on the ways in which 
the market for ARTs is manufactured by scientists, the popular press, and scholars obsessed with 
declining birth rates and the promise of now-available technologies once unimaginable.60 The act 
of bringing reproduction into the space of fertility clinics and under the care of physician marks a 
move towards a medico-scientific solution to a cultural concern. A declining birth rate, delayed 
childbearing, and ongoing understandings of conceiving and bearing genetically-related children 
in the context of a nuclear, heteronormative family are social concerns that are increasingly 
conceived as sites of medical intervention. This medicalization of childbirth and the shift away 
from midwifery and other traditional forms of knowledge are apparent in a number of 
interventions that have come to be seen as unremarkable. Ultrasound, fetal monitoring, and 
caesarean sections were once rare interventions that are now commonplace, often expected in the 
birthing process. The ever-increasing number of medical interventions in childbirth are an 
important example of medicalization, which following Peter Conrad, refers to seeing “a problem 
in medical terms, using medical language to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework 
to understand a problem, or using a medical intervention to ‘treat’ it.”61 If medicalization is 
indeed the process through which a lowered libido becomes sexual dysfunction, 
rambunctiousness becomes hyperactivity, and bad breath becomes halitosis; it follows that the 
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medicalization of reproduction is similarly a means to make a socio-biological experience a 
matter of modern medicine.62 As IVF, egg freezing, and sperm donation have been normalized, 
assisted reproduction affirms the place of reproduction within the clinic, and that women can and 
should use these technologies to address unwanted childlessness, precluding scrutiny of the 
social structures and assumptions about biological reproduction on which they are based.63 In 
short, the medicalization of reproduction and with it, infertility, coupled with the availability of 
ARTs and the understanding of ARTs as an infertility “cure,” extends the possibility of using 
these technologies to an ever-growing number of people, constructing an inflated cycle of supply 
and demand that propels the market in infertility services. 
 
The Canadian Context 
There have been a number of scholarly works that take up concerns about the intersections of 
neoliberalism, biomedicine, and capital in the governance of ARTs in Canada. This scholarship 
was primarily comprised of feminist critiques of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, which suggested that although the Commission operated under the auspices of 
advancing equality and the needs of vulnerable populations, its commitments to evidence-based 
medicine and failure to consider the political economy of infertility ensured that its 
recommendations would uphold the “existing class alliances”64 of the federal government. 
Although economic analysis was largely absent from the Royal Commission’s report, in part due 
to the lack of substantive feminist works asserting that the political economy of ARTs was an 
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important site for interrogation,65 the Royal Commission’s failure to interrogate the links 
between the retrenchment of social policy,66 “corporate incursion into medicine,”67 and 
international trade agreements68 meant that the policy field defined by the Commission report 
was largely devoid of these concerns. In addition to a lack of economic analysis, the 
Commission’s advancement of liberal discourses also privileged biomedical actors, due to a 
commitment to scientific model of evidence-based medicine removed from the real-life 
experiences of clinical practice. This model served to construct the practices of reproductive 
medicine as matters of scientific innovation and research conducted on gender-neutral subjects, 
shifting away from the clinical expertise of physicians, and towards science supported by 
biotechnology companies, and pharmaceutical firms.69   
Recent scholarship on ARTs in Canada has moved away from these concerns. Since the 
Royal Commission, the literature has focused primarily on three areas of analysis related to 
ARTs in Canada. First, a number of articles examine the historical development of assisted 
reproduction in Canada as a policy field.70 These works emphasize the factual, seeking to 
chronicle the nature of the evolution of such policy in Canada, often from the point of view of 
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authors who participated directly in the policy process.71 Second, many works in this field 
provide analysis of how the Act came to straddle a matter of provincial and federal authority 
through the use of the criminal law power.72 These works typically take strong positions on the 
legitimacy of the criminal law to regulate assisted reproduction, arguing either that it is too blunt 
an instrument that oversteps the bounds of federal authority to govern matters of health, or 
alternatively that it is a critically important measure intended to protect public safety and to 
prevent the reproductive tourism that might emerge if a patchwork of legislation emerged in the 
provinces.73 A subset of these works measure Canadian legislative and policy proposals against 
those in other jurisdictions, providing comparative analyses.74 Third, scholarship on policy 
governing ARTs in Canada examines the role of various actors in policy development.75 These 
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works chronicle the rise and fall of feminist actors in the policy debates, the influence of 
religious and pro-life activists, the importance of physician groups, the role of scientists, and the 
influence of competing party interests.76  
Within this scholarship, however, there are few works which focus explicitly on the ways 
that people using these technologies and born of them, partook in the policy debate. For example, 
although lesbians have long been important users of assisted insemination, the contributions of 
LGBTQ people in the policy debates are rarely identified. Francesca Scala’s dissertation research 
on the legacy of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies and Jacqueline 
Luce’s research on the use of ARTs by lesbian, bi, and queer women in Canada are notable 
exceptions,77 but overall, there are few works that address the ways in which LGBTQ people in 
Canada have navigated the governance of ARTs in the Canadian context, particularly in the 
process of federal policymaking. Further, scholarship on the role of interest groups and other 
actors in the governance of ARTs has not explored the ways in which surrogates and egg donors 
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were involved in the policy process.78 This may be in part because there was limited involvement 
on the part of surrogates, and egg donors were completely absent in the development of the 
public policy (though talked about often), but this absence is both remarkable and informative. 
The women whose bodies have been central to the use of assisted reproductive technologies were 
largely not included in policy deliberations; instead, their interests were assumed—articulated on 
their behalf. Scholarship on the development of public policy governing ARTs in Canada does 
include some consideration of the positions of infertile Canadians,79 and donor-conceived 
families,80 although these works are few and far between. The emphasis on feminists, scientists, 
and physicians’ networks has overshadowed the role of those whose bodies were and are affected 
by the use of these technologies.  
Ultimately, what emerges from the scholarship on ARTs in Canada is that there are two 
significant gaps in the literature. First, with few exceptions, scholarship on assisted reproduction 
in Canada has largely focused on the nature of the policy process, rather than on citizen 
participation. The consideration of policy actors that has occurred has largely failed to consider 
the importance of those who use or are born of ARTs in the development of relevant public 
policy. Although feminists, scientists, and pro-life advocates may have been more prominent in 
the policy process, the emergence of LGBTQ people, surrogates and donors, infertile people, and 
donor-conceived families as subjects of public policy governing reproduction, and particularly 
                                                   
78 Alana Cattapan, “Risky Business: Surrogacy, Egg Donation, and the Politics of Exploitation,” Canadian Journal 
of Law and Society 29 no. 3 (2014); Alana Cattapan, “Rhetoric and Reality: ‘Protecting’ Women in Canadian Public 
Policy on Assisted Human Reproduction,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 25 no. 2 (2013). 
79 Éric Montpetit, “Policy Networks, Federalism and Managerial Ideas: How ART Non-Decision in Canada 
Safeguards the Autonomy of the Medical Profession,” in Comparative Biomedical Policy: Governing Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, eds. Ivar Bleiklie, Malcolm C. Goggin and Christine Rothmayr (London, UK and New 
York: Routledge, 2004); Jones and Salter, Proceeding Carefully: Assisted Human Reproduction Policy in Canada 
(2007); Sky, “Commercial Interests and New Reproductive Technologies.” 
80 Alison Motluk, “Donor Anonymity in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act: The Back Story” in The Right to 
Know One’s Origins, ed. Juliet R. Guichon, Ian Mitchell, and Michelle Giroux (Brussels: ASP, 2012).  
!! ! !
27 
assisted reproduction, reveals much about who is considered a “good” reproductive citizen in 
contemporary Canada. The emergence of new policy subjects in the context of the governance of 
assisted reproduction is a notable omission. Second, scholarship on assisted reproduction in 
Canada has largely examined the policymaking process outside of the broader social context in 
which the policy field has emerged. There have been few works (other than those that critique 
the Royal Commission) that interrogate the relationship between the marketization of infertility 
and the governance of ARTs within a neoliberal paradigm. The near-simultaneous emergence of 
neoliberalism and assisted reproduction in Canada suggests that the making of public policy on 
ARTs was necessarily informed by social changes in the kinds of arguments that might be made, 
and the kinds of actors that might be included in the policy process. 
This dissertation addresses these gaps in the literature by investigating how the 
experiences of particular policy actors were affirmed or contested throughout the public policy 
process leading to the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA). Focused on the federal 
policymaking process between 1989 and 2004, it explores the emergence of LGBTQ people, 
surrogates and donors, infertile people, and donor-conceived families as policy actors and policy 
subjects on the long road to legislation. More specifically, it locates this policy process within 
the context of an evolving citizenship regime, chronicling the ways that policymakers came to 
understand the position of those using and born of ARTs, as well as how these actors engaged 
with policymakers, how they mobilized, and how they articulated their own interests. Ultimately, 
it demonstrates how the regulation of assisted reproduction in Canada has privileged individual 
patient-consumers, leaving egg donors, surrogates, and children born of reproductive 
technologies to navigate an effectively unregulated market, despite explicit provisions to protect 
collective interests. In doing so, this dissertation examines how assisted reproductive 
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technologies have been incorporated into Canadian public policy and law to identify the complex 
ways that reproductive citizenship has evolved in a neoliberal citizenship regime, grounded in 
notions of choice, individualism, medicalization and self-sufficiency.  
 
Methodology  
This dissertation research was conducted using a multi-faceted research strategy that relies on a 
number of sources, including eighteen semi-structured interviews, a review of official 
government and Royal Commission documents, parliamentary transcripts, secondary academic 
and media sources and, the grey literature of relevant interest groups. Interview participants were 
selected from policy actors who had participated in the development of the public policy on 
ARTs at more than one stage, with the understanding that they would be able to reflect on 
changes in state-based and interest group approaches to ARTs over time. Further, the interviews 
were intended to provide contextual information about the groups’ activities, as well as to clarify 
and fill gaps in information otherwise obtained through documentary research. As this 
dissertation focuses on specific groups (i.e., LGBTQ people, egg donors and surrogates, infertile 
people, and donor-conceived families), twelve interviews were conducted with representatives 
and members of these groups that speak on their behalf. Many of these interview participants 
also engaged with the federal government through stakeholder consultations, through testimony 
to parliamentary committees, or by partaking in advisory groups. 
The groups that the interview participants represent(ed), either consumer/patient groups 
(LGBTQ people and infertile Canadians), providers of reproductive services and resources 
(surrogates and donors), and those born of reproductive technologies (donor-conceived people) 
were of greatest interest as, with the exception of LGBTQ Canadians, they were not viewed as 
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subjects of public policy prior to the emergence of ARTs. With the arrival of these technologies, 
it became both important and possible to govern these new subjectivities. For LGBTQ people, 
who had already been engaged in parental rights claims, ARTs represented new means through 
which biological reproduction was possible and, as described throughout this dissertation, ARTs 
offered a new site to argue for equal rights and access to (reproductive) citizenship. The other 
groups examined in this study were formed throughout the development of federal public policy 
related to ARTs—some around the time of the Royal Commission and others later, just as the 
federal government was beginning to intervene into this policy field. It was throughout this 
period that they articulated their interests and identified their group identities, for themselves, for 
the public, and for policymakers. The groups addressed in this study then, are those whose 
interests were most prominent or notably absent throughout the development of federal policy on 
ARTs, representing people with a personal, embodied or familial interest in the policy process, 
including the Infertility Awareness Association of Canada, the Infertility Network, the Lesbian 
Mothers’ Association of Quebec, the New Reproductive Alternatives Society, as well as 
representatives of a few other relevant organizations. These groups were selected for some 
combination of their prominence throughout the development of public policy on ARTs, as well 
as their contributions in Parliament, in consultations with the federal government, or in other 
measures of advocacy work. Many of the interview participants participated in different interest 
groups at different times or in loose coalitions of interest groups. In short, the experience of 
interview participants representing interest groups was widely varied, although together their 
experiences speak to the range and scope of much of the interest group representation in this 
field.81  
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As this dissertation also addresses the relationship between citizen-actors and the state, 
the research strategy also included interviews with three key participants from the public service 
(either current or retired) who were involved in the policy process, with a focus on those who 
had been particularly active, or had been departmental spokespeople on the ARTs file. Some had 
occupied more than one role throughout the long policy process, and the experience amongst 
them included conducting research for the Royal Commission, engaging in policy analysis for 
Health Canada, and working as a senior manager on the file. One of the participants (Jan Hatcher 
Roberts), worked both for the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, and for 
Health Canada. Another (Francine Manseau) worked for Health Canada on the file from the time 
of the Royal Commission until after the Assisted Human Reproduction Act was passed. The third 
public servant participated in this research anonymously. 
  The participants also included three experts in the field who have been involved in 
various stages of the policy process, in some combination of their work as researchers, 
advocates, and academics. Two of these experts (Francoise Baylis and Rona Achilles) provided 
research to the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, and all three (including 
Abby Lippman) have been engaged in advocacy work on the governance of ARTs.   
In all, eighteen semi-structured interviews with these key actors were conducted, which 
provided critical information about the formation and work of interest groups in this field, as 
well as how public servants were able to interact with citizens, and to incorporate citizen 
perspectives into policy advice and decision-making. The semi-structured interviews varied 
widely based on the history of the participants and their prior work in the field, and 
individualized questionnaires were developed for each interview. Interviews took place by 
telephone, by Skype, or where possible, in person (in Ottawa, Montreal, Hamilton, and Toronto). 
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In-person interviews took place wherever was convenient for the participant including, for 
example, borrowed offices at Concordia University, McMaster University, the University of 
Ottawa, and the University of Toronto and in participants’ homes and offices. Participants 
provided either oral or written consent to participate in the interview,82 indicating whether they 
wanted to have their names and organizations included in the dissertation. Anyone identified in 
this dissertation has given their consent to be identified, and only information provided “on the 
record’ has been included.83 Furthermore, information provided by anonymous participants  
(there was only one) has been verified by additional sources to ensure that the information 
provided can be subject to scrutiny. All interviews were recorded, and relevant information was 
transcribed. As the interviews were conducted in order to provide contextual information about 
the nature of the policy process and interest group activities, and to fill gaps in the documentary 
research, not all of what was discussed in the interviews was relevant to the goals of the 
dissertation and transcribed. For example, information about the participants’ personal 
experiences with assisted reproduction that was not directly relevant to the research goals and 
information provided “off the record” were excluded from transcripts. All interview recordings 
were reviewed at least twice to ensure that the partial transcripts included all relevant 
information.  
The work of the federal government and the interest groups relevant to this research are 
well-documented, and this study included extensive documentary research to this effect. 
Documentation related to the federal government’s work in this field includes the 1989 Throne 
Speech, press releases, memos and briefs, some internal policy documents and presentations, 
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publicly released discussion documents, proposed legislation, and others. Collectively, these 
documents work to present a picture of the evolution of certain ideas about the governance of 
ARTs into policy documents, and occasionally, legislation. Parliamentary debates were also 
examined and analyzed, to give a clearer idea of the exchanges between parliamentarians and the 
prevalent discourses used to discuss ARTs in Parliament at any given time. As to the work of 
interest groups, in addition to making requests and receiving documentation from the groups 
themselves, their websites (including archived versions) and targeted media searches (through 
the Factiva and Érudit databases) were helpful in devising a clearer idea of their contributions. In 
the case of groups representing surrogates and donors, who did not participate in this research, 
the media searches provided important information about the work and perspectives of certain  
prominent surrogacy agencies otherwise unavailable. The transcripts of relevant parliamentary 
committees were also examined, providing insight as to the positions that interest group actors 
were presenting to Parliament on proposed legislation, as well as the reactions of 
parliamentarians to those positions.  
The documentary research for this dissertation also included an extensive media search 
not only of the work of interest group actors, but also of the debates themselves. This media 
search focused on any discussion of “assisted reproductive technologies,” “assisted 
reproduction” “new reproductive technologies,” “assisted human reproduction,” “procréation 
assistée” and “procréation médicalement assistée” from 1989-2004 in the Factiva and Érudit 
databases, providing insight as to how certain perspectives were emerging in the public 
discourse. The documentary research was conducted prior to interviews to ensure that the 
interview questions would be constructed in such a way as to fill in remaining gaps in existing 
knowledge. Research was primarily conducted in English, although media searches were 
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conducted in both English and French, and some of the grey literature and websites reviewed 
were published only in French.  
 
Overview of Chapters  
The next chapter of this dissertation provides the theoretical and historical background for the 
remainder of this dissertation. It explores developments in citizenship theory that contribute to 
the understanding of “reproductive citizenship” in contemporary Canada. Drawing from T.H. 
Marshall’s conception of citizenship grounded in social rights, it examines how social citizenship 
has been taken up by scholars interrogating the role of gender, sexuality, and biological 
citizenship, as well as how these same contributions to citizenship studies inform new 
understandings of “reproductive citizenship.” It also provides a short history of reproductive 
citizenship in Canada to theorize how contemporary reproductive citizenship is grounded in the 
evolution of citizenship regimes, from the social to the neoliberal.  
 Chapters three, four, five, and six provide the substantive contribution of this dissertation. 
Collectively, these chapters provide a chronology of the legislative development of the AHRA, 
focusing on the ways that certain groups, namely LGBTQ people, egg donors, surrogates, 
infertile people, and donor-conceived families were recognized as legitimate policy actors, or 
otherwise engaged in activities to identify their salience as legitimate policy actors in the field of 
ARTs. Chapter three examines the work of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, the Commission report, and related secondary research to identify how the 
Commission worked to establish a biomedical framework for legislation-to-come that would 
shape who came to be seen as relevant policy actors. The chapter asserts that the Royal 
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Commission set the stage for later public policy on assisted reproduction in Canada by both 
outlining the policy framework and legitimating certain actors as valid participants in the debate. 
 Chapter four examines the period following the Royal Commission that was marked by a 
three-phase approach to governing assisted reproduction comprised of a voluntary moratorium,  
tabled legislation, and a discussion document outlining regulations-to-come. It identifies how the 
assertion of biomedical authority, largely through the relationship between physician groups and 
infertile Canadians, undermined the capacity of the federal government to legislate. Further, it 
identifies how the configuration of interest groups in the period worked to highlight the interests 
of donor-conceived people, emphasizing their importance as relevant stakeholders. At the same 
time, LGBTQ people were not understood to be relevant stakeholders, although through a variety 
of other means, LGBTQ people were working to improve access to ARTs outside of the federal 
policy process. Finally, the chapter identifies the ongoing exclusion of donors and surrogates 
from the policy process, despite heated discussions about their potential exploitation and the 
need to “protect” their interests in the policy debates.  
 Chapter five considers the period between 1997 and 2001, and various federal initiatives 
undertaken during the period including a failed private member’s bill on cloning, a program of 
investment in the promotion of biotechnologies (i.e., the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy), 
regulations on the distribution and use of semen, and consultations on sexual and reproductive 
health. Taken together, these initiatives suggest that during this period, the federal government 
continued its rhetorical commitments to the interests of surrogates, gamete donors, and donor-
conceived people and others vulnerable to harm through the misuse of ARTs, while promoting 
the expansion of the infertility industry. At the same time, surrogates and LGBTQ people were 
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making their interest in largely unregulated access to ARTs known, increasingly emerging as 
important policy actors.  
 Chapter six considers the consultations, policy debates, and other interventions that led to 
the passage of the AHRA, and its implications for donors, surrogates, LGBTQ people, and other 
groups. It argues that the AHRA did not merely institute the policy framework set out by the 
Royal Commission, but that it went much further, concretizing notions of protection, of access to 
ARTs as a citizenship entitlement (again, for those who could afford it), and of gamete donors, 
and donor-conceived people as less significant policy actors. This chapter suggests that even as 
many parliamentarians were committed to ensuring that there were provisions in place to prevent 
the exploitation of gamete donors and surrogates and to protect the interests of donor-conceived 
people, the AHRA ultimately advanced a model of reproductive citizenship that enabled the 
continuation of the pre-existing market in infertility services. Chapter six concludes with an 
overview of relevant developments since the passage of the AHRA, identifying the ways in which 
the AHRA’s commitments to non-commercialization and non-commodification have been 
tempered by a lack of regulation and enforcement. It suggests that the AHRA is little more than a 
paper tiger that does little while appearing to restrict the commercial practices of the infertility 
industry. 
The seventh and final chapter of this dissertation revisits reproductive citizenship and the 
intersection of subjectivity, commercialization, and governance that it entails. This final chapter 
also reviews the themes that emerge through the history of the subjects of ARTs in Canada, 
namely the role of the state as a “protector” of the population from the unknown challenges of 
new technologies, and the complex language of rights that accompanies these advances. This 
chapter reviews the findings of the dissertation to assert that the AHRA and the attempts at 
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governance that preceded it, effectively operate to enable consumers to engage openly in a 
commercial market in assisted reproductive services, constraining commercial practices only to 
the extent that it remains rhetorically possible to claim that altruism persists. Further, it argues 
that the affirmation of certain subjects throughout the policy process, namely infertile Canadians 
and their advocates as well as LGBTQ people with the financial means to access ARTs, has 
worked to validate their reproductive citizenship.  
 
Summary 
The argument of this dissertation is that federal governance of assisted reproductive technologies 
developed in ways that reflect the influence of a neoliberal citizenship regime. Advocates of 
infertile people, LGBTQ people, donor-conceived families, egg donors and surrogates emerged 
as important subjects of the governance of ARTs in Canada throughout the policy process by 
asserting their own subject positions, but in the end only those interests which were aligned with 
the continuation of a largely unrestricted market in ARTs were propagated. At times there were 
(what seem to be) genuine interventions to protect the interests of the vulnerable to the detriment 
of the market. But neoliberalism is not a consistent project, following Brodie, it is “often 
contradictory, if not at times incoherent.”84 In the case of ARTs in Canada, commitments to 
collective concerns and vulnerable subjects were overtaken by policy decisions that upheld 
commercial interests or promoted them outright.  
To argue that the development of federal law and policy on ARTs in Canada has been 
bound up with a neoliberal citizenship regime, this dissertation focuses on discourses of liberal 
individualism and choice, the failure to recognize the collective interest of marginalized groups, 
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concerns about the privileging of medico-scientific approaches to addressing infertility, and the 
promotion of  biologically related forms of kinship. The dissertation concludes with the assertion 
that, while much has happened since the calling of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, little has changed other than the expansion of whose interests are heard, so long as 
they replicate and reinforce the discourses of liberal individuality, medicalization, and unfettered 
access to ARTs.  
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Chapter Two: Reproducing Citizens 
Citizenship theory most often begins from the premise that belonging to a political community 
hinges on some balance of rights and obligations, although theorists differ widely in what that 
balance should be, and to whom rights and obligations should be extended. Until the mid-
twentieth century, citizenship theory relied on two broad traditions that conceptualized this 
balance between rights and obligations differently: liberalism and civic-republicanism. Theorists 
who have privileged rights over obligations mostly fall within the liberal tradition; a rights-based 
approach premised on the idea that the state protects negative rights to enable citizens the 
freedom to make the best choices for their individual lives. A liberal approach also assumes that, 
while the state exists to ensure that citizens’ negative rights are protected, the power of the state 
must be limited to ensure that the freedoms and rights of citizens are not infringed upon through 
state intervention. Within the liberal model, citizens are largely free from obligations, required 
only to refrain from infringing on the freedoms of others, in short, to do no harm. Whereas 
liberals focus on the protection of negative rights, those who emphasize obligations above rights 
draw on the values of civic republicanism and the Aristotelian tradition. Civic-republicans value 
the common good over the interests of the individual, with civic duty seen as an honour and a 
privilege.85 Though oversimplified here, civic-republicanism emphasizes political community 
and privileges that which is good and virtuous over the rights of the individual.86 
 With the rise of the welfare state in the mid-twentieth century and an increasing role for 
governments in the provision of social goods, there was a new understanding of the citizen-state 
relationship. New theories emerged to accommodate the establishment of social service 
provisions that contested the individualism of the liberal model as well as the participatory 
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requirements of civic republicanism. The emergence of social rights, and social citizenship 
theory, particularly through the work of T.H. Marshall, suggested that the rights of the individual 
could be best protected through a measure of publicly funded social entitlements that enabled 
individuals to make use of their civil and political rights while establishing a basic standard of 
living for all. These theories of social citizenship inspired new literatures that explored the 
diversity of people’s access to the rights of citizenship, including the diminished experiences of 
citizenship felt by women and LGBTQ people amongst others, as well as the ways scholarship 
exploring the relationships between corporeality and experiences of citizenship. 
The medicalization of reproduction and the advent of new reproductive technologies have 
created space for a new way to theorize citizenship. “Reproductive citizenship” is emerging as a 
new element of citizenship studies, bridging the spaces between gendered, sexual, and biological 
citizenship broadly derived from the Marshallian tradition.87 The availability of pre-natal genetic 
testing procedures like amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling has changed the kinds of 
decisions people can make about their child-to-be well before birth is imminent. Further, with 
technologies like IVF, people are faced with choices about how many embryos to implant, how 
many times to try to conceive, how to dispose of any surplus embryos, and (when a donor is 
needed) what kind of relationship with the donor of their child’s genetic material they want. 
Intended parents, donors, surrogates, and those whose families have been created using these 
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technologies may understand their experiences as parents in different ways than parents of the 
past, challenging, reinventing, and adopting narratives about what it means to have a child. 
Reproductive citizenship, then, is an increasingly useful lens through which to study the ways 
that access to social rights and citizen-activism have changed over time in relation to how people 
conceive, carry, and rear their children.  
This chapter provides an in-depth look at lineage of reproductive citizenship from the 
contributions of T.H. Marshall through to the contemporary study of assisted reproductive 
technologies in Canada. It begins with a brief examination of citizenship as manifest in social 
rights, including recent contributions on gendered, sexual, and biological citizenship. It then 
builds a theory of “reproductive citizenship,” extending from existing contributions to citizenship 
studies. The chapter then provides a brief history of “reproductive citizenship” in Canada, 
emphasizing how changing citizenship regimes have altered the way that reproduction has been 
governed. It concludes with a brief look of the nature of reproductive citizenship in 
contemporary Canada.  
 
On Citizenship Theory 
Marshall and Social Citizenship 
 
Recent scholarship on citizenship most often begins with a discussion of T.H. Marshall’s 
“Citizenship and Social Class.” First published in 1950, this ground-breaking essay offered an 
examination of the development of citizenship in modern England through the lens of citizenship 
rights. Here, Marshall argued that modern understandings of citizenship are derived from 
longstanding rights of citizenship—civil, political, and social—historically “wound into a single 
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thread,”88 although these rights in “early times” were contingent on one’s status in society and 
not uniformly applied. Contemporary citizenship, for Marshall, differs from historical 
conceptions in its relationship to a sense of national belonging and a sense of equality, as well as 
the establishment of institutions that explicitly recognize civil, political and social rights 
respectively. Social rights, granted through such programs as universal health insurance, social 
assistance, and employment insurance were newly tied to citizenship in the post-war period 
insofar as citizens had the right to access these social programs on their merit as citizens alone.  
As such, citizenship was to be theorized as more than official recognition of belonging to a 
particular political community and the associated civil and political rights, and became also 
about the right to basic levels of social welfare, extending to include citizenship-as-rights 
framework. In this way, Marshall argued that social rights enable an extended community of 
political belonging, offering the potential for a universally experienced social citizenship vested 
in social rights.  
 The contribution of Marshall’s work to contemporary citizenship theory cannot be 
overstated. It is rare to find an article on citizenship published since the 1990s that does not 
reflect on Marshall’s work. In 1994, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman measured the state of 
scholarship on citizenship in terms of how authors related to the “postwar orthodoxy” of 
citizenship that Marshall established89 and today, Marshall’s legacy continues as most any 
discussion of citizenship includes the requisite “nod to Marshall.”90 The wide-ranging influence 
of Marshall’s work can be attributed to the way that social rights work to partially reconcile the 
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positions of liberal and civic republican theorists. While liberals might contest state intervention 
in private lives on which Marshallian social rights rely, Marshall’s argument that the creation of 
programs and institutions to recognize social rights work to enable civil and political rights that 
would not otherwise be fully realized, “giving substance” to the rights that citizens were to have 
already acquired.91 Without social rights, he argued, marginalized groups would not be able to 
exercise their political and social rights to the same effect as those in privileged positions. Social 
rights following Marshall, are a means to address social inequalities, enabling individuals to be 
full members of a community. Further, social rights also include a measure of civic 
republicanism, notably by asserting the importance of the welfare of the polis over the 
individual, giving citizens the resources they need to be able to contribute to society. Although 
the active contributions of citizens on which civic republicanism relies is largely absent from the 
Marshallian approach, it is clear that social rights include elements of the civic republican 
tradition, particularly the privileging the greater good and that which is virtuous over the 
interests of the individual. 
 
Challenging Social Citizenship: Gendered, Sexual, and Biological Citizenship 
The legacy of Marshallian social citizenship is also attributable to the proliferation of scholarship 
that has used Citizenship and Social Class as a starting point for critique. Theorizing about the 
shortcomings of Marshall’s social citizenship has spawned subfields of citizenship studies that 
identify the exclusionary tendencies inherent to the Marshallian model. Broadly speaking, these 
works rely on the premise that Marshall theorized the social rights of the individual qua citizen, 
although the experience he described was that of a white, heterosexual, male citizen and did not 
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consider the very different experiences of people of colour, women, sexual minorities, and other 
potentially marginalized citizens. Citizenship and Social Class also failed to adequately consider 
the differences amongst citizens and their varied access to civil and political rights. The result 
has been that vast literatures now exist that identifying how the lived experiences of different 
groups work to challenge the Marshallian ideal. 
One such literature explores women’s relationship to Marshallian social citizenship. 
Feminist scholars have argued that by writing about the experiences of citizens as a group, 
Marshall universalized the male experience. The “cloak of gender-neutrality”92 disguised the 
ways that the concept of citizenship on which Marshall relied was necessarily gendered. Whereas 
Marshall described the broad establishment of socio-political institutions to recognize civil rights 
in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth, and social rights in the twentieth, this 
trajectory of rights recognition simply did not hold true for women. In many Western states, 
basic political rights (such as the right to vote) were tied to women’s access to basic civil rights 
in the twentieth century, including the rights “of access to education; to own property; to 
terminate a marriage to bodily integrity, such as the right not to be beaten by a husband; to 
professional employment; to sit on juries; to join the police.”93 In Canada, women did not have 
suffrage in federal elections until 1918, although suffrage came later in some provinces, and in 
1940 for women in Quebec.94 As for civil rights, women’s capacity to maintain their bodily 
                                                   
92 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 4. 
93 Walby, “Is Citizenship Gendered,” 385. 
94 Indo-Canadian, Chinese Canadian, and Japanese Canadians, including women, were not able to vote in federal 
elections until the late 1940s, while the restrictions on voting for Aboriginal women changed gradually over time, 
with unimpeded voting rights were available to all Aboriginal people as of 1960. See Kiera Ladner and Michael 
McCrossan, The Electoral Participation of Aboriginal People (Working Paper Series on Electoral Participation and 
Outreach Practices, Ottawa: Elections Canada, 2007) 
http://elections.ca/res/rec/part/paper/aboriginal/aboriginal_e.pdf, 11; Kiera Ladner, “The Alienation of Nation: 
Understanding Aboriginal Electoral Participation,” Electoral Insight 5, no. 3 (2003); Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: 
Aboriginal People and the Canadian State (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 26; Royal 
!! ! !
44 
integrity was long undermined by, for example, the marital rape exemption which allowed 
husbands to legally rape their wives, embedded in the Criminal Code of Canada from 1892 to 
1983.95 In short, Marshallian social rights did not acknowledge women’s longstanding exclusion 
from other rights of citizenship.  
The exclusion of women from the Marshallian model has been used as a starting point to 
consider whether the very idea of citizenship is useful for women at all.96 Liberal feminists have 
argued that the challenge in addressing women’s unequal citizenship is to add women to existing 
models by identifying sites of omission and articulating rights claims that would make women 
“equal citizens.”97 However, this perspective has been the subject of extensive critique insofar as 
“citizenship” is imbued with certain notions of heroism, patriotism, and ultimately, masculinity 
and is tied to very specific notions of political participation in the public sphere. Rather than 
simply embrace existing notions of citizenship that rely on a masculine ideal, some have 
suggested that what is needed instead is the articulation of a feminine or maternal citizenship.98 
This differentiated feminine citizenship would recognize the nature of women’s contributions to 
the polis in both the public and private spheres especially in the acts of care work, childbearing, 
and childrearing.99 However, critics of this model argue that the expression of a citizenship 
experience unique to women would simply replicate the existing disparities between men and 
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women, and would undermine the deep-seated nature of gender differences.100 Feminist 
citizenship theory is thus plagued by the difficulty of reconciling equality and difference that 
stands at the heart of broader feminist theory. Scholarship on gendered citizenship has built on 
the Marshallian model to identify women’s different experiences of citizenship, the desirability 
of citizenship as a concept for women, and how best to reconcile the history of an androcentric 
notion of citizenship with the need for equality and for the recognition of gender difference.  
The omission of gender in conventional analyses of citizenship has opened up similar 
critiques about sexuality.101 Gendered and sexual citizenship went hand in hand as scholars in the 
1990s increasingly used citizenship theory and especially critiques of Marshall to articulate 
women’s different contributions to the public sphere through care work and reproductive labour, 
enabling discussions about how private lives translated into political belonging.102 Scholars of 
sexual citizenship have similarly explored how LGBTQ people have experienced social 
exclusion depriving them of the “belonging, recognition, and participation” that a full and robust 
experience of citizenship entails.103 Shane Phelan, for example has identified how these 
exclusions exist in the case of LGBTQ people in the United States, as despite the semblance of 
formal equality, members of sexual minorities are not fully incorporated into social institutions 
such as marriage and the military and further, into the “national imaginary.”104 She argues that if 
“equal citizenship requires equal treatment by political authorities and by other citizens” LGBTQ 
people are not citizens, but “strangers” within their nation-state not only due to institutional 
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discrimination, but also due to homophobia in various aspects of social life.105 A sense of 
belonging to the nation-state as a political community is difficult to achieve when hate crimes 
and prejudice endure.  
A significant part of this literature has also explored the importance of market 
participation in defining sexual citizenship. Early works on sexual citizenship identified the 
implicit and explicit ways in which experiences of full citizenship are tied to heterosexuality, 
excluding lesbians and gay men.106 Some of this work has also identified how members of 
certain sexual minorities are granted a level of legal and social rights in exchange for the capital 
that they provide to society as workers, consumers, and taxpayers, although their access to a 
robust experience of citizenship remains limited because of the ongoing persistence of 
heteronormativity.107 More recent scholarship has built on this work by differentiating between 
“good” socially productive, employable, non-descript citizen-consumers and “bad” citizens who 
seek to disrupt social convention by shirking social assimilation, failing to partake in the norms 
of consumer culture.108  
The scholarship on gendered and sexual citizenship that challenge the Marshallian 
approach has also created space for analyses that interrogate the role of the body in how 
citizenship is experienced. Following Bacchi and Beasley, the division between public and 
private in notions of citizenship, including the Marshallian tradition, unduly compartmentalize 
the public life of citizens and the private life of the body.109 The social lives of citizens and the 
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private lives of their bodies have long been theorized as separate concerns, including the ways 
that wellness, illness, and the messiness of the body complicate this divide.  
Works on biological citizenship extend and contest the Marshallian tradition by 
understanding the way that the corporeal experiences of individuals work to shape their 
engagement with the state, as well as how the contested terrain of medical, legal, and socio-
political discourses have made new forms of claims-making possible. These works often draw on 
the scholarship of Adriana Petryna, who coined the phrase “biological citizenship,” to describe 
how the victims of the Chernobyl disaster were able to make claims on the Ukrainian state for 
forms of social welfare on the basis of injuries sustained. The suffering incurred by those 
affected by the disaster coupled with the Ukrainian state’s provision of compensation resulted in 
a perceived right of victims to access certain social services including, “cash subsidies, family 
allowances, free medical care and education, and pensions.”110 Access to these state-funded 
resources was achieved by proving one’s physiological disability via particular medical, legal, 
and political criteria, and acquiring legal status as one of “the suffering.”111 This legal 
designation as a sufferer became “the ground for social membership, and the basis of staking 
citizenship claims,” and individuals worked to negotiate their designation by using the resources 
and knowledge available to them. The biological citizens of post-socialist Ukraine needed to 
conform to the limitations of certain discourses to claim newfound rights to social services based 
on their experiences and identities as victims of the disaster in order to access the social rights of 
citizenship, broadly conceived. 
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Biological citizenship then, emphasizes the ways that illness and wellness are understood, 
constructed, and experienced, as well as how citizens use their biological understandings of 
themselves as the basis of new biosocial identities, to engage in patient activism, to fight stigma, 
to make claims for social services, and to help one another manage their conditions and 
understand their experiences.112 Following Petryna, access to social rights is enabled through the 
iteration of particular kinds of stories, and particular kinds of experiences about one’s body and 
its functions. In this way biological citizenship describes the ways that the body and its strengths, 
limitations, and malleability have become a conduit for interaction with the state, with one 
another, and with ourselves, especially in an age when fast-advancing technologies are enabling 
possibilities for new corporeal interventions.  
 
On Reproductive Citizenship 
The emergence of new technologies and ways of understanding illness have led to the study of 
“reproductive citizenship,” a still-nascent concept in citizenship studies that describes who can 
reproduce “with whom and under what social and legal conditions.”113 The term “reproductive 
citizenship” is most often attributed to sociologist Bryan S. Turner, who in his “The Erosion of 
Citizenship,” used it to identify how citizens’ social contributions as parents have been 
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historically tied to certain social rights.114  For Turner, the social supports provided to families 
(e.g., education and health care provision for children, baby bonuses, childcare subsidies) have 
been granted in exchange for the reproductive labour that parents provide, as “reproducers of the 
nation.”115 The result under the welfare state was a relationship of rights and obligations wherein 
childbearing and childrearing are rewarded with corresponding entitlements granted by the 
state.116 Based firmly in the Marshallian tradition, reproductive citizenship is, therefore, a means 
for certain citizens to access social rights, and for the state to achieve the reproduction of its 
citizenry. The granting of rights and entitlements on the basis of reproduction has allowed the 
state to encourage certain family forms, for example, linking entitlements to “marriage and 
domesticity” in ways that long kept LGBTQ families from accessing the same supports.117 In 
short, reproductive citizenship has been theorized as a confluence of biological, sexual, and 
gendered notions of citizenship, addressing the ways that people are thought about and come to 
think about their reproduction in terms of belonging, recognition and participation within a state. 
 
Reproductive Citizenship as Gendered Citizenship 
Physiologically speaking, human reproduction is disproportionately women’s lot. Conception 
takes both sperm and egg, but pregnancy and childbirth make the act of human reproduction 
largely the territory of women. This biological circumstance is particularly apparent in the use of 
assisted reproductive technologies. Infertility treatments, for example, generally involve 
medications consumed and procedures undertaken by women, even when it is the male partner 
                                                   
114 Richardson and Turner, “Sexual, Intimate or Reproductive Citizenship,” 330. 
115 “The Erosion of Citizenship,” 193. 
116 Remmenick, “Between Reproductive Citizenship and Consumerism,” 319; Unal and Cindoglu, “Reproductive 
Citizenship in Turkey,” 23. 
117 See also Turner, “Citizenship, Reproduction and the State”; Richardson and Turner, “Sexual, Intimate or 
Reproductive Citizenship”; Bryan S. Turner, The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory, 3rd ed. (Los 
Angeles, SAGE Publications, 2008). 
!! ! !
50 
(in a heterosexual couple) who is biologically infertile. She is treated for her own infertility, for 
his infertility and for their infertility. In cases where a surrogate is involved, for male couples, or 
in cases where women cannot or choose not to carry their own child, it is a woman who is 
inseminated and carrying the pregnancy. Further, even though sperm and egg donation are 
generally treated the same in public policy they have different physiological implications. Unlike 
sperm donation, egg donation is a very complex procedure, involving weeks of time, taking 
hormones for an extended period, and eventual surgical extraction of the eggs. The side effects 
of the treatment include “breast tenderness, backaches, headaches, insomnia, bloating, and 
increased vaginal discharge,” amongst other risks.118 This is not to say that sperm donation is 
simple. In Canada, both sperm and egg donors have to complete extensive questionnaires and a 
number of blood tests to ensure that the donor is healthy, in addition to grappling with the ethical 
implications of donation. The physiological effects of egg donation, however, render it a 
relatively risky procedure. Although assisted reproductive technologies concern both men and 
women in different ways, women more than men are the subject of their use, and are therefore 
more susceptible to the consequences of their misuse.  
Beyond the physiological, reproductive citizenship is necessarily a gendered concept as 
the governance of childbearing and childrearing has historically occurred through interventions 
in the lives and on the bodies of women. The history of parental entitlements, abortion, the 
medicalization of pregnancy and labour, access to contraceptives, and prenatal care point to the 
ways that the women have long been the targets of biomedical, political, scientific, social, and 
religious claims about who can legitimately reproduce and under what circumstances. 
Furthermore, as the gendered citizenship literature has demonstrated, male-centered notions of 
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citizenship have long relied on assumption of women as dependent on a male breadwinner within 
the context of a nuclear, heterosexual family.119 This male breadwinner model was 
institutionalized in social policy during the time of the welfare state, leaving women outside of 
the public sphere, their reproductive labour counted only as a means through which they were 
meeting their duties as citizens, without being independently privy to the social rights of 
citizenship. It was only as mothers, wives, and occasionally as incidental labourers, that women 
have been historically entitled to any social rights at all.120 
Scholars have also explored how women’s health organizations and feminist groups have 
organized to take control over the ways women’s reproduction and experiences as mothers are 
regulated.121 Contestation of the governance of reproduction has long occurred through 
clandestine access to abortion services, and knowledge exchange about contraception, extending 
to more politicized efforts at increasing access to abortion and contraception in the 1960s 
onward.122 While attempts at empowering women to make choices about childbearing in the 
early twentieth century replicated problematic imperatives about reproducing a certain kind of 
citizen, by the mid-twentieth century, empowerment vis-à-vis reproduction used the language of 
liberal freedom of choice, extending choice to include women’s freedom to choose who to 
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reproduce with, when, and how. The interaction between women demanding control over their 
bodies, and the religious, political, medical, and legal institutions that they were contesting, mark 
moments of contention in the history of reproductive citizenship in Canada, and at times, 
moments of change.  
 
Reproductive Citizenship as Sexual Citizenship 
The governance of sexuality has intrinsically been about reproduction, insofar as the only 
legitimate parents in the eyes of the state and society have historically been married, 
heterosexual couples with the presumed capacity to procreate.123 The assertion that certain sexual 
acts are immoral, and should therefore be banned, governed, or otherwise regulated, is buttressed 
by claims that the only legitimate sexual acts are those that might result in conception within 
wedlock. Although the longstanding discrimination experienced by LGBTQ people reaches far 
beyond the challenges that LGBTQ people face in creating their families, the governance of 
sexuality in educational, political, legal, and religious institutions has long been, in part, a means 
to advance and privilegee the heterosexual, reproductive family to the detriment of domestic and 
sexual arrangements that are (biologically) non-reproductive.124 Understanding discrimination 
based on sexual orientation must include an analysis of the obstacles faced by LGBTQ people 
trying to create their families. As same-sex couples have only recently been included in adoption 
law in Canada and there are many examples of access to reproductive technologies being 
impeded on by homophobic clinic policies,125 thinking about reproductive citizenship provides a 
theoretical framework in which to do so. 
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While reproductive citizenship necessarily includes the governance of sexuality, the 
concept entails not only sexuality, contraception, and the regulation of homosexuality, but also 
fertility, adoption, childbearing, and childrearing. The study of sexual citizenship is important as 
it casts light on the ways that sexual minorities have been denied access to their rights as citizens. 
Further, it identifies how people have mobilized to contest the discrimination that they have been 
subject to on the basis of sexual orientation, actively engaged in taking the citizenship rights that 
they long felt they were owed. However, the sexual citizenship literature has largely failed to 
identify how the denial of those rights is tied to the state’s interest in reproducing its citizenry, 
focusing on sex without reproduction, rather than the diverse ways that LGBTQ people engage 
in reproduction with or without sex.126 Following Richardson and Turner, the governance of 
sexuality is “secondary and subordinate to [the state’s] demographic objective of securing and 
sustaining the connection between reproduction and citizenship,”127 and consequently 
reproductive citizenship offers a more effective theoretical framework than sexual citizenship 
alone to explore state interventions into family formation. 
 
Reproductive Citizenship as Biological Citizenship  
Petryna’s notion of “biological citizenship” has, since its early use, been widely taken up as a 
theoretical grounding to identify both how citizens diagnosed or pathologized are limited in 
terms of things like access to services and by stigma, as well as how they work to contest such 
limitations through collective action.128 Relevant works have identified how citizens have come 
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together to take control of their lives using biomedical frameworks by negotiating the limits of 
law and public policy. The diverse ways that biomedical forms of citizenship are experienced 
have been an important subject of study, from the ways that parents of children with genetic 
disorders have built communities online to educate themselves and seek out new treatments,129 to 
the marginalization and organization of Hepatitis C patients who are also intravenous drug 
users.130 The influx of literature on biological citizenship and the ever-greater prevalence of 
biology in citizen activism suggest that not only are citizens increasingly understood and 
understanding themselves in biological terms, but further, they are using this newfound 
understanding to make claims on the state. The tendency to know ourselves in biomedical terms, 
and to understand all biological problems through the discourses of science, medicine, and the 
possibility of a cure, means that people are increasingly accessing and demanding health care 
services on the basis of biologically understood claims that may have historically been 
understood in social terms. Medicalization, including the medicalization of reproduction, is an 
important manifestation of biological citizenship. 
In Canada, where the parameters of publicly-funded health insurance are decided on a 
province-to-province basis, each province grapples with what new services to include, and what 
services to eliminate from the provincial rolls. Providing services in order to address the 
perceived right to health care presents difficult ethical and moral questions about which 
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conditions and illnesses are a priority to treat, that is, what counts as illness, disability, or 
disorder. This is not to discount the importance of citizen activism around certain diseases, one 
need only look to the ways that AIDS activists demanded participation in clinical trials and 
challenged stigma, to see the importance of biological citizenship activism to promote access to 
much needed services. 131 However, it is important to identify that as more issues are 
pathologized and seen to be issues of health care, and as more medical technologies enable 
treatments of newly identified health care problems, the scope of the right to health care expands 
outward.  
 Reproductive citizenship takes these lessons from biological citizenship, including the 
ways that citizens have come together to fight for access to childcare, health care, and the 
capacity to raise their children in the ways that they think are best. And in many ways, 
reproductive citizenship takes from biological citizenship the basic tenet that citizens are 
increasingly understood in biological terms, configuring their understandings of what is possible 
in terms of claims-making along the lines of their biological limitations, experiences of illness 
and infirmity, and activism. However, as reproductive citizenship focuses explicitly on how 
citizens are governed in terms of procreation, biology and biomedical understandings are a 
significant part, but not all of what reproductive citizenship comprises. One need not bear 
children or be genetically related to a child to be their parent, and, as the experiences of adoptive 
families have long shown, biology is only a small part of what the extensive process of creating a 
family entails. 
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On Reproductive Citizenship               
Even when taken together, the biological, sexual, and gendered elements of reproductive 
citizenship do not, then, fully address how reproduction is governed. Social inequalities shape 
the ways that people reproduce, governed as marginalized people may be by different 
interventions on their bodies, their access to resources, and in short, their lives. For example, 
disability theory has provided insight into the social construction of infertility, and the ways in 
which people with disabilities are enabled and constrained in the ways that they reproduce.132 
From the history of forced sterility for “mentally deficient” Canadians in Alberta and British 
Columbia,133 to the ways that adoption and access to infertility treatments are restricted for 
people with severe disabilities and terminal illnesses, the governance of reproduction occurs in 
tandem with the governance of disabled bodies. Furthermore, reproductive citizenship is 
racialized. Dorothy Roberts, for example, has explored the ways that the contraceptive implant 
Norplant—which lasts up to five years, and is expensive to remove—has been imposed on low-
income women in the United States as a means to prevent them from having children while on 
social assistance.134 As Roberts chronicles, this has altered the capacity of women who took 
Norplant to choose when and how to have their children, particularly as implantation would be 
subsidized or free, while removal would come at a cost. In the Canadian context, Amy Salmon’s 
work has pointed to the ways that Aboriginal women’s bodies have been subject to scrutiny in 
conception and throughout pregnancy, unduly surveilled as a result of assumptions made about 
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the consumption of alcohol and the ability of Aboriginal women to care for their children.135 
Reproductive citizenship is thus bound up with the diverse experiences of social life and the 
marginalities that mark peoples’ lives.  
 For purposes of this dissertation then, reproductive citizenship is at once gendered, 
biological, racialized, and concerned with sexual orientation and disability, as well as other 
markers of identity. It is also about the fundamental biological processes of conception and 
bearing children, and the often (but not always) related social processes of childrearing. 
Reproductive citizenship marks “a route to active social participation through reproduction,”136 
that is an avenue to the exchange of rights, obligations, and entitlements between citizens and the 
state, as well as a means through which to promote belonging and recognition. Public policies 
targeting pregnant women, parents, and families, for example, point to the ways that 
reproduction and family building operate to establish the boundaries of reproductive citizenship. 
Given the state’s ongoing interest in the growth of its population, the relationship between 
citizenship and reproduction is significant. It is important to note, however, that reproductive 
citizenship is about rights and entitlements that are not neutral, but rather, are experienced in the 
context of a citizenship regime shaped by the context of institutions, “rules and guidelines,” 
“problem definition” and “claims recognized as legitimate.”137 The citizenship regime in which 
one’s experience of reproduction occurs has important implications for the rights and 
entitlements exchanged, and the recognition, participation, and belonging that subsequently 
occurs. 
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Reproductive Citizenship and Social Policy in an Evolving Citizenship Regime        
The explicit governance of reproduction in Canada, as elsewhere, can be most clearly traced to 
the turn of the twentieth century. The period between 1880 and 1920 was an important transitory 
time in Canada, insofar as it was marked by the expansion of the Canadian economy and 
bureaucracy, significant urbanization, industrialization and a burgeoning new nationalism. The 
nation-building project of the newly confederated Canada was based on the assumption that a 
thriving nation required strong population growth, requiring women to bear and raise children as 
a public good and a duty of citizenship, an obligation “at least as important as that of men-as-
soldiers.”138  
 While the obligations of women as mothers (i.e., mothers-as-citizens) were clear at the 
turn of the twentieth century, related entitlements were slow to come. There were a few state 
funded programs to assist mothers at that time,139 but for the most part supports offered to 
mothers in need of assistance were provided by churches and other charitable organizations. This 
would change with the establishment of Mothers’ Allowance programs during and after the First 
World War that created a clear role for the state in not only funding, but also regulating the 
“virtuous” mother.140 These programs, available only to poor widowed or deserted mothers, were 
bound to assumptions about the centrality of a male wage earner, without whom mothers would 
need support.141 These early interventions into family life extended the logic of the moral and 
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social reform movements that sought to keep the children of the destitute in their homes and out 
of more costly public orphanages.142 
 These early Mothers’ Allowance programs worked to legitimate a form of reproductive 
citizenship in which some mothers qua mothers were seen to make a valuable contribution to the 
nation through their reproductive labour. Concern about a declining birthrate at the turn of the 
century was supplanted by increasing concern about the quality of childrearing and the 
assumption that it was in the best interests of “virtuous” but destitute mothers to keep their 
children at home. The establishment of Mothers’ Allowance programs made the interests of poor 
mothers an issue of public concern, and although moral regulation and eligibility requirements 
limited the scope of the programs considerably, there was, for the first time in Canada, 
substantive and financially supported recognition of certain forms of mothering as deserving of 
social support. 
 By the 1940s, there were new state-funded interventions into the governance of 
motherhood in Canada that broadened the range of assistance available to women. The 
challenges of the Depression era led to social organizing around protecting Canadians from 
future spikes in unemployment which, after many years, resulted in the passage of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act in 1940. This national, federally administered program was the 
first contributory benefit program in Canada—where recipients would pay into future benefits—
and it served as a centerpiece of Canada’s emerging welfare state. In 1941, maternity leave was 
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granted for a short time to women through the new unemployment insurance program, and 
although unpaid, it provided a way for women to leave and return to the workforce following 
childbirth.143 In addition to the small, largely symbolic inclusion of maternity leave under 
Unemployment Insurance, the onset of WWII led to women’s mass engagement in 
manufacturing work and the establishment of Canada’s first and only, national childcare 
program.144 Women’s work during wartime meant that there was a pressing need for available 
childcare, and in 1942, the federal government announced a federal-provincial cost sharing 
program in which Ottawa would provide fifty percent of childcare costs for women engaged in  
“industries essential to the war effort.”145 The reach of the program was limited, however, as the 
concentration of manufacturing jobs in Ontario and Quebec meant that women outside of these 
provinces did not benefit.146 Further, in the early 1940s, the MacKenzie King government 
introduced a program of family allowances providing parents with funds to subsidize child 
rearing. Paid directly to mothers, family allowances were a means through which the 
Government of Canada could mitigate demands for higher wages; reducing the need for 
employers to pay salaries that could independently support entire families, while giving many 
women the funds they needed to offset the income they would lose by leaving their wartime 
jobs.147 Throughout the war, the citizen duty to reproduce was met by related entitlements that 
framed women both as mothers and as workers, at once engaging in both the public and the 
private sphere.  
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 In whatever ways women’s contributions as workers were recognized during the war, 
entitlements in the post-war period continued as in the early twentieth century, to recognize 
women as contributing members of society, first and foremost through their reproductive labour. 
The small, symbolic steps made to recognize women’s capacity to be both workers and parents 
through the establishment of national childcare funding and promises of maternity leave were 
quickly retrenched after the war, and the relevant programs eliminated. By the 1950s, social 
policy related to parenthood was working once again to reinforce the contributions of women as 
mothers and men as breadwinners. The assumption of the post-war social contract was that 
women involved in a two-parent, heterosexual, nuclear family would necessarily have children, 
with a male breadwinner in the workforce and a mother in the home. The imperative to provide 
care for children within the context of the household with some measure of state support 
remained strong, only now more expansive and bound up with new understandings of 
entitlement to a family wage within the context of a two-parent home. Throughout the 1960s, the 
commitments of the welfare state would be further expanded, including new provisions for 
family benefits, and some subsidies for childcare148 that would reaffirm the social citizenship of 
the welfare state by giving parents financial support in exchange for the necessary work of 
childbearing and childrearing in which they were engaged.  
 The ascendency of a neoliberal ideology from the 1970s onward brought important 
changes to social policy provision, and with it, provisions to parents. Widespread cuts were slow 
to come, and while some retrenchment occurred earlier,149 the 1995 federal budget has been most 
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widely cited as a turning point and the marker of significant decline in the social citizenship 
regime in Canada. This budget included an important “downloading” of services through the 
elimination of the Canada Assistance Plan and the establishment of the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer which, together with changes to Unemployment Insurance and childcare benefits, 
brought about a new understanding that the once-strong social safety net was weakening. The 
elimination of programs like Mothers’ and Family Allowances and their replacement with 
models that left families to their own devices within the broader framework of the free market, 
removed the explicit family-orientation of some forms of social service provision, and focused 
increasingly on the citizen-worker as the deserving recipient of social assistance. 
 For example, without the Canada Assistance Plan, the condition that work could not be a 
requirement to receive social assistance was removed, and the Ontario government replaced 
welfare with Ontario Works, a workfare program that required that all recipients to “take 
advantage of welfare-to-work programmes that will prepare them for paid employment and end 
their ‘dependency’ on the state.”150 Welfare recipients were framed, under this new program, as 
people who did not contribute to society or the state, and who were simply paid to “do 
nothing.”151 Although Mothers’ Allowance had originally been conceived as a way to enable 
mothers who could not afford to stay home to make a valuable contribution to society by raising 
their children, the workfare legislation reframed single mothers on social assistance as part of the 
Ontario Works program, undeserving and therefore not entitled to support.152 As such, it required 
them to engage in some combination of employment, community work, and training activities 
for thirty-five hours a week, despite their obligations as sole-support parents. The contribution to 
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the labour force that single parents might be making was clearly valued over their potential role 
in childrearing. In British Columbia, similar reforms to social assistance also included the 
introduction of workfare, and a significant reduction to the assets that someone was able to hold 
and still qualify for assistance. While (some) single mothers were once eligible for social 
assistance to ensure that they could stay home with their children until they reached school-age, 
the shift in social policy reframed “the social identities of single mothers…and their capacity to 
make claims on the state by redefining them as the welfare problem—as undeserving, 
employable, and dependent.”153  
 The replacement of the social citizen of the post-war period by a responsibilized citizen-
subject under neoliberalism is a critical shift. Whereas the social citizen is entitled to a wide 
array of social rights to ensure that they can enjoy a robust experience of citizenship, the 
neoliberal citizen is the subject of a shrinking state, a state in which an interest in privatization 
allows for the “rolling back” of government functions and a shifting of social service provisions 
from the public to private sector. As described in chapter one, the citizen-subject of this state is 
one who is self-sufficient and only requires state assistance in the most dire of circumstances.154 
Ever ready to bounce back from troubled times, the neoliberal citizen is responsible for their own 
well-being, and when unemployed or otherwise troubled, can look to the state for short-term 
stop-gaps. Coupled with their own work ethic and skills-building, this “hand up” will help them 
re-enter the workforce. For reproductive citizenship, this shift from a social to neoliberal 
citizenship regime is particularly important, as certain policy interventions in the post-war 
welfare state, and certainly by the late 1960s, addressed the needs of certain kinds of parents as 
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parents (though they might be workers too), considering the particular needs and lives of those 
engaged in social reproduction. Programs like family allowances, for example, considered the 
material circumstances of families, and committed the state to providing benefits that would 
allow those families to survive. And though the examples presented here identify only a few of 
the ways that reproduction has changed in the decline of the welfare state, they represent how the 
parental (and largely maternal) obligation to engage in childrearing once met with relevant 
entitlements has been displaced by a model in which entitlements are bound to self-sufficiency 
and individualism. A different history, for example, might trace the liberalization of abortion law 
and access to contraception, focusing on the emergence of abortion as embedded in a language of 
choice, with access provided historically (and to a certain extent, contemporaneously) through 
private clinics.155 Or still another might explore the medicalization of reproduction and its 
increased regulation and governance through the administration of professional medical 
associations. However, the crude history of social policy related to parenting provided here 
demonstrates similarly that it is increasingly as individuals, as workers, as consumers, and as 
taxpayers—rather than as parents—that people are seen as legitimate reproductive citizens. In 
short, the shift away from welfarism in has marked a new chapter in the history of reproductive 
citizenship in Canada, an individualizing model wherein reproduction is a private matter and the 
responsibility of the self-sufficient citizen within the context of the market.  
 
Summary: Reproductive Citizenship in 21st Century Canada 
The pressures of an increasingly neoliberal citizenship regime are met with lingering pressures 
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on women to bear biologically related children, and to do so within the context of a white, 
middle-class, able-bodied, two-parent (often heterosexual) family, and in ways that do not 
commercialize reproduction. The paradox of reproductive citizenship in a neoliberal age is that 
certain things have not changed—there is an ongoing reticence not to commercialize or 
commodify conception, childbearing, and reproduction, as well as concern about the public 
interest where the exploitation of vulnerable women or children are involved. However, at the 
same time, these commitments are increasingly mitigated by new obligations to participate in, 
and not to impede, the workings of the free market. While reproduction is not typically viewed as 
a commercial enterprise, there are many industries built to benefit from procreation—from 
pregnancy tests to baby yoga classes—and having children often means partaking in the 
commercial exchanges of those industries. One straightforward example is the employment of 
low-wage childcare workers, which at once disproportionately exploits the labour of racialized 
women, in the name of enabling privileged women to engage in the paid labour force while 
ensuring that their children are well cared for. The individual benefits to privileged women’s 
families occur as a result of their capacity to marginalize the labour of another, more vulnerable 
person, although this is seemingly an acceptable practice given the disparate nature of wages in 
the market economy and the valuation of some forms of labour above others. Exploitation of 
labour is a reality in the context of the free market, and seemingly acceptable within its 
parameters so long as engagement is freely chosen, or at least, the “fiction of consent” is 
present.156 Reproduction has long been an economic and exploitative enterprise, but the 
exchange of goods and services is often viewed as acceptable so long as it is understood as a 
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means to  improve one’s life or that of one’s child; enjoyed within the context of a neoliberal 
citizenship regime. There are shifting boundaries about what are considered legitimate practices 
in reproduction, with payment for childcare, reimbursement for surrogacy services, the 
purchasing of embryos amongst the practices involved in reproduction that are deemed 
acceptable or unacceptable depending on the limits of choice, exploitation, and 
commercialization of the governing regime. Here, inequalities are recaptured in the language of 
individual decision-making, where workers are seen to choose to partake in gendered, low wage 
jobs, rather than being relegated to them by virtue of structural inequities. For those without 
economic stability, or whose days squeeze in part-time jobs and caretaking responsibilities, there 
may be little access to the parameters of “good” market-based parenting, and the capacity to 
choose how to engage in reproduction.  
The possibility of purchasing a better life, or at least, better opportunities for one’s child 
is not unique to neoliberalism, it was certainly present during the heyday of the welfare state. 
Elites are always already able to access better opportunities for their children than others, and to 
engage in a seemingly privileged form of childrearing. What has changed is that longstanding 
commitments to a basic standard of living, and to publicly provided social services have become 
less accessible to marginalized people, thereby making it increasingly difficult to meet the 
standards of what constitutes an adequate parent, let alone a good one. The recognized 
reproductive citizen, is one always already engaged in paid employment, who partakes in the 
market, and indeed, relies on privately funded childcare to ensure that their labour is not too-
interrupted by the demands of social and biological reproduction. Alternatively, the good 
reproductive citizen exists in a two-parent family with a single income in which one parent stays 
home. Those with low incomes, in single-parent households, or otherwise marginalized are 
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necessarily excluded from a robust experience of reproductive citizenship. The recognition of 
certain citizens as legitimately reproductive thus involves both the market and the state, knowing 
that it is only with a certain kind of engagement with the labour force and consequently the 
purchase of goods and services (including childcare) that “good” parenting practices can occur. 
While good parenting in a neoliberal context operates—at least to a certain degree—as a 
function of purchasing power legitimated by the state, having a child is not seen as an 
engagement with the market, but rather (most often) as a choice that people make to fill their 
home and hearts and to engage in the proliferation of their families. Purchasing goods and 
services can help parents improve the lives of themselves and their families, fulfilling their 
ethical obligation to do right by their children. Although historically, people had children in part 
to participate in labour—agricultural, industrial, domestic or otherwise—in Canada today, this is 
practically unthinkable. Ethical practices of reproduction seemingly occur for their own sake, 
that is to say for the altruistic desire to either have or raise a child. One is supposed to build a 
family because they want to and because it is simply the right thing to do.  
Thinking about the acquisition of childcare, or the purchase of diapers solely as acts of 
care invisibilizes the ways that reproduction is embedded within a neoliberal citizenship regime. 
This theoretical compartmentalization is easy in the case of buying clothes for one’s child, for 
example, made possible by the understanding that such clothing is necessary to take good care of 
one’s child. From this view, the market provides what for many is the only viable means of 
exercising one’s capacity to care; constructing the parameters of what practices of parenting are 
possible and desirable. However, in the case of the use of ARTs, the intersection of market 
forces and care makes these practices visible and perhaps even more problematic. The 
commercial acquisition of highly prized gametes, or the services of a surrogate who has a history 
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of healthy pregnancies means that commercial exchanges that have been an increasingly 
foundational part of parenting in a neoliberal age are coming to mark conception in new and 
profound ways. When the purchase of goods and services is not for a child, but rather for the 
creation of that child, the lines between care and commercialization are unclear. Conception 
itself becomes a commercial endeavour, not only the care work that follows. The desire to 
reproduce is theorized here, not as a collectively felt social pressure, but rather as an individually 
felt, biological-but-personal desire, and one that individuals can act upon by making the best 
possible choices (with their physician) about what technologies they undergo and how.  
The movement of conception into the site of the (mostly) private space of fertility clinics 
has also meant that the desire to have a child, and to do so using reproductive technologies is 
increasingly understood in medical terms. Although the inability to reproduce biologically is not 
necessarily a dysfunction—not all bodies are necessarily reproductive—unwanted childlessness 
has been articulated in the language of clinic, as “infertility,” as an illness to be cured. Where 
“social infertility” exists (when someone cannot reproduce biologically with their sexual partner) 
that too is seen as a condition to be “cured” with the intervention of ARTs. The framing of 
infertility as a site of medical intervention, and of high-priced infertility treatments as the cure, 
has created a new means in which choices about how to reproduce, with whom, and how can 
occur, so long as one has the means to pay.  
 The medicalization of infertility, however, has also brought with it a new discursive 
framework with which to think about reproduction and infertility. Just as biological citizenship 
enables individuals to think about themselves in biological terms (and contest biomedical 
paradigms), reproductive citizenship enables people to think about themselves as reproductive or 
non-reproductive, and to understand reproductive capacity and family building in terms of 
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medical notions of fertility and infertility. If the medical model of infertility and ARTs as 
treatments of choice are a new reality in Canada, it is through these newfound reproductive 
identities that citizens involved with these technologies have made their voices heard.  
 Examining reproductive citizenship in the transition from a social to a neoliberal 
citizenship regime provides an important lens to interrogate how the most fundamental aspects of 
human life, life itself, have been incorporated into new modes of governance. Focusing 
particularly on the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in the process leading to the 
AHRA, the remainder of this dissertation interrogates how individuals and groups seeking to use 
ARTs (or born of them) emerged as policy subjects, that is, as reproductive citizens included or 
excluded in the relevant policy debates. The policy process leading to the AHRA provides a 
particularly useful case for interrogating the intersections of reproduction and a neoliberal 
citizenship regime, as it addresses not only who was seen as a legitimate reproductive citizen but 
also, who could engage in claims-making, and whose interests were addressed in the legislation 
eventually passed.  
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Chapter Three: The Emergence of ARTs 
The historical evolution of reproductive citizenship—particularly from the collective 
entitlements and protections of the welfare state to the individualizing self-reliant experiences 
following the neoliberal turn—has been replicated in the ways that assisted reproduction in 
Canada has been debated and governed. The history of public policy on assisted reproduction in 
Canada demonstrates how the governance of motherhood and parenthood remain subject to state 
intervention, increasingly through neoliberal practices presented under the auspices of the public 
good and the protection of women’s interests. The ascendency of a neoliberal politics 
emphasizing personal choice and individualism in reproduction has always already been 
reflected in the development of public policy on ARTs, beginning in the late 1980s with the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies.   
Drawing on early scholarship on ARTs (focusing on feminist analyses and the social 
policy literature), as well as primary documents and interview research, this chapter examines 
the work of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies and the context in which 
it emerged. It argues that the work of the Royal Commission had three significant consequences 
for the governance of (assisted) reproduction and the reproductive citizenship of Canadians. 
First, the Royal Commission’s work advanced the adoption of a biomedical framework that 
privileged the understanding that infertility is a disease for which ARTs are the best “cure” or at 
the very least, treatment. Reproductive technologies were thus framed primarily as a privately 
experienced matter of medicine rather than a matter of public health policy. Second, and 
relatedly, the Royal Commission’s emphasis on biomedicine worked to favour financially 
privileged, heterosexual couples as parents deserving of care, that is, as the ideal parent-citizens 
in a neoliberal citizenship regime. Third, the Royal Commission and particularly its public 
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consultations influenced the emergence of an “infertility community” to be included in 
subsequent processes of policy development. These actors, whose interests would be differently 
included and excluded in future attempts to make policy in this field, were first recognized as 
groups with a stake in the regulation of assisted reproduction at the time of the Royal 
Commission.  
Overall, the chapter demonstrates that the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies set the framework for future policy interventions, identifying not only the 
privileged position of biomedical interventions, but also whose interests amongst those using 
reproductive technologies would be recognized as important in future legislation. In so doing, the 
Royal Commission came to recognize certain groups as legitimate and illegitimate users of 
ARTs—(assisted) reproductive citizens—tied closely to each groups’ position vis-à-vis 
biomedicine, individual choice, and the continued non-regulation of the market in infertility. The 
Royal Commission thus identified who counts as a reproductive citizen in terms of the ongoing 
authority of biomedical actors, couched in the language of individual choice, with small 
concessions made to address concerns about collective interests and commercialization. 
 
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies  
Although the first live birth of a child conceived in vitro occurred in 1978, it was not until the 
mid-1980s that high-profile legal cases that involved surrogacy and semen donation were 
heard,157 or that many new reproductive technologies were available in Canada. As more and 
more families were using reproductive technologies, they struggled with how to address the use 
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of the technologies for their families and in their lives, and the socio-legal implications of using 
ARTs became increasingly apparent.  
 The rallying cries for government study and intervention into the use of ARTs in Canada 
were voiced by a national coalition of feminists led by Dr. Margrit Eichler, a professor at the 
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, and Maureen McTeer, a prominent feminist lawyer 
(and wife of former Prime Minister Joe Clark). Eichler and McTeer, as well as activists, students 
and others, worked to form the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies to call for an inquiry into the implications of ARTs, for women, for 
the resulting children, and for society. Informed by the successes of the Royal Commission on 
the Status of Women, a Royal Commission was seen as a means to raise “awareness and 
consciousness nationally about women’s issues.”158 Led by Eichler, the Coalition engaged in 
extensive lobbying, letter writing, and collaboration with various women’s groups throughout the 
late 1980s, to significant effect. In a news article about a 1987 symposium held by the Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Eichler was quoted as saying that, “if we fail to act 
we may find ourselves in a nightmare society in which women of color become breeders and 
money determines who can and cannot give up their children,” making clear her position that the 
implications of reproductive technologies for Canadians could be dire.159  
The work of the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies was important for two key reasons. First, the Coalition’s advocacy for a Royal 
Commission was an intervention intended to assert women’s control over their bodies and to do 
so in public policy. Policy on ARTs was seen as a means to address women’s health and contest 
the medicalization of reproduction, as part of a broader legislative and regulatory vacuum on 
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reproduction and reproductive autonomy coming out of R. v Morgenataler.160 Second, the 
Coalition worked to identify reproductive technologies as a matter of collective moral concern 
not only for women, but also for society writ large. Informed by the Coalition’s fact sheets161 and 
media releases, the Royal Commission once called, would be framed by the federal government 
and the press as an important social issue that required government intervention to protect the 
public from little-understood but potentially dangerous technologies. Although the debate would 
later shift, the idea that families should have access to reproductive technologies in order to build 
their families, and that there was an implicit right to access ARTs in order to have one’s children 
were largely absent from the initial debate. The implications of these technologies for individuals 
were seen to be of minimal importance relative to the broader moral, ethical, social, and legal 
implications. Describing ARTs as a matter of women’s health and reproduction embedded in 
broader moral concerns about the future of Canadian society allowed for the Coalition to call for 
the study of assisted human reproduction as a widely-felt ethical issue of particular concern for 
women. 
On April 3, 1989, the Mulroney government announced in its Speech from the Throne 
that it would be calling a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (herein, “the 
Commission”) as a means to address concerns that “medical and biological science” would 
“outpace our ability to deal with their moral, ethical, legal, and social implications.”162 In the 
midst of questions about how the federal government would deal with the Morgentaler decision, 
it was clear that the calling of the Commission was a means to both diffuse the pressure of 
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activist groups, and to delay addressing reproductive rights until some sort of “appropriate course 
of action” could be found.163 The Order-in-Council establishing the Commission’s mandate came 
in October 1989,164 and the Commission was, at that time, officially charged with inquiring “into 
and report[ing] on current and potential medical and scientific developments related to new 
reproductive technologies, considering in particular their social, ethical, health, research, legal, 
and economic implications and the public interest, recommending what policies and safeguards 
should be applied.”165 The wide range of its mandate meant that the Commission would not just 
focus on reproductive technologies themselves but rather, on a broader range of related issues 
including the causes of infertility and the general reproductive health of Canadians. Further, 
while not exactly reproductive technologies, the use of reproductive tissues for research also fell 
to the Commission’s purview, and the Commission was effectively charged with identifying 
acceptable research standards for embryonic and fetal tissues. In addition to Patricia Baird (Chair 
of the Commission and a medical geneticist), six commissioners were appointed representing a 
variety of backgrounds including medicine, theology, feminist sociology, and law, bringing a 
wide range of perspectives to the work that the Commission was set to undertake.  
After the appointment of the commissioners, public hearings were set up for the 
following year, and slowly, the Commission began its work.166 It divided its efforts into two 
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streams, public consultations and a research programme, culminating in the publication of a final 
report. Over the course of its mandate, commissioners would hear from over 40,000 Canadians 
(a number repeated in nearly all accounts of the Commission’s work) by means of public 
hearings across the country, polls, written submissions, calls to a dedicated hotline, and informal 
consultations with key stakeholders.167 The Royal Commission paid special attention to those 
who had experiences with reproductive technologies, conducting private “armchair” sessions 
with five hundred “individuals or couples who had personal experiences with one or more of the 
new reproductive technologies.”168 Although it is unclear to what extent the consultations 
informed the Commission report, the Commission is notable for the extensive and far-reaching 
nature of its public deliberation process. Further, the Commission would eventually produce 
fifteen volumes of research on an array of topics related to reproductive technologies, including 
novel research on the use of ARTs in Canada at the time.  
 The Commission is perhaps best known for the controversy that marred its tenure. The 
Commission had problems from the beginning: from the appointment of the Chair, to the 
discontent of commissioners with her perceived unilateral and non-transparent decision-making. 
In “Frankenstein Meets Kafka: The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies,”169 
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Margrit Eichler paints a disturbing picture of a Commission hampered by an atmosphere of 
mistrust. She describes the inner workings of the Commission as secretive, and the work of the 
Commissioners paralyzed by a Chair who hindered their participation.170 In an unprecedented 
move, four commissioners were fired, including Maureen McTeer, who had been an important 
part of the lobbying for the Commission in the first place. The dismissal of those commissioners 
seen to espouse a feminist perspective, as well as problems with the transparency of its research 
programme, led to widespread critique of the Commission by feminist groups, by the Social 
Science Federation of Canada,171 and by the press.172 The Commission’s authority was 
challenged and the scandal “made it necessary for Dr. Baird to appease, or to be seen to appease 
feminist public opinion” in order to retain any legitimacy.173  
 The much-anticipated report of the Commission was released to the public on November 
30, 1993. The report, entitled Proceed with Care, is a substantial document that identifies an 
“urgent need for boundaries to regulate unethical uses” of assisted reproductive technologies to 
protect the public interest.174 The report is divided into three main parts. The first part is an 
examination of the relationship between new reproductive technologies and Canadian society, 
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which effectively outlines the Commission’s guiding principles (including a balance of 
individual and collective interests), its use of evidence-based medicine as a research approach, 
and the validity of federal interventions in the field. The second section represents the most 
significant part of the report and defines how infertility is experienced, prevented and treated, 
with additional chapters on sex selection, gene therapy and genetic alteration, judicial 
intervention in pregnancy and birth, and uses of fetal tissue. The third section provides an 
overview of the Commission’s two hundred and ninety-three recommendations, directed to a 
wide variety of actors, amongst them provincial governments, health care professionals, 
employers, and school boards. The most substantive recommendations are those made to the 
federal government, which propose a framework for sweeping federal legislation that would use 
criminal law to prohibit certain practices and establish a regulatory agency to develop guidelines 
and implement regulations to govern ARTs on an ongoing basis. The focus of the Commission’s 
recommendations in Proceed with Care are the legislative and regulatory recommendations 
made to the federal government that seek to criminalize the most reprehensible technologies and 
regulate others through a National Commission in the vein of the CRTC (Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission). These recommendations would form the basis 
of proposed legislation and, as will be explored over the course of this dissertation, what would 
eventually become the AHRA.  
  
Biomedicine as the Commission’s Dominant Frame 
What emerges from a review of the Royal Commission’s recommendations is an overemphasis 
on medical and scientific understandings of ARTs. The Royal Commission was mandated to 
study the broadly conceived implications of reproductive technologies, but there was a clear 
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prioritization of perspectives that viewed ARTs predominantly as a matter of medicine and 
science, as opposed to a legal, social, or moral issue. The appointment of epidemiologist Patricia 
Baird as the Chair of the Commission was a harbinger of this approach, confirmed in the 
Commission’s research programme, the hiring of staff, public consultations, and most clearly in 
its final report. There is a substantial literature documenting the various ways that the biomedical 
focus of the Commission was manifest, tracing its public consultation process, research 
programme, and report.175 The biomedical bias was not sweeping, and there were important ways 
that the Commission addressed feminist concerns, including the commercialization of 
reproduction. However, the biomedical perspective would render sociological, ethical, and legal 
analyses of reproductive technologies peripheral to the Commission’s analysis, and would 
identify ARTs as, above all, a potential treatment for infertility rather than as a matter of ethics, 
and of public health. In so doing, the Royal Commission emphasized medicine and science as the 
most important elements of ARTs and the use of ARTs as an individually experienced medical 
matter.  
It was in the early stages of the Commission that an emphasis on biomedical approaches 
to studying ARTs began to emerge. In addition to Baird’s appointment, at the so-called search 
conference in Wolfville, Nova Scotia (intended to provide a forum for commissioners to sort out 
how to fulfill the Commission’s wide-ranging mandate), attendees with medical and scientific 
backgrounds or with an economic interest in the use of infertility treatments were 
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overrepresented176 and the workshops within the conference focused on medical and scientific 
approaches to the exclusion of other relevant perspectives. As noted by Scala, the failure to 
adequately consider perspectives outside of medical and scientific discourse was seen by some 
commissioners, conference participants, and researchers to be, at this early stage, edging out the 
possibility for women’s health, disability, and religious perspectives to be substantively 
represented in the Commission’s work.177 
 The indication of biomedical bias evident at the search conference would become 
apparent in at least four aspects of the Commission. First, its research program was divided into 
four working groups, each reflecting a specific area of medical or scientific interest: infertility, 
assisted human reproduction, prenatal diagnosis and genetics, and fetal tissue and embryo 
research.178 Changing notions of kinship, and the social role of donors and surrogates in new 
reproductive technologies were not, for example, seen as critical components of the 
Commission’s research. Instead, relevant concerns “were dispersed among the four research 
areas.”179 The Commission did conduct research on such matters (for example, there was 
research on the social construction of infertility in the “infertility” group), however this research 
was organized around biomedical concepts rather than sociological ones, minimizing the 
attention paid to what had been conceptualized by feminist actors as the key concerns of a 
potential Commission. The framing of the research programme along biomedical lines also led to 
a predominance of certain kinds of researchers among those commissioned to do studies or hired 
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to research work.180 While there might have been an interdisciplinary approach to the research 
amongst the scholars, the commitment to a medical-scientific approach to the Commission’s 
work hindered potential for more nuanced and socio-ethically interested analysis. 
Secondly, the research process (and the Commission report) was deeply embedded in 
principles of evidence-based medicine, which limited the attention given to qualitative, 
sociological, political, feminist, legal, philosophical, and historical approaches to the study of 
new reproductive technologies .181 Evidence-based medicine was defined in the Commission 
report as “medical practice and management of the health care system based on knowledge 
gained from appropriate evaluation of treatments and their results” and was used to try to provide 
a seemingly objective approach to reproductive technologies “based on data and assessment.”182 
While evidence-based medicine can be important in the application of clinical evidence in 
decision-making related to the course of treatment for individual patients, the appeal to evidence-
based medicine in the case of the Royal Commission worked to displace the legitimacy of those 
who were using non-scientific evidence and approaches.183 As noted by Scala, at the time of the 
Commission, evidence-based medicine was increasingly being used as a tool for policymaking in 
health care, particularly as it could be used to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of treatments. 
Operating at a time when health care costs were increasingly falling to provincial governments, 
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the Royal Commission took evidence-based medicine as a frame of analysis that could identify 
“the most effective use of finite resources” for reproductive technologies.184  
  Third, the privileging of a biomedical frame of analysis would become apparent in the 
Commission’s consultation process. Unlike other Royal Commissions (e.g., the Berger 
Commission and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples) that provided funding to 
interveners, the Commission did not provide such funding, which might have “levelled the 
playing field” among potential participants to a certain extent.185 While certain large professional 
organizations had the capacity to conduct research on ARTs anticipating the call for the 
Commission, smaller, non-professional groups had no such capacity. Consequently small, non-
professional, non-expert organizations that might have been interested in participating in the 
Commission’s public hearings or in submitting briefs did not necessarily have the resources, 
expertise, or time to dedicate to participating.186 In contrast, well-funded organizations within the 
“medical and research communities, the pharmaceutical industry, and the legal profession”187 
were at a significant advantage. Organizations like the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists of Canada, the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian Fertility and 
Andrology Society, and the Canadian College of Medical Geneticists as well as pharmaceutical 
companies, worked to make their voices heard in the public participation process, providing 
briefs, giving testimony in public hearings, and engaging in private sessions with 
commissioners.188          
 Finally, the biomedical approach of the Royal Commission was evident in the framing of 
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its report, Proceed with Care. Despite its use of a framework that drew on “secular mainstream 
ethics, feminist theory, and religious thinking,”189 Proceed with Care was largely about 
infertility and its potential remedies. Seventeen of the report’s thirty-one chapters were dedicated 
to either the discussion of the causes of infertility and subfertility or otherwise to addressing 
circumvention of infertility through reproductive technologies and adoption.190 
Recommendations about the use of reproductive technologies to address infertility combined the 
idea of reproductive technologies as a necessary medico-scientific approach to reproduction with 
evidence-based medicine. Here, the Commission implicitly suggested that the use of ARTs to 
treat infertility was a desirable course of action for individuals, particularly when justified by the 
balance between scientific data about the efficacy of certain technologies and a cost-benefit 
analysis. This was evident, for example, in the Commission’s near-outright dismissal of adoption 
as a “feasible alternative” to infertile Canadians.191 
The biomedical frame of the Commission report is perhaps most apparent in its 
recommendation to provincial health care programs to limit public funding for IVF except in 
cases of bilateral fallopian tube blockage. This recommendation asserted that the limited state of 
evidence made it an “experimental” procedure, moving it out of the publicly funded health care 
system and into the private sector. The Commission made this recommendation on the basis that 
IVF had been proven effective only in cases of complete fallopian tube blockage, suggesting that 
future research be conducted for other indications. The reason given by the Commission was that 
using IVF for indications that were not proven to be effective “amount[ed] to experimentation on 
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women’s bodies without their informed consent.”192 The Royal Commission thus recommended 
that provincial health insurance plans terminate funding for all uses of IVF other than for cases 
where the patient presented with bilateral fallopian tube blockage (although Ontario was the only 
province funding IVF at the time). All other uses of IVF would have to be made available 
outside of the provincially funded health care system, largely within private clinics where 
patients would be responsible for paying for their own care.  
This recommendation was particularly important given that the Commission recognized 
the widespread use of IVF for indications other than blocked fallopian tubes. Proceed with Care 
explicitly noted that between 1987 and 1991, “just under 45 percent of the IVF services provided 
were for indications other than tubal blockages,”193 providing evidence that women were seeking 
out and receiving IVF for a variety of reasons other than tubal blockage. By the time Proceed 
with Care was published, IVF had been available as a publicly funded service in Ontario since 
1985. Women in Ontario had come to expect funded IVF for treatment of endometriosis, single-
blocked fallopian tubes, male-factor infertility, amongst other reasons, and the Commission’s 
suggested restrictions on IVF were seen as an impediment to what had, for nearly a decade, been 
seen as a matter of medical necessity under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan.194 This 
stratification of diagnoses meant that patients with one diagnosis became the legitimate, state-
funded recipients of IVF while others would have to pay for treatments themselves or do 
without.195 For those patients who sought out IVF without state funding, the prohibitive costs of 
the procedure, and related medications, were identified as leading patients to make riskier 
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choices such as what procedures and drugs to use, and how many embryos to implant to ensure 
cost-effective success.196 Given the percentage of IVF patients who did not have tubal blockages, 
people were not likely to stop using IVF as a means of conception, but rather, they were more 
likely to mitigate the costs through cheaper, more experimental uses of ARTs.197 While the 
Commission’s recommendation to limit IVF funding was justified as, first and foremost, a matter 
of public health grounded in evidence-based medicine, and second, as a cost-saving measure, it 
is unclear that the public health outcomes were more significant than the cost-savings. This is not 
to say that public funding of IVF should occur, but rather that the reasoning of the 
Commission—that funding for IVF should be restricted to protect women from experimental 
uses of the procedure—was an application of evidence-based medicine in the name of public 
health that may, in fact, have put women at greater risk of engaging in experimental uses of 
ARTs. The claim that restricting funding would result in safer, more effective uses of IVF is a 
vacuous one when seemingly less effective, unsafe practices continued to be available outside of 
the public system.  
In short, in centering the study of assisted reproduction around the treatment and 
prevention of infertility, reproductive technologies were implicitly reduced to seemingly 
ethically neutral medical treatments. Again, it is important to note that the Commission was not 
exclusively biomedical in its analysis as Proceed with Care did pay attention to issues of family 
and gender and legalities surrounding ARTs, but in its focus on medical understandings of 
infertility, the biomedical frame and the individual experience of infertility were reified. 
Consequently, the overall effect of the Commission’s biomedical approach is the subtle 
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individualization of reproductive technologies initially described in the work of Margrit Eichler 
and Maureen McTeer’s feminist coalition as a broader social issue. Whereas those originally 
calling for a Royal Commission attempted to challenge the ongoing and increasing 
medicalization of reproduction and to approach ARTs as a broadly conceived moral and social 
issue, the Commission’s work did little to unseat the biomedical orthodoxy in the field. In-vitro 
fertilization, artificial insemination, gamete donation and other reproductive technologies were 
constructed as, above all, medical concerns, in the Commission’s work. The consequence was a 
validation of the biomedical expertise of doctors, of clinics, and of biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical firms to the detriment of other kinds of knowing, and the affirmation of 
biomedical authorities, in conjunction with government, as the legitimate gatekeepers of 
reproductive technologies.  
Furthermore, the biomedical framework worked to individualize ARTs through its 
advancement of liberal, individual rights discourse and the expansion of reproductive choice. 
Francesca Scala has suggested that the failure of the Royal Commission to understand ARTs as a 
broader social concern is attributable not only to the advancement of a biomedical frame, but 
also, the application of the biomedical model in conjunction with individual rights discourse that 
had been a rallying cry of the abortion rights movement. She finds that while the Commission 
was poised to identify ARTs as an important socio-ethical issue, the Commission’s “formative 
decisions” and its emphasis on individual autonomy resulted in recommendations that put ARTs 
squarely within the domain of biomedicine.198 This model of individual interests within a 
biomedical framework is particularly clear in the Commission’s overview of recommendations 
which begins with the statement that: “as a society we need to create a situation such that 
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individual Canadians can make decisions about their involvement with new reproductive 
technologies in the knowledge that their ethical, legal, and social aspects and their safety and 
effectiveness have been given due consideration.”199 Here, socio-ethical concerns serve as the 
bounds of assisted reproduction, that is, a means to facilitate individual choice. To this end, the 
Commission asserted that if reproductive technologies are evidence-based, ethically neutral 
elements of medicine and science, then there is no reason to restrict women’s access to choice, 
and instead, ARTs should only be restricted within the limits of cost-effectiveness and the 
relative-safety of procedures determined through evidence-based medicine.200  
The biomedical and evidence-based approach to governing ARTs not only propagated a 
model of liberal choice, but with it, a neoliberal model of reproductive citizenship. The 
individual choices made possible by access to ARTs were made broader by recommendations for 
shrinking state support. Although IVF was deemed experimental, untested, and unproven for 
most medical indications, rather than promote further investigation or cautious use of the 
technology, IVF was moved outside of the publicly funded health care system in the name of 
“evidence” where regulation would remain largely outside of governmental purview. The risks 
of engaging in IVF, financial, medical, or otherwise, were shifted to the patient-consumer, self-
reliant and responsible for their own health and that of their offspring.  
The biomedical approach would come to shape official discourse on ARTs when (as 
described in the next chapter of this dissertation) the federal government would make an official 
response to the Commission, and the broad, social understanding of ARTs that it hoped to 
espouse would be eroded more and more as a valid approach to studying and governing ARTs. 
From a biomedical perspective, ARTs are a matter of infertility and its treatments, and primarily 
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a matter of individual health and well-being. Although Royal Commissions are not institutions 
tasked with policy design and do not necessarily represent the interests of the federal 
government, they may provide government with direction in a policy area, and this was certainly 
the case for the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. The Commission would 
have a substantive legacy, as its recommendations would provide the framework for future 
legislation, and the privileging of a biomedical model and liberal individual rights discourse 
would be an important part of legislation-to-come. 
 
Biomedicine, Exclusion, and the Ideal (Assisted) Reproductive Citizen   
The Royal Commission’s focus on infertility, its prevention, medical indications, and treatments 
worked to advance the position that the subjects or primary users of ARTs are infertile or likely 
to be infertile heterosexual couples, looking either for a means to build their family or to prevent 
reduced fertility. The treatment of infertility, which had slowly and steadily become the domain 
of obstetricians, gynaecologists and reproductive endocrinologists, expanded more rapidly than 
ever before, and the shift of infertility from the bedroom to the doctors’ office meant that 
infertile people became patients with infertility, an understanding of infertility that was explicitly 
embraced by the Commission, and many of those who testified before it.  
As noted above, the Commission’s early consultations were focused not only on 
strategizing how best to achieve the Commission’s mandate, but also identifying key actors and 
interested parties. Due to the work of the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, feminists were amongst those most clearly in need of consultation, 
as were physician groups, legal experts, and scientists, all of whom were well-represented in the 
early consultations and discussions. However, LGBTQ Canadians, gamete donors, and 
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surrogates—groups with explicit and direct interests in the governance of ARTs—were not 
particularly evident in the work of the Commission. Its consultations, research, and 
recommendations demonstrate a significant lack of attention paid to the needs of these groups, 
particularly for gamete donors and surrogates whose interests had until that point (and since) 
rarely been mobilized. Despite its efforts, the Commission’s framing of reproductive 
technologies as a matter of infertility that emerged from its biomedical approach, failed to 
adequately consider changing norms of kinship, including the concerns of lesbians, single 
women, and those families that differ from the two-parent, heterosexual, nuclear family.  
 
LGBTQ People 
The Royal Commission at once recognized and marginalized the interests of LGBTQ people. In 
the early chapters of Proceed with Care, the use of reproductive technologies was portrayed as a 
heterosexual pursuit that is extended to lesbians and single women. By focusing on infertility as 
the primary reason to use reproductive technologies, lesbians and gay men were imagined out of 
the Royal Commission’s conceptual frame, only to be added on as an equality concern. From this 
view, infertility was defined in terms of failure to conceive through heterosexual intercourse after 
a period of two years, and the potential medical conditions associated with “the man” and “the 
woman” were discussed in turn. However, the Commission then acknowledged the exclusionary 
nature of this definition, and articulated that ARTs were also a concern of lesbians and single 
women. Indeed, Proceed with Care included descriptions of the practice of donor insemination, 
including some discussion of self-insemination (donor insemination outside of a medical setting, 
without medical intervention),201 recommending that “self-insemination [be] available as a safe 
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effective, and low-cost alternative to DI [donor insemination] carried out in a medical setting.”202 
For lesbian intended mothers, for whom there was already a long history of self-insemination, it 
was important that the Commission enable the continuation of at-home self-insemination and not 
medicalize the experience of conception. Furthermore, the Commission recommended changes 
to family law to protect families (specifically those including lesbian couples) from future claims 
of parentage by donors.203 The Commission report also included a discussion of sexual 
orientation and different family forms,204 insofar as the Commission recognized the 
discriminatory nature of certain fertility clinics’ refusal to provide services to lesbians and single 
women. As such, the Commission was fairly progressive for its time in recognizing the needs of 
lesbians vis-à-vis assisted reproduction, despite its privileging of ARTs as a heterosexual 
concern.  
For the most part, however, LGBTQ citizens were not well-represented in the 
consultations of the Royal Commission, or its research programme. EGALE (a national LGBTQ 
equality-seeking organization) did participate in one public hearing, and noted the importance of 
access to ARTs to enable LGBTQ people to build their families. However, the testimony also 
noted that EGALE had neither the time nor the inclination to participate actively in the debate on 
ARTs given its more pressing concerns about relationship recognition.205 Another organization, 
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the Halifax Lesbian Committee on New Reproductive Technologies, participated in the 
Commission’s public hearings in Halifax in October 1990; however they were not invited back 
to a private Commission session with “Community Leaders and Organizations” in June 1991, 
unlike the Women’s Health Education network, the Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status 
of Women, the Atlantic Research Centre for Mental Retardation, and the Metro Area Family 
Planning Association, groups that has also testified at the public hearings in Halifax.206  
No matter the cause, the relative absence of varied LGBTQ advocacy in the Commission 
hearings may have had the consequence of limiting the ways that LGBTQ people were included 
in the Commission’s work and future legislation that took Proceed with Care’s recommendations 
as a starting point. Self-insemination and the protection of woman-led families was a notable 
concern of the Commission, more as a matter of non-discrimination than as a means to enable 
access. At the time of the Commission, the equality struggles of LGBTQ people in Canada using 
the equality provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were just beginning, and 
while attention was being paid to the elimination of discriminatory practices, less attention was 
given to expanding notions of the family and parenthood to challenge longstanding 
heteronormativity. To this end, addressing access to donor conception meant that the 
Commission recognized that lesbian intended parents should not be discriminated against, but 
again, through the advancement of the biomedical model of infertility, the Commission quietly 
affirmed and reaffirmed that the deserving, legitimate (and potentially state-funded) users of 
ARTs are heterosexual married couples with a medical history of infertility. Furthermore, the 
Commission did not consider the potential of surrogacy and gamete donation to enable gay men 
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to conceive biologically related children, nor did it discuss the importance of relationship 
recognition to recognize LGBTQ families within the context of Canadian law. While this is, in 
part, attributable to the articulation of the interests of lesbian mothers (and the non-articulation of 
other relevant LGBTQ issues), it remains that the medicalized framing of ARTs precluded 
broader social understandings of involuntary childlessness that would have better included 
LGBTQ Canadians. 
 
Egg Donors and Surrogates 
Following Thelma McCormack, the emphasis on the heterosexual couple or the nuclear family 
renders the third-party often involved in the use of reproductive technologies to the status of a 
non-person.207 In the case of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, this 
was certainly true. While gamete donors were explicitly identified in the Commission’s mandate 
and Proceed with Care examined the contributions of donors and surrogates, their interests were 
not taken seriously in the public consultations. Only one anonymous donor was included in any 
of the public or private hearings of the Commission. The Commission thus assumed knowledge 
of donors concerns based on perceived social, ethical, and legal challenges, but with the 
exception of some research conducted on donor insemination and the one donor who testified 
before the Commission, donors’ voices simply were not heard. This absence is in part 
attributable to the “clandestine” and commercial nature of gamete donation at the time of the 
Commission,208 but nevertheless, donors were largely described in the Commission report as 
disembodied providers of reproductive material, and as objects, rather than subjects actively 
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involved in the use of reproductive technologies.  
 As to sperm donation, the only consideration given in Proceed with Care is about the 
need to limit compensation, and to protect the privacy of donors in the procurement and use of 
their donation. There was one recommendation suggesting that law be made to “ensure that the 
donor’s rights and responsibilities of parenthood are severed by the act of sperm donation” 
although this was seemingly included in order to protect the families of donor-conceived people, 
rather than the donors themselves. Again, only one donor was ever consulted in the 
Commission’s work, and his engagement was largely with a group representing donor-conceived 
people and their families. Heard with testimony on the challenge of knowing one’s origins, and 
the need for legal protection for donor-conceived families, concerns about how donation might 
change the donor’s own family life come across in the report as relatively minor.209 Proceed with 
Care paid slightly more attention to egg donation likely due to the invasive nature and significant 
physiological consequences of egg donation relative to sperm donation. As noted in chapter two, 
the differences between sperm and egg donation are extensive, and the risks and potential side 
effects of egg donation are exceptional particularly in comparison to sperm donation. The 
Commission also included a short section on “donors” in its chapter on the use of eggs and 
embryos, suggesting that counselling for donors might be useful. 
Overall, the Commission took a very strong position on egg donation, expressing concern 
about the health risks that donors face, as well as the potential commodification of human life 
that might come with any commercial trade in gametes. Proceed with Care discussed the 
potential health risks associated with egg donation, and suggested that ovarian stimulation and 
egg retrieval should not be performed on otherwise healthy women, unless the woman in 
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question is already undergoing medical treatment that might harm her fertility (i.e., 
chemotherapy). The report also examined the potential commercialization of egg donation, 
asserting that while egg donation is problematic due to the potential risks to women’s health, the 
practice is even more problematic when payment is involved, recommending that commercial 
gamete donation be prohibited by law.210  
Although Proceed with Care included an examination of the health effects of egg 
donation and the potential economic exploitation of different circumstances for donation, the 
Commission’s examination of egg donors focused largely on egg sharing. Egg sharing occurs 
when a woman undergoing IVF treatment including egg retrieval donates her “surplus” eggs to 
another infertility patient. In this case, where the donor is herself a patient, the experiences of the 
theoretical donor are seen as nuanced and complex, involving a number of relevant concerns 
(i.e., potential for coercion, psychological distress, the nature of informed consent) supported by 
relevant research. The agency of the donor-patient was recognized, and their informed consent 
was prioritized. This stands in stark contrast to the Commission’s limited discussion of other egg 
donors, not otherwise undergoing a medical procedure, who were assumed to be at significant 
physiological risk and without the capacity for informed consent because the risks they might 
face in donation were too great for anyone to be able to consent. Due to egg donation’s 
“attendant risks, on an otherwise healthy woman for the benefit of someone else, particularly in 
the absence of information about the long-term effects of these procedure” the Commission 
proposed a ban on altruistic as well as commercial egg donation. This is particularly notable 
given that there is no research on egg donation cited or conducted by the Commission, and no 
consultations with egg donors themselves. This is not to say that egg donation is a safe 
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procedure, but rather that the needs and interests of donors qua donors were not given the same 
consideration as infertility patients engaging in egg sharing.  
 The interests of surrogates, like those of egg donors, were largely presumed by the Royal 
Commission, and recommendations were made that aligned with the positions of certain feminist 
actors and religious groups opposed to reproductive technologies with limited consideration of 
the position of surrogates themselves. Surrogacy was of particular interest to the feminists who 
had called for the Commission. The case of Baby M. in the United States had caught the public 
imagination and interest had grown around the socio-legal implications of “contract 
motherhood.” The Commission funded two studies on surrogacy including one bibliography and 
another “legal and ethical analysis,” dedicating a chapter of its final report to the issue. In this 
chapter, the Commission recommended that surrogacy arrangements should be unenforceable, 
that commercial surrogacy be illegal, and that non-commercial surrogacy be prevented through 
sanctions against medical practitioners, brokers, and others. In short, the Commission 
condemned surrogacy (and especially commercial surrogacy) for a number of reasons including 
the potential for exploitation in such arrangements, the possibility for the commodification of 
children and reproduction, and assumed psychosocial consequences for surrogates.  
The Commission’s arguments about exploitation in surrogacy arrangements—its 
reasoning—were presented as a matter of fact, despite the existence of “little empirical research 
on preconception arrangements in Canada and elsewhere.”211 Where evidence did exist, the 
Commission report noted that what research did exist at the time was of “limited reliability.”212 
Rather than funding its own empirical study, the Commission largely relied on a 1985 study of 
approximately 118 cases of preconception arrangements that in some way involved Canadians. 
                                                   
211 Ibid., 664. 
212 Ibid., 672. 
!! ! !
95 
Perhaps the most significant finding of this research (which was conducted for the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada by Margrit Eichler and graduate student Phebe Poole) was that there 
were significant disparities in the socio-economic circumstances of surrogates and intended 
parents.213 Taken together with anecdotal evidence heard by the Royal Commission, this study 
was taken to be an indication of commercialization and exploitation in surrogacy 
arrangements,214 even though no reports of exploitation or coercion were made in Eichler and 
Poole’s work, and the one surrogate who participated in the Commission’s “armchair” sessions 
spoke positively of her experience. In fact, she chose to participate in the session in order to 
“encourage that pre-conception arrangements be legalized in Canada and to dispel the myths 
about women who choose this arrangement.” 215 In a Commission seemingly dedicated to 
evidence-based research, Proceed with Care’s unsupported claims about surrogacy appear 
particularly problematic, and suggest that the evidence-based framework of the Commission was 
very selectively applied.  
  In addition to a lack of research, the Royal Commission did not adequately consult with 
surrogates themselves. Rather than use the narratives of surrogates to describe potential 
exploitation and negative psychosocial consequences of surrogacy arrangements, Proceed with 
Care’s chapter on surrogacy contained a number of quotations from feminist organizations 
opposed to surrogacy, including the Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women 
(twice), the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada, and 
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the Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, the Fédération des 
femmes du Québec, and the Canadian Federation of University Women (as well as the decidedly 
non-feminist Archdiocese of Vancouver). There was no representation of quotations from the 
surrogate who did participate in the hearings, or any substantiated claim about the experiences of 
surrogates. Like gamete donors, there was no mobilization of surrogates at this time, but 
regardless surrogates were taken by the Commission to be inherently exploited, non-consenting 
subjects of assisted reproductive technologies, rather than potential agents involved in making 
choices about their reproduction. The potential legitimacy of surrogacy arrangements was never 
really considered, and the Commission’s recommendations on this issue come across more as a 
concession to feminist stakeholders than a measured consideration of the interests of women, 
surrogates and people conceived using ARTs.  
 Additionally, when taken together with the Commission’s dismissal of adoption as a 
viable option for infertile Canadians, the recommendations against egg donation and surrogacy 
suggest a maternal bioessentialism in Proceed with Care. Whether or not the Commission was 
justified in its suggested restrictions on surrogacy and egg donation, if implemented, these 
recommendations would mean that women would (except in rare cases where donor eggs from 
infertility patients were available) have to reproduce using their own bodies, using their own 
eggs. Women would have to be the biological, gestational mothers to their own children, 
whenever possible, and given that adoption was seen as a highly unavailable option, maternity 
could only come to those able to carry or conceive using their own biological material (perhaps 
with donor sperm). The Commission did raise the possibility of embryo donation, but the 
Commission found that Canadian “IVF programs are not set up to deal with implications of 
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embryo donation.”216 IVF then, was presented as a treatment for infertility to the exclusion of 
other practices, propagating the understanding that involuntary childlessness was best “cured” 
through medical techniques that use one’s genetic material to create a child. In this way, the 
Commission advocated for people trying to have genetically-related children, validating genetic 
relationships as an important form of kinship, and the most desirable way to have a child.  
 The Commission’s recommendations about LGBTQ Canadians, surrogates, and donors 
demonstrate underlying concerns about reproductive technologies and the future of Canadian 
families. For LGBTQ people, donor insemination for lesbians was the only potential means of 
using ARTs theorized by the Commission (i.e., gay fatherhood was not imagined, nor did the 
Commission address the potential to open up adoption legislation to LGBTQ parents). The 
inclusion of lesbian mothers in the work of the Royal Commission is important, and marked 
burgeoning recognition of LGBTQ families, but in a way limited to reasons of non-
discrimination rather a need to reimagine the bounds of what constitutes family life. The 
Commission’s discouraging of surrogacy and egg donation can be thought of along the same 
lines, insofar as recognizing surrogates and donors as important subjects and actors in the use of 
reproductive technologies would challenge conventional understandings of what reproduction 
entails, and who is, and should be included in conceptions of the family. The failure to 
adequately engage with surrogates and donors in the Commission’s consultative work is 
indicative of a view that only those who are actively working to build their families are 
legitimate reproductive citizens worthy of consideration. 
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Inclusion and the Ideal (Assisted) Reproductive Citizen 
By the time the Royal Commission was announced, a small number of Canadians were already 
mobilizing around issues related to assisted reproduction, notably families who had conceived 
one or more children using donor sperm and those experiencing infertility. By the mid-1980s, 
these groups had already started to mobilize, and were consequently ready to make their cases to 
the Commission. These groups were well-reflected in the Commission’s work, including its 
consultations, research, and report. Unlike LGBTQ Canadians, surrogates, and gamete donors, 
infertile people and donor-conceived families benefited from the biomedical frame of the 
Commission and its understanding of reproductive technologies as neutral and necessary 
treatment for infertility. The biomedical understanding of ARTs meant that these groups were 
understood as the appropriate, deserving benefactors of assisted reproductive services. 
 
Infertile Canadians 
As noted above, infertile Canadians and infertility were well-represented in the work of the 
Commission. The focus on infertility and infertile families advanced by the Commission’s 
biomedical frame was also buttressed by the significant representation and organization of 
infertile Canadians themselves. When the Royal Commission was called, there were a few small 
groups doing advocacy work for infertile people, but they were rather limited in scope and 
number. One organization, the Infertility Awareness Association of Canada (IAAC), would come 
to represent the interests of infertile people for the Commission and, due to their articulation of 
their interests and their alignment with a number of medical associations, to validate the 
Commission’s biomedical frame. 
The organization that would come to be known as IAAC was founded as the Infertility 
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Self Help Support Group in Ottawa in 1983. Co-founded by three infertility patients, the 
Infertility Self Help Support Group held support group meetings in Planned Parenthood’s offices 
with the assistance of director Norman Barwin (a fertility specialist and then-President of 
Planned Parenthood Ottawa).217 In 1990, just as the Commission was beginning its work, the 
Infertility Self Help Support Group changed its name to the Infertility Awareness Association of 
Canada. The organization received a three-year $450,000 grant from Health Canada’s Health 
Promotion Directorate,218 and by the summer of 1990, it was expanding to include a number of 
other emerging support groups, to create a national newsletter, to create a help and information 
hotline, and to establish new branches. Until that point, the group had been focused almost 
exclusively on creating a network of support for infertile people, but it was poised to speak on 
behalf of infertile Canadians from coast-to-coast-to-coast when the well-timed injection of 
funding from the federal government increased its capacity to do so.  
IAAC was active in the public consultations and research of the Commission, with IAAC 
representative Nancy Jackson participating in both the public hearings of the Commission (as an 
individual) and in the Search Conference in Wolfville (as a representative of IAAC).219 
Furthermore, two representatives of IAAC, National Coordinators Trish Maynard and Paula 
Timmons were invited to participate in the one of the Commission’s research panels, and Dr. 
Barwin (although he testified in relation to his work with Planned Parenthood Canada) also 
spoke to the interests of infertile Canadians and engaged extensively with the Commission. Other 
representatives of infertile Canadians also participated in the Commission’s work, for example, 
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Jan Silverman (an infertility counsellor and founder of “Infertility – Facts and Feelings”) 
participated in the Commission’s Search Conference, and Diane Allen (who had just co-founded 
IAAC’s Toronto branch) testified at the Commission’s public hearings in Toronto. The Kingston 
Infertility Network also participated in the public hearings, and there were numerous written and 
oral submissions from people who had personally experienced infertility in some way.220  
 The infertility lobby was strong, because of its established support groups, its newfound 
organizational capacity, and its clear articulation of interest in expanding access to ARTs. IAAC 
board members and representatives not only spoke to the Commission, but also wrote letters to 
the editor in newspapers across the country,221 and released statements to ensure that the voices 
of IAAC’s membership were heard.222 Additionally, its links to Dr. Barwin (and through him, to 
a broader network of physicians) enabled IAAC to position itself alongside the Society of 
Gynaecologists and Obstetricians of Canada, the Canadian College of Medical Geneticists, and 
the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society, as experts ready to speak to the interests of 
infertile people. Indeed, IAAC’s response to Proceed with Care was made as a joint statement 
together with these medical professional associations, as if their interests were one and the 
same.223  
It is clear that IAAC quickly positioned itself as an authoritative national interest group 
speaking to the interests of infertile people, with the support of the doctors who could help them. 
This meant that while IAAC was (and continues to be) actively engaged in the day-to-day 
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management of infertility and its devastating consequences, at the same time, it did so with the 
understanding that infertility is a medical condition, that is, a disability best addressed through 
Canada’s health care system. The biomedical focus of the Commission was not, by any measure, 
IAAC’s doing, as the die for the biomedical approach of the Commission may have already been 
cast. At the same time, however, the prevalence of IAAC representatives at public hearings, and 
in the press meant a visibility of the very sympathetic position of Canadians suffering with 
infertility.  
 It is important to note, however, that the Royal Commission did not simply take up 
IAAC’s interests. In its initial response to the Royal Commission, IAAC, together with the 
Society of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians of Canada, the Canadian College of Medical 
Geneticists, and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society outlined support for the 
Commission’s work, but also concern about recommendations that might inhibit access to ARTs, 
including the elimination of public funding for IVF in all cases but bilateral fallopian tube 
blockage, and restrictions on access to donor gametes. The Commission’s attempts to balance 
individual autonomy with collective concerns meant that there were recommendations about 
tempering what was then unregulated access to reproductive technologies, and while IAAC 
supported some measure of regulation, the emphasis was on concerns about limiting the capacity 
of infertile Canadians to use ARTs to build their families.224 IAAC was interested in extending 
the language of reproductive choice used by the Commission even further than the Commission 
had taken it.  
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Donor-conceived Families                
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies took a special interest in donor 
conception, focusing a volume of research studies as well as a chapter on the issue. Donor-
conceived families, and more specifically, donor-conceived children were seen to need 
protection from the misuse of ARTs, and a number of recommendations were made to this end, 
including the recommendation for an entire subcommittee of the proposed National Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies to address issues of donor conception. Things did not start 
out this way, as according to Rona Achilles (who completed the first Canadian study on donor-
conceived families before the Commission began its work), “the Royal Commission did not get 
how important donor insemination was […]. IVF was nothing; really, really, small numbers and 
a really, really small success rate, whereas donor insemination was incredibly prevalent 
comparatively, and no one seemed to get that.”225 However, Achilles was hired by the 
Commission to conduct research for the Royal Commission and to facilitate a hearing, and 
subsequently the interest of the Commission in donor conception grew. 
 Throughout the Royal Commission’s work, Achilles would be a key figure articulating 
the needs of donor-conceived people, and coordinating dialogue between commissioners, 
Commission research staff, and donor-conceived people, the latter largely represented by the 
(now defunct) New Reproductive Alternatives Society. The New Reproductive Alternatives 
Society (NRAS) was established in 1987 after a frequent sperm donor and his wife attempted to 
get information about the children conceived via his sperm. With no real responses from the 
clinic, the donor contacted a lawyer in Vancouver. The lawyer put out a “Donor Insemination 
Alert”226 about potential legal action that eventually reached Shirley Pratten, a mother who had 
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conceived via donor insemination. Pratten and other parents, as well some sperm donors, 
contacted the Vancouver-based lawyer, who wrote to the clinic about their particular concerns, 
most notably a lack of communication on the part of the clinic. The parents of donor-conceived 
children were concerned that they would not be able to procure information about their donors 
for their children. Donors and their families were interested in keeping open lines of 
communication with the clinic to know how many children were conceived with their sperm, and 
in some cases, to update any changes to their health information.227 When the clinic failed to 
respond again, the lawyer held a press conference in Vancouver in 1987 calling “on the 
government and the medical profession to regulate” the practice of sperm donation.228 After the 
press conference, the lawyer proposed forming an organization in order to keep the momentum 
of the group going, and the NRAS was born. In addition to the immediate goals of pressing the 
clinic in question to communicated with donors and lobbying for regulation of donor 
insemination, the NRAS was imagined, according to Pratten, as a “vehicle to put forward the 
needs of the offspring, and what we as parents felt their needs were, and should be, and what 
should be protected around the records.”229 The newly founded NRAS held a small self-funded 
conference in Vancouver later in the year, and then quickly got to work on another.  
The first conference had attracted the attention of the Human Rights Law Section of the 
federal Department of Justice. The Department of Justice allocated $5000 to fund the second 
conference, expressing interest in the rights of donor-conceived people, particularly under the 
newly implemented equality rights section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
second conference was much bigger than the first, in part due to the funding from Justice, and 
                                                   
227 Interview with Shirley Pratten, March 13, 2012 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
!! ! !
104 
put the NRAS on the media and federal government radar as an important stakeholder in the 
emerging field of reproductive technologies. At the same time the NRAS was working as a 
support group for donor-conceived families, holding annual barbeques, and helping donor-
conceived children to meet one another. The experience of knowing other families who had been 
involved in donor conception and especially donor insemination was an important part of the 
group, especially to let the children know that there were other children born like they were.” As 
noted by Shirley Pratten, the group “was unique, and there wasn’t another one like it in Canada 
of its kind at that time.”230 
By the time that the Royal Commission was called, the NRAS had been around for two 
years, articulating its interests to the press, to the public, and to the Department of Justice. When 
the Royal Commission was called, and the search conference in Wolfville was held to identify 
areas of research, donor insemination was not immediately identified as a key element of its 
work. No representatives of the NRAS were invited to the search conference, nor was there 
significant representation from people who had used or had been conceived with donor gametes 
in the public hearings. Shirley Pratten testified to the Commission in Victoria on the last day of 
its public hearings, November 29, 1990. However, when the Royal Commission started its 
research work and hired Rona Achilles, there was new interest in donor conception, in part 
because of the findings of Achilles’ doctoral research. Achilles invited the New Reproductive 
Alternatives Society to participate in a “Commission Roundtable Discussion” with the 
commissioners. Shirley Pratten has stated about this roundtable discussion: “we got their 
attention.”231 Pratten and the NRAS were primarily concerned about the climate of secrecy 
around donor conception, a lack of record keeping on the part of clinics, and the inability of 
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children conceived this way to access any information about their genetic origins, including 
relevant medical information. Informed also by Achilles’ research, the Commission took up a 
number of these concerns, noting that secrecy should be discouraged, that detailed records 
should be kept, and that donor information should be available to donor-conceived people for 
medical reasons only. Quickly, the NRAS became a key stakeholder group, and Pratten their 
national spokesperson. 
The Commission then, was integral to the emergence of interest groups in this field. 
People who had long thought that they were alone in their experiences of infertility, or in the 
challenges that their donor-conceived family was facing, started to form support groups and 
interest groups to not only share their experiences, but also to express clear positions to the 
Royal Commission. Although some of these groups had formed before the Commission, the 
public hearings and other consultative endeavours gave impetus to infertile people and parents of 
donor-conceived children to clarify and make known their opinions on various aspects of 
reproductive technologies in Canada. The Commission offered opportunities for consultation that 
enabled the concretization of emergent interest group actors, and marked certain groups, such as 
the NRAS and IAAC as integral to policy formation. What this meant was recognition, almost an 
endorsement, of the positions that they had presented. The Royal Commission effectively 
recommended that the federal government take action, and their subject-position as important 
actors in the governance of ARTs was vindicated.  
 
Summary  
What emerges from the work of the Royal Commission, then, is the affirmation of ARTs as a 
matter of medicine and science, largely for the purposes of addressing the needs of infertile 
!! ! !
106 
people. Infertility in this framework, is a medical condition, experienced by heterosexual 
couples, to be treated through the use of reproductive technologies. This position, this biomedical 
model, allowed for the emergence of a then-new sort of biological-reproductive citizens, 
empowered to make claims about the regulation of reproductive technologies on the basis of a 
medicalized experience of infertility. In adopting a biomedical frame, the Commission was able 
to make relatively small commitments to addressing public health, while establishing that 
assisted reproductive technologies are primarily a remedy for infertile couples (and research 
activities a means to aid the same group). Using liberal rights discourse, and particularly a 
language of “choice” in reproduction, understandings of the collective interests of Canadians in 
the social, ethical, and legal implications of ARTs were made peripheral to medical and scientific 
perspectives that privileged the individual-as-patient over the social-collective. In doing so, the 
Commission shifted away from discursive understandings of reproductive technologies as an 
urgent social issue and worked to individualize ARTs. More clearly, the Commission’s 
biomedical framework made what might have been an issue of social policy, a privately 
experienced medical one. As explored in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, the validation 
of a biomedical and individualized approach to reproductive technologies enabled by the Royal 
Commission would lead to a policy framework in which individual citizens who are 
involuntarily childless are seen to be responsible for obtaining infertility treatment, either by 
acquiring a particular medical diagnosis or by financing their own treatment. The emphasis on 
individual access to infertility treatments in order for heterosexual couples to have genetically 
related children pointed to the ongoing social importance of biological ties, and relatedly, a 
minimization of alternative means of family building, like adoption.  
 The use of the biomedical model using evidence-based medicine, and its application to an 
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“ethics of care,” is another key element of the Commission’s legacy. Although the 
individualization and medicalization of assisted human reproduction evident in the 
Commission’s work is clear, it is important to note the Commission’s continual engagement with 
ethical arguments, and its attempts to protect the interests of Canadians, for example, through its 
recommendations about surrogacy and egg donation. The repeated articulation of the 
Commission’s intention to act in the public interest, while ultimately promoting an 
individualistic approach to citizens’ use of reproductive technologies, suggests that the 
Commission struggled with addressing vestiges of social welfare while upholding the role of 
private-for-profit clinics as the providers of health care services that the state was unwilling to 
provide. Cutbacks to the health care system, the use of experimental procedures on women’s 
bodies, and the expansion of commercial interests in the use of ARTs were simultaneously 
addressed through the application of evidence-based medicine in the name of the public interest.  
 The legacy of the Commission is also found in its identification of relevant stakeholders 
qua reproductive citizens. Prior to the calling of the Royal Commission, potential parents, donor 
offspring and their families were not conceptualized in Canadian law and policy as subjects 
necessitating governance. However, with the validation of their subject-positions through their 
engagement with the Royal Commission and the Commission’s re-articulation of their concerns, 
these groups emerged as new political subjects whose activities and experiences required 
regulation. This did not preclude addressing some of the needs of lesbian and single women, 
although the interests of LGBTQ Canadians were narrowly conceived, including only the need 
for access to donor insemination (including self-insemination) and some legal protections for 
women-led families. Without advocacy groups to articulate their interests, the interests of donors 
and surrogates were also narrowly conceived, and consequently, donors and surrogates were 
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largely imagined as marginal contributors to infertility patients’ use of ARTs. Recognizing 
donors, surrogates, and LGBTQ people as important and engaged actors in the use of ARTs 
would have challenged conventional models of the family, and the use of these technologies, 
through the advancement of the medical model of infertility, worked to reaffirm the two-parent, 
nuclear, heterosexual norm.  
 The legitimation of groups representing infertile people and donor-conceived families 
may have occurred, in part, because they were not contesting who was a reproductive citizen in 
Canada at the time, rather, they were largely challenging how middle-to-upper class, 
heterosexual Canadians could conceive. The interests of infertile Canadians did not 
fundamentally challenge family norms, or the importance of biological ties; rather they reiterated 
the importance of having one’s own children within the context of a nuclear, heterosexual 
family. Infertile Canadians were seeking out the fulfillment of conventional Canadian family life, 
only they needed to use ARTs to do so. As for donor-conceived people and their families, their 
experiences challenged bio-essentialism and kinship to a degree, although their interest in 
acquiring information about their donors worked to validate the importance of knowing one’s 
biological origins. These groups did contain some LGBTQ families, however neither the NRAS 
nor IAAC worked to challenge the two-parent, biologically based model of kinship, and instead 
tried to expand longstanding constructions of the ideal reproductive citizen to include their 
experiences.  
 The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies thus set the stage for 
legislation-to-come. As a publicly funded, high profile investigation of ARTs, and through its 
work and engagement with interested parties, the Royal Commission provided a particular frame 
of analysis—a biomedical lens focused on infertile couples and the children they conceived—
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that would later be repeated and re-inscribed. The Royal Commission’s work contributed, at least 
in part, to the neoliberal turn in reproductive citizenship described in chapter two, and a model 
for governing reproductive technologies based on legitimacy of the individually diagnosed 
would-be parent largely responsible for funding their own care. Further, the exclusions of 
marginalized populations (including single women, LGBTQ people, those with low socio-
economic status, and others) from accessing ARTs replicates longstanding exclusions of 
marginalized populations from parental entitlements. Overall, the Royal Commission identified 
models of deserving and undeserving users of reproductive technologies, and consequently, 
reproductive citizens, that would inform future policy development. 
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Chapter Four: Setting Boundaries? 
The legacy of the Royal Commission was deeply felt throughout the 1990s and later, as the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act came into being. The absence of certain voices, and the 
privileging of others that emerged in the Commission would occur in different ways over time, 
and variations on the theme of the individual, medically-infertile citizen-subject would be 
repeated again and again throughout the legislative process. This was the case in the mid-1990s, 
when officials at Health Canada started to take steps towards legislation, first with a voluntary 
moratorium, and then with proposed legislation (Bill C-47) and a discussion document (Setting 
Boundaries, Enhancing Health) outlining the scope of future regulation. Although C-47 did not 
pass, this period (between 1995 and 1997) was marked by important interventions in the 
regulation of ARTs that would continue the trends of variously recognizing and disregarding the 
reproductive citizenship of diverse actors that had occurred in the work of the Royal 
Commission.  
 As the federal government was formulating this three-phase approach, growing markets 
for sperm, eggs, and surrogates were taking root. Infertile people with the financial means to do 
so (or through a measure of public insurance in Ontario) were engaging in commercial egg 
donation and surrogacy arrangements, as the relevant technologies became increasingly available 
in Canada. There were more and more LGBTQ Canadians accessing reproductive technologies 
than ever before, and despite discrimination faced in the clinics, there were new inroads made to 
access. At the same time, infertile Canadians were reorganizing, aligning themselves more 
closely with the specialists of reproductive medicine, pharmaceutical companies, and 
biotechnology firms that would ultimately help them try to conceive, while donor-conceived 
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families were working to make the voices of their children and their families’ needs heard 
without stepping on the toes of those seeking to build their families using ARTs. 
This chapter examines reproductive citizenship and the governance of ARTs in the period 
between 1995 and 1997. It proceeds in two parts. In its first section it examines the three-phase 
approach to governing ARTs taken by the federal government in the mid-1990s. It explores each 
phase in turn, identifying not only how the phase proceeded, but also how it intersected with 
broader trends in reproductive citizenship, namely neoliberalism, individualism, and the 
advancement of biomedicine. It argues that all three phases worked to uphold the status quo in 
the governance of ARTs, namely an open market in reproductive services that privileged 
biomedical actors and failed to take decisive action to legislate or regulate. Following the 
examination of the three-phase approach, the chapter turns to a discussion of how citizen groups, 
namely those representing LGBTQ people, egg donors and surrogates, infertile people, and 
donor-conceived families were included and excluded in this policy process as well as how these 
groups otherwise articulated their interest in the use and governance of ARTs during this period. 
Effectively, advocates of infertile people and donor-conceived families were negotiating access 
to reproductive technologies, inclusion in policy development, and the need for regulated access 
to donor information, that is to say, negotiating the terms of use of reproductive technologies as 
legitimate reproductive citizens. At the same time, surrogates, donors, and LGBTQ people 
continued their engagement with reproductive technologies without being recognized as relevant 
actors. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that the individual, biomedical focus of the Royal 
Commission emerged clearly in federal attempts to govern ARTs in the mid-1990s, although the 
experiences of stakeholders varied. 
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A Three-Phase Approach to Governing ARTs  
The federal government responded to the Royal Commission with a “three-phase” approach 
comprised of a voluntary moratorium, proposed legislation, and promises of regulation-to-come. 
The three-phase approach was developed as a means to govern ARTs in the public interest to 
protect vulnerable citizens, although at the same time, in its failure, it reinforced the 
understanding that infertile Canadians and clinicians should continue to freely use and develop 
assisted reproductive services in the context of a largely unregulated market.  
The Royal Commission’s report was issued in late 1993, in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1993 federal election, and it took two years for the new Liberal government to issue a 
response. It was in 1995, then, that Minister of Health Diane Marleau announced a voluntary 
moratorium (sometimes referred to as the “interim moratorium”) banning nine of the practices 
seen to be most abhorrent, including: sex selection for non-medical reasons; commercial 
surrogacy arrangements; buying and selling of gametes and embryos; egg donation in exchange 
for discounted or free in-vitro fertilization services (egg sharing); germ-line genetic alteration; 
the creation of a fetus in an artificial womb (ectogenesis); cloning human embryos; the formation 
of animal-human hybrids (chimera); and the retrieval of gametes from cadavers and fetuses for 
purposes of donation, fertilization and research.232 In order to promote compliance, Marleau also 
announced related restrictions on federal funding to organizations and individual researchers 
engaged in the practices covered by the moratorium.233 The announcement also suggested that a 
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more “comprehensive approach”234 to governing reproductive technologies was in development, 
including legislation and regulation that would take up the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission to criminalize some technologies and create a regulatory framework for others. 
 As a voluntary measure, the moratorium was not enforceable, and incentives for 
compliance were practically nonexistent. The moratorium was defied by clinicians and 
researchers who were open about their continuation of commercial practices in gamete donation 
and surrogacy,235 suggesting in one case that without legislation there was “no legal reason”236 to 
adhere.237 Without compliance, critics (including Patricia Baird) suggested that the moratorium 
simply could not go far enough, and that the absence of legislation was permitting the 
exploitation of women’s bodies, the commercialization of human life, and otherwise 
reprehensible aspects of reproductive technologies to continue.238 The one incentive for 
compliance—that federal funding would be withheld from those acting in breach of the 
moratorium—had little real value, as it did not apply to private fertility clinics, most of the 
banned technologies were not occurring (six out of nine “had never been done in Canada”), and 
there was not one research grant at the time being funded by the federal government which might 
be subjection to restriction under the moratorium.239  
The voluntary approach was a surprise to those expecting the federal government to 
respond rapidly to the Royal Commission with a broad legislative and regulatory framework. 
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The cautious approach taken by the federal government was met with much critique, as it was 
broadly seen as a policymaking placeholder on a controversial issue, intended to give the new 
Liberal government time to make policy on ARTs in the wake of the Royal Commission report 
and the 1993 election.240 However, the need to “buy time” to develop legislation may also have 
been influenced by the state of federal-provincial relations in health at the time. In February 
1995, just a few months before the announcement of the voluntary moratorium, the federal 
budget was tabled in Parliament including significant reductions to provincial health transfers. 
The announcement of the moratorium in this context may be viewed as temporary compromise 
to both allay provincial concerns about federal interventions into health and to address pressures 
to respond to Proceed with Care. The federal government could start to take action by trying to 
restrict some activities without requiring provincial assent or incurring the costs of more 
comprehensive legislation.  
The voluntary moratorium, however, may also be explained by an ongoing commitment 
to the self-regulation of biomedical actors on the part of the federal government. At the time that 
the moratorium was announced, a little-known bill, Bill C-62 was making its way through 
Parliament. Bill C-62, the Regulatory Efficiency Act, “would have allowed companies to cut 
individual deals with government departments to completely bypass environmental, health, and 
safety legislation.”241 Although the Bill was developed with the goal of reducing the costs of 
making and enforcing regulation and “to enable innovation,”242 clinics, research facilities, 
biopharmaceutical companies, and biotechnology firms involved with reproductive technologies 
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would have been able to engage in self-regulation by developing agreements with the federal 
government under the terms of C-62.243 This may have allowed for the deregulation of industries 
that might otherwise have significant “legislative hurdles.”244 Proposing a voluntary moratorium, 
rather than criminal legislation or a regulatory regime, or both, would have left room for the 
development of alternative regulatory arrangements under C-62, although C-62 was never 
passed. Nonetheless, the moratorium presented a temporary middle ground between 
criminalization and complete inaction that allowed for the continuation of self-regulation on the 
part of the biomedical community without restricting the rapidly expanding market in infertility 
services, all while enabling the federal government to take a position against certain reproductive 
technologies. 
Following the announcement of the voluntary moratorium, Health Canada appointed an 
Advisory Committee to monitor compliance, but violations continued245 and by June 1996, the 
federal government took more decisive action by introducing Bill C-47 (An Act respecting 
human reproductive technologies and commercial transactions relating to human reproduction). 
The second phase of the three-phase approach, Bill C-47 proposed the criminalization of the nine 
technologies included in the moratorium,246 as well as five others.247 The penalties attached to 
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the banned practices were substantial; up to $500,000 in fines, or ten years in jail, or both.248 The 
legislation was clear in its intent, with the preamble stating that Parliament was “gravely 
concerned with human dignity, the risks to human health and safety…serious social and ethical 
issues, exploitation of women and children for commercial ends…and the need for measures to 
protect and promote the best interests of children affected.”249  
 This intent of the legislation then, as noted in the preamble, was to protect the broadly 
conceived public interest, as well as to make certain reproductive technologies a matter of 
criminality, suggesting both a sense of urgency and an important underlying assumption that 
ARTs were a matter of national importance necessitating federal intervention. A federal role in 
the governance of reproductive technologies was not obvious, but the first section of Proceed 
with Care had previously identified the bases on which interventions could be made. To this end, 
the Commission recognized the complexity of jurisdictional issues pertaining to ARTs and 
suggested intervention through a number of parliamentary powers, including the “peace, order, 
and good government” (POGG) power, as well as under the criminal law, trade and commerce, 
spending and other relevant federal constitutional powers.”250 The federal government’s use of 
the criminal law power was its best method of intervention in ARTs given that any use of the 
peace, order, and good government clause would be strained at best. Historically, POGG was 
used to allow the federal government to intervene in issues of provincial jurisdiction for pressing 
matters of national concern, and it was unclear that ARTs would fit this criterion.251 Further, 
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although the commissioners could not have predicted this at the time, the use of POGG as 
support for controversial legislation would fall out of favour with the courts after 1993, and the 
criminal law was increasingly seen as a means to engage in federal legislation in areas of 
provincial jurisdiction.252 Taken together with the ongoing hostile climate of federal-provincial 
relations in health following cutbacks to provincial transfers, the criminal law power was the 
most effective means to make law at the federal level on assisted human reproduction, leaving 
regulation to occur (in consultation with the provinces) once a federal foot-in-the-door had been 
established.253  
In addition to establishing ARTs as a site of federal policymaking under the criminal law 
power, Bill C-47 attempted to identify how the bodies of vulnerable women and children might 
have been commercialized, appropriated, or exploited by the misuse of ARTs if certain practices 
were not banned. Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health, the discussion document released at the 
time that C-47 was tabled, identified this intent of the legislation clearly: 
The major objectives of the new legislation are the following: first, to protect 
the health and safety of Canadians in the use of human reproductive materials 
for assisted reproduction, other medical procedures and medical research; 
second, to ensure the appropriate treatment of human reproductive materials 
outside the body; and third, to protect the dignity and security of all persons, 
especially women and children.254 
 
C-47 then, presented the view that the governance of reproduction would require the state to act 
in the public good by putting collective interests before those of individuals. From this view, the 
interests of intended parents would be secondary to the protection of women using ARTs and 
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children born of them, as well as the “collective values” of Canadians as a group. 
However, while the stated objectives of C-47 included public health and safety, the 
legislative process related to C-47 suggests a privileging of biomedical understandings of 
infertility that would maximize the interests of clinicians, lawyers, and infertile Canadians. Over 
the course of the legislative process, those with a vested interest in the continuation of an open 
market in gametes, surrogacy, and infertility services, would cast a shadow over the legitimacy 
of the legislation and would condemn it for its failure to address the importance of biomedical 
interests. Ultimately the federal government was unwilling to make legislation on ARTs without 
the endorsement of these groups, suggesting that C-47 was not necessarily intended to protect 
public health and safety, but rather to provide the veneer of doing so while ensuring the ongoing 
authority of biomedical actors and the non-regulation of medical practices. 255 
The legislative process leading to and following the introduction of C-47 involved a 
series of consultations and engagements with stakeholders—a cross-country tour by Health 
Canada, a federal-provincial-territorial working group, a discussion group on embryo research,256 
and witness testimony to the Standing Committee on Health—which sought input into the 
approach the federal government was taking. The ongoing consultations with a range of policy 
actors, might suggest that the three-phase approach took seriously the changing interests and 
opinions of Canadians vis-à-vis ARTs. Following Montpetit, however, despite the inclusion of a 
range of actors, the consultations were largely a means for Health Canada to confer legitimacy 
on an approach it was already set on putting forth rather than a site for meaningful input from 
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stakeholders. A number of officials in the Health Policy Division of Health Canada who were 
working directly on the three-phase approach had contributed significantly to the work of the 
Royal Commission, and were committed to the broad framework that it had recommended in 
Proceed with Care.257  
Biomedical and legal professionals were amongst the most ardent critics of C-47 and the 
process that led to its tabling, concerned that banning payment for gametes and surrogacy 
services went too far and would inhibit the capacity of Canadians to access assisted reproductive 
services. These critics suggested that such a ban would be unlikely to prevent commercial 
transactions in assisted reproduction, and would also create barriers to safe access that could 
result in both a significant decline in available gametes and surrogacy services258 as well as the 
proliferation of “underground economies” resulting in exploitation and “damage to women.”259 
Further, critics of C-47 generally argued that criminal law would be too blunt an instrument to 
regulate assisted reproduction despite criminal prohibitions limiting similar activities existing in 
a number of other Western countries, including Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.260 Instead, the preferred option was regulation that might achieve a similar effect with 
fewer implications on commercial practices and would not limit possibilities for medical self-
regulation.261  
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Critics of C-47 also took issue with the nature of the consultations that had taken place 
prior to its tabling. Both the Canadian Medical Association and the Canadian Fertility and 
Andrology Society took the position in testimony before the parliamentary subcommittee on C-
47 that as experts of reproductive medicine, they had not been consulted about the particulars of 
the Bill. The result of this failure, they argued, was not only a bill that infringed upon the 
capacity of doctors to engage in reproductive medicine (through restrictions on gamete donation 
and embryo research), but also one that was simply incorrect due to technical errors including 
misuse of the term “zygote.”262 There were also complaints by other groups, including the 
National Action Committee on the Status of Women about the limited nature of the pre-tabling 
consultations.263 However, it was biomedical and legal groups that emphasized the failure of the 
proposed legislation and regulatory regime to recognize the reproductive autonomy of 
Canadians, and further, to take seriously the importance of including biomedical stakeholders to 
ensure that any legislation is not only sensitive to the needs of doctors and patients, but also that 
it is technically correct. 
C-47’s death on the Order Paper has widely been attributed to the failure of Health 
Canada to Canada to adequately consult medical and scientific stakeholders in the development 
of the legislation, and thereby prevent their reaction to “what they perceived as the generally 
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hostile tenor of the legislation.”264 In short, without the support of the biomedical community, C-
47 could not proceed, particularly given the Liberal government’s interest in having stakeholder 
support and the particular pressure of an impending election.265 In both the clinic and in the 
legislature, doctors were seen as the authorities on assisted reproduction, and without their 
support, the proposed legislation was too controversial to proceed.  
The importance of medical expertise and authority in the debates over C-47 cannot be 
overstated. As with the consultations that took place on abortion prior to the 1969 amendments to 
the Criminal Code,266 there was a concerted effort on the part of physicians to articulate that the 
matter of assisted reproduction was first and foremost, a matter of medical practice, rather than a 
matter of criminality. Many physicians were not interested in the criminalization of practices in 
which they were already engaged (namely commercial gamete donation and surrogacy), and 
emphasized the medical nature of ARTs as matters of health care services. For physicians, 
regulation was fine, but only so long as regulation would validate the choices of patients, and 
ensure the ongoing provision of services. This framing aimed to protect the interests of 
physicians and people seeking out assisted reproductive services as intended parents (i.e., who 
might be in need of donor gametes or surrogacy services), but left out the need to protect 
surrogates and donors and donor-conceived people through more comprehensive legislation. The 
medical model of infertility, in which individual patients engage with doctors to seek out 
treatment for infertility (diagnosed on the basis certain physiological criteria), was thus 
legitimated through the legislative process resulting in C-47’s failure. The passage of any 
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legislation would necessitate the support of doctors and a more explicit dedication to the 
importance of reproductive technologies as a necessary and useful treatment for medically 
diagnosed infertility.  
As noted above, when C-47 was tabled so too was an accompanying discussion 
document, Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health. Setting Boundaries explicitly laid out plans to 
regulate ARTs following the passage of C-47, beginning with consultations with the provinces 
and territories on “a proposed regulatory structure”267 and then to amend C-47 to accommodate 
the new regulatory framework, resulting in a single piece of legislation that would address the 
range of reproductive technologies, criminalizing some, and regulating others. Much of the 
document was dedicated to identifying the guiding principles of the federal approach to 
governing ARTs and the issues (i.e., addressing vulnerability in infertility treatment, the interests 
of children born of ARTs, and disability and prenatal genetic diagnosis) deemed of greatest 
concern. The most significant contribution of Setting Boundaries—the description of the 
impending regulatory regime—occupied only eight of the document’s forty pages, and described 
only the framework for how licensure of clinicians and researchers would be implemented and 
parameters for relevant information registries. The range of other areas for regulation identified 
by the Royal Commission as key to the comprehensive governance of ARTs (e.g., provisions 
regarding informed consent, compensation for research tissue provision, record keeping) were 
only briefly mentioned in Setting Boundaries, in ways peripheral to the areas designated for 
regulatory intervention. Further, infertility prevention and other complex matters of addressing 
reproductive health beyond regulation were included in Setting Boundaries (i.e., acknowledging 
the importance of “infertility prevention” and “social solutions”) although only as matters for 
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future, collaborative interventions without concrete, actionable ways forward. Overall, 
recommendations were reserved for unclear future regulation that would one day occur in 
collaboration with the provinces and other stakeholders.  
As with the voluntary moratorium, uncertainty about when and how regulation would 
occur in Setting Boundaries is attributable to a need to tiptoe around the complex 
intergovernmental relations in health that were occurring at the time. Setting Boundaries 
included careful nods to C-47’s use of the criminal law power as a legitimate intervention. It was 
written as a hybrid discussion document and white paper, setting out federal priorities in 
regulation, and suggesting that these priorities would likely change in consultation with other 
stakeholders, that is to say, the provinces. The federal government’s intended policy direction in 
Setting Boundaries was clear; however the role for the federal government in making regulation 
was not to be assumed given that ARTs were not clearly a matter of federal jurisdiction. The use 
of the criminal law power could be a toehold for federal intervention in the governance of ARTs, 
and there was little to do but wait for C-47 to pass before moving forward with regulation. 
After C-47 died on the Order Paper, there was little movement on assisted reproduction at 
the federal level for a number of years; however, the attempt to govern ARTs represented by the 
three-phase approach would have important ramifications in terms of how the federal 
government would include and address certain stakeholders in the future. The way that these 
documents took up certain recommendations of the Royal Commission, and left others to 
tentative future collaboration, reveal the federal priority in addressing reproductive technologies. 
As with the Royal Commission, the importance of social understandings of infertility, 
preventative care, and reproductive autonomy were acknowledged in the three-phase approach, 
but the use of the criminal law power to restrict certain reproductive technologies with the 
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promise of future regulation demonstrates an overarching commitment to the use of reproductive 
technologies as an at-once dangerous and useful site for governing reproduction. At first, this 
may have been understood as a matter for government alone, particularly as the consultations 
that informed C-47 and Setting Boundaries worked to “verify the validity”268 of the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations, rather than to consider new perspectives or determine a policy 
direction. Nevertheless, with the failure of C-47, particularly when the Liberal majority at the 
time could have pushed it through, there was an affirmation of the role of biomedical actors in 
determining the ways in which ARTs in Canada could be governed.  
 
Reproductive Citizenship During the Three-Phase Approach 
As biomedical and legal actors (as well as, to a certain extent, religious actors) came to the fore 
as key stakeholders in the governance of ARTs during the three-phase approach, groups less 
prevalent in this stage of the long policy process found other means to make their interests 
known. LGBTQ Canadians, egg donors and surrogates, infertile Canadians, and donor-conceived 
families were much less apparent in the three-phase approach, although as with the Royal 
Commission, the interests of each group were very differently recognized. The strategies used by 
these groups to gain recognition differed as well, and included the formation of new 
organizations, expansion, engagement in public education, and looking to the courts to make 
claims that the use of reproductive technologies are a part of fundamental rights of citizenship.  
 
LGBTQ People  
The period following the publication of the Royal Commission report saw little 
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acknowledgement or intervention on the part of LGBTQ people regarding assisted reproduction. 
The recognition of lesbian mothers as users of reproductive technologies included in the Royal 
Commission, however marginal, was simply not present in the three-phase approach, and it 
seemed that the constituency of users of ARTs imagined at the time of the Royal Commission 
was narrowed. No groups explicitly advocating for LGBTQ Canadians were consulted in the 
deliberative work leading up to C-47 or during its consideration before the parliamentary 
subcommittee, nor were LGBTQ Canadians identified as key stakeholders in the proposed 
legislation or regulatory regime. The National Association of Women and the Law spoke out 
about how limiting payment to gamete donors might have a negative impact on lesbian access to 
sperm for insemination, but it was the only such intervention.269 While the Royal Commission 
made a point of discussing donor insemination, self-insemination, discrimination in access to 
services, and the need for family law reform to protect lesbian-led families, the three-phase 
approach to governing ARTs did not include any mention of the particular concerns of LGBTQ 
people at all. Given the explicit articulation of the interests of lesbian mothers in the Royal 
Commission report, and Setting Boundaries’ discussions of equality as a guiding principle, the 
particular concerns of queer families are remarkable in their absence.270 
This is not to say, however, that LGBTQ people were not engaging in assisted human 
reproduction, or engaging with the state to ensure that their families would benefit from rights 
protections; rather, LGBTQ people were organizing outside of the three-phase approach. Lesbian 
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mothers in particular were continuing to use the courts and provincial legislatures and to do 
community-based organizing in order to ensure that they could build the families that they 
wanted.271 The negotiation of reproductive citizenship on the part of LGBTQ people, and 
particularly lesbian mothers, was occurring outside of the development of federal legislation. 
Lesbian mothers were working to create their families in ways that both ignored and contested 
the federal government’s emphasis on the individual, medically infertile, heterosexual subject.  
 At the same time that the three-phase approach was being developed, a case about  
lesbian access to fertility clinics was being addressed at the British Columbia Council of Human 
Rights that challenged the right of physicians to refuse artificial insemination services on the 
basis of sexual orientation. In this case, a Vancouver physician, Dr. Korn, refused to provide 
artificial insemination services to a couple because they were lesbians, referring them instead to 
another doctor.272 After the couple had a successful pregnancy, they brought a case regarding 
their denial of services by Dr. Korn to the British Columbia Council of Human Rights. The 
Council ruled that Dr. Korn had denied the applicants, “a service customarily available to the 
public because of their sexual orientation” in breach of the Human Rights Act of British 
Columbia. The couple was awarded a total of $3396.44, including funds for “emotional injury” 
and expenses.273 Dr. Korn appealed the decision, but it was dismissed by the British Columbia 
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Supreme Court.274  
 Potter v Korn came at an important juncture in the history of LGBTQ parenting in 
Canada. The case recalled the history of custody challenges in the 1970s and 1980s, wherein 
claims that lesbians were unfit parents on the basis of their sexual orientation had resulted in the 
custody of children being given entirely to women’s ex-husbands or former male partners with 
whom they had conceived.275 The legal framework of these custody battles was often that 
lesbians were deemed unsuitable parents because their children would not be exposed to 
traditional gender role modelling, that they would somehow be made to be gay themselves, and 
that they would be otherwise damaged. These custody cases were hard-fought and often lost, and 
it became increasingly clear that in order to win custody, women had to establish that they had 
stable lives, fit into the two-parent family model, and were otherwise “‘just the same as’ and ‘just 
as good as’ an ideologically based notion of the heterosexual nuclear family.”276 This often 
necessitated moving away from longstanding notions of queer families challenging the 
conventional heterosexual two-parent model, or even challenging the heteronormative frame of 
the family, and instead iterating that one was a good or deserving lesbian mother that was not 
sexual, an activist, a lesbian feminist, or in any way disputing the legitimacy of the conventional 
family form. Groups like the Lesbian Mothers’ Defence Fund worked throughout the 1980s to 
keep custody issues out of court where the likelihood of their keeping their children was slim, 
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and to provide support to those engaged in legal battles to keep their children.277 
It is in this context that Potter v Korn is an important case in terms of the recognition of 
the reproductive citizenship of lesbian mothers. The custody battles of the 1970s and 1980s were 
part of an on-going denial of parental rights to LGBTQ people, and it was only by the 1990s that 
institutional change, largely through the courts, was beginning to occur. As Miriam Smith has 
argued, the courts have been used as a site for LGBTQ rights claims in the post-Charter era in 
which litigation has taken up the “rights talk” generated by social movement organizing. She 
argues that increasingly litigation has been used as a strategy for equality-seeking groups to 
make rights claims and to address discrimination against LGBTQ people in Canada.278 
Following the Egan decision in 1995, the Supreme Court affirmed that sexual orientation was a 
grounds of discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter,279 making clear that sexuality alone could 
no longer be used as a justification for denying women custody of their children.  
By the mid-1990s, it could no longer be taken for granted that the courts would side with 
a biological fathers’ custody claims, and new laws, including the Ontario Children’s Law 
Reform Act (1990) allowed non-biological parents, including non-biological lesbian mothers, to 
make custody claims. The idea of family at this point, and particularly in the courts, was 
broadening to make room for LGBTQ families.280 Further, in 1995, just months before the 
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judgement in Potter v Korn was rendered, an Ontario court decided in favour of a group of 
lesbians who sought to adopt their partners’ children. In this case (Re K),281 an Ontario court 
judge found that the Child and Family Services Act of Ontario discriminated against same-sex 
couples in violation of s.15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.282 Although the 
changes to the law would still require non-biological parents to make an application for adoption 
and required the two parents to be “spouses” (thereby replicating many elements of the 
conventional family form), this case recognized not only that lesbians were parenting already-
existing children together but also that LGBTQ people might intend to have children together. 
Taken together with Potter v Korn, it is clear that there was not only a shift in the recognition of 
the parental rights of lesbians who were already mothers, but also those who were intended 
parents.  
Potter v Korn only applied to British Columbia, and the law regarding adoption would 
not change in that province for another year, but the implicit outcome of the case was that lesbian 
mothers should be able to build their families together in the ways that they want, be it through 
services available in fertility clinics, or through the adoption of one another’s children. 
Furthermore, the acknowledgement of access to assisted reproduction as a right (so long as one 
could pay for services), or at least as a service that could not be unduly restricted, went far to 
extend the frame of potential stakeholders of ARTs to implicitly include LGBTQ Canadians, 
even if they were not included in the legislative process. 
The effect of Potter v Korn was not merely the statement that clinics could not 
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discriminate against lesbians, or a marker of the use of the courts as a continued site for parental 
rights claims, but the case also affirmed that the clinic was (and is) a recognized site of lesbian 
reproduction. The Royal Commission did recognize lesbian self-insemination as an important 
site for LGBTQ family building, noting problems around denial of services and discrimination 
against lesbians, but even still, use of the clinics by lesbians had been complicated, with 
physicians openly refusing to provide services, demanding psychiatric assessments, or requiring 
women to write explanations of why they should provide access to donor sperm or to 
“insemination services.”283 In the absence of legislation, with discrimination in clinics 
continuing,284 and with so little acknowledgement of LGBTQ people in the three-phase 
approach, Potter v Korn served the important role of recognizing the legitimacy of lesbians as 
stakeholders in assisted human reproduction, even if it was outside of the formal policymaking 
process.  
Additionally, Potter v Korn was part of the increased recognition of donor insemination 
as necessarily occurring within the context of conventional medicine. This challenged the 
longstanding idea that self-insemination was the best option for lesbian motherhood, insofar as it 
allowed women to conceive on their own terms, and to control their reproductive experiences 
outside of a medical context. Women inseminated themselves in all kinds of spaces outside of 
clinics, including their homes, “campgrounds, parked cars, and the apartments of friends,” and 
there were many formal and informal networks of information sharing that allowed lesbians to 
pass information about techniques for insemination, acquiring sperm, and navigating clinics 
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when necessary.285 
By the mid-1990s, however, there was an increased focus on clinics and medical 
practices as the site where donor insemination should occur. This is attributable to changing 
priorities in relation to donor insemination. Whereas self-insemination by donor was seen as a 
means to contest the medical model of reproduction in the 1970s and 1980s, with the rise of 
HIV/AIDS, and new anxieties about the risks of using fresh semen, engaging with clinics and 
doctors in order to obtain “safe” semen was a new priority for lesbians seeking semen to use. The 
Royal Commission had funded and published research that found that three clinics were not 
freezing semen before use, instead using fresh sperm, which cannot be adequately tested for 
HIV. The same study found that one sperm donation program (out of a total of 33) was not doing 
initial testing for donors, two were not doing follow-up testing and a significant number of others 
were not testing for a range of other sexually transmitted infections.286 Fresh semen was 
increasingly identified as a cause for concern, and although many people who used known 
donors and fresh sperm were asking their donors for HIV tests, the advantage of frozen semen 
was that the semen itself was tested twice, six months apart, rather than the donor. As the typical 
incubation period for HIV testing is six months, receiving negative HIV tests for a donor six 
months apart only identifies that the donor did not have HIV at the time of the first test. Testing 
the semen itself six months apart identifies that the semen is HIV negative, and therefore tested 
frozen semen is viewed as a safer choice for insemination.  
The reaction to the research contracted by the Royal Commission, the subsequent media 
coverage, and a Supreme Court case in which a woman had contracted HIV from donor semen 
without knowledge of the risk of exposure (ter Neuzen v Korn) raised public awareness of the 
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risks of using fresh sperm. With concern about HIV and AIDS running high, lesbians who might 
have otherwise used friends as donors were turning to frozen sperm as a safer option. This did 
not mean that women had to actually be inseminated in the clinic, indeed, they could simply 
order the semen to a fertility clinic, or to their family physician (so long as there was a liquid 
nitrogen tank available for storage). Once a physician was already involved in the process of 
insemination, and women were already in the doors of the clinic, women were more likely to be 
inseminated in the clinic or doctors’ office.287  
Furthermore, in 1996, Health Canada introduced the first iteration of its Semen 
Regulations (The Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations) 
that curbed potential use. The semen regulations required semen used for “artificial 
reproduction” to undergo a six-month quarantine and rigorous testing, and for donors to undergo 
testing as well. Imported semen was also subject to the same standards,288 and consequently 
obtaining semen from the two California-based sperm banks which had long served lesbian 
populations in Canada became more difficult than ever, and forced many women who would 
have otherwise ordered sperm directly to involve their doctors in the process.289 Semen had to be 
ordered to a doctor’s office, and any semen used had to conform to Canadian standards, labeled 
and quarantined following the regulations. Although the intention of the semen regulations was 
simply to “decrease the risk of infectious disease transmission”290 the consequence for lesbians 
and single women who may have ordered sperm directly from a queer-friendly sperm bank in the 
United States, or those who may have wanted to involve a known donor in their insemination, 
was a new set of obstacles to donor conception. 
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The outcome of the concerns about HIV/AIDS in relation to donor sperm that really 
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a shift in the language used around lesbian-led 
families and access to donor sperm. Following Jacqueline Luce, “clinic-based insemination is 
often conflated with safety” even though, as was the case in ter Neuzen v Korn, clinic-based 
insemination did not preclude exposure to sexually transmitted infections. While at-home self-
inseminations and insemination support networks had been a way to circumvent medical 
intervention in one’s reproduction, the need to mitigate the risks associated with donor semen 
was seen as too great to ignore. This is not to say that self-inseminations were halted or that 
people did not continue to contest the medicalization of conception, but it is clear that the 
practice of self-insemination described by the Royal Commission was slowly being displaced by 
a more medicalized practice in which women were moving into clinics to protect themselves and 
their future children.  
The exclusion of LGBTQ people in the policy process then, was not offset in any way by 
the shift into the clinic or relevant litigation, but increased access to reproductive technologies, 
where and when it occurred, legitimized lesbians as part of the constituency of people using 
assisted reproduction, assuming their place among other intended parents. At the same time, the 
more costly clinically-managed care that this entailed also meant a mediation of reproductive 
citizenship that had long worked in contestation of the norm. The “social infertility” of lesbian 
intended parents became, in many ways, subsumed into a broader understanding of infertility 
care within a medical context.  
As clinic doors were slowly opening, many obstacles for lesbians remained, particularly 
difficulty acquiring “safe” sperm in the late 1990s after the semen regulations were enforced.291 
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With increased engagement in clinic-based insemination, access to semen outside of clinics for 
lesbians was limited (unless women were using known donors). It was in this context that Rachel 
Epstein was asked by her former mid-wife Kathie Duncan to “plan and co-facilitate a course for 
lesbian/bi/queer women considering parenthood”292 This course, entitled Dykes Planning Tykes, 
would grow and evolve over the years to come, but it was developed in 1997 to fill an important 
gap in education and service provision, namely knowledge about parenting options for queer 
families. Although Dykes Planning Tykes never focused solely on artificial insemination, it has 
long served as an important site, at least in Toronto, for lesbians seeking to build their families, 
providing them with the information they need to make informed choices about how to have 
their children, and on what terms. As will be discussed in chapter five, groups like Dykes 
Planning Tykes in Toronto, and the then-yet-to-be-established Lesbian Mothers’ Association of 
Quebec would become increasingly important service providers in the late 1990s, offering 
information to lesbian intended parents and others. These groups would provide sites for LGBTQ 
people to acquire information about possibilities for family building, to ask questions, and share 
experiences. As time went on, both Dykes Planning Tykes and the Lesbian Mothers’ Association 
of Quebec would extend their work from primarily service providers and became strong 
advocates for the LGBTQ community with the federal government (although the Lesbian 
Mothers’ Association would focus more strongly on issues within Quebec), becoming important 
stakeholders in the policy process. 
The reproductive citizenship of LGBTQ people, and particularly lesbians seeking to use 
reproductive technologies in the mid-1990s came not then, through the outright inclusion of their 
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interests in the legislative process. The emergence of lesbians as subjects of public policy on 
assisted human reproduction came through new demands for access to clinical care, in part as 
access to “safe” sperm became an issue of concern. Through the recognition of LGBTQ people 
as would-be parents with particular rights and responsibilities, Potter v Korn and the semen 
regulations mark the recognition of the reproductive citizenship of LGBTQ people using 
reproductive technologies in a new way. Further, while self-insemination has been and continues 
to be a practice for women to become pregnant outside of the clinic, the shift to seeking clinical 
care would create a greater space for the interests of many intended lesbian mothers to undergo 
insemination within the context of biomedicine. Affirmed in Potter v Korn, the movement of 
lesbian insemination into the clinic created a new and expanded market for the infertility industry 
as women who may have used a known donor (or simply have purchased sperm outright from a 
sperm bank) began to engage in the litany of costly tests and interventions that come with 
biomedical care. This early recognition of lesbians as potential patient/clients of fertility services 
was a sign of the eventual recognition of LGBTQ people and single women in the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act to come, as access to ARTs was identified as a matter of equality (i.e., 
non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status) so long as one had the 
financial resources needed for access to occur. 
 
Egg Donors and Surrogates 
As in the consultative processes of the Royal Commission, consultations leading to and 
following C-47 failed to include gamete donors and surrogates. Nevertheless, the three-phase 
approach did mark an important change in the discursive practices used by parliamentarians and 
in the policy documents around egg donation. Whereas the Royal Commission recommended 
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that egg donation should be heavily restricted due to relevant health risks and payment should 
also prohibited, in the three-phase approach health protection and limiting exploitation were seen 
as one and the same. In other words, throughout the three-phase approach, the debate over how 
to address egg donation shifted to emphasize the prevention of exploitative practices as the only 
public health measure that was needed. 
The discussion of egg donation included in the work of the Royal Commission both 
problematized the commercial aspects of donation when compensation or payment were 
involved, and further, suggested that all egg donation is problematic because of the undue harms 
faced by donors. The ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval required for egg donation were seen 
as risky and the Commission recommended that women should not be able to undergo these 
procedures unless they were doing so for themselves, or were undergoing medical treatment 
likely to harm their own fertility. Egg donation for pay was also deemed unacceptable, but in the 
Royal Commission’s report, egg donation was broadly seen as impermissible, primarily due to 
the risks to women’s health, and only secondarily as a matter of non-commercialization.293  
The three-phase approach, however, took a very different stance vis-à-vis egg donation. 
Like the voluntary moratorium, Bill C-47 proposed an outright ban on egg donation but only 
when pay was involved. The banning of commercial (but not altruistic) donation suggested that 
egg donation itself was a relatively safe procedure—at least benign enough for Canadian women 
to engage–and that commercialization was reason enough to ban the procedure. However, this 
prohibition on payment relied on a logic that conflated the protection of women’s health with the 
prevention of commercialization. Women could consent to undergo egg donation, but only when 
pay was not involved, and only when fully informed of the risks of donation. In other words, egg 
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donation was identified as only risky when occurring for pay, minimizing the substantive health 
risks outlined by the Royal Commission.  
When C-47 was debated in the House of Commons, exploitation, payment, health risks, 
surrogacy, and egg donation would become conceptually entangled to a greater extent. Members 
of Parliament took up the language of the Royal Commission, repeating some of the leaps in data 
interpretation made by Proceed with Care in regards to the exploitation of surrogates discussed 
in Eichler and Poole’s 1985 study. When C-47 was tabled, Liberal MP Andy Scott, and then-
Secretary of State for the Status of Women Hedy Fry used the same phrases and same ideas that 
had appeared in Proceed with Care to describe egg donation. They both stated that the 
socioeconomic disparities between surrogates and intended parents were so great, and the risks 
of egg donation so dire, that women could simply not participate in surrogacy or gamete 
donation “on equal footing” if pay was involved.294 Egg donation and surrogacy were thus 
constructed as exploitative practices on the basis of very limited data, and the potential for 
economic exploitation became the crie-de-coeur for regulating surrogacy and egg donation.  
 The understanding of egg donation and surrogacy as exploitative, and therefore 
necessitating a ban on commercial practices emerged even more strongly in other contributions 
to the debates in the House of Commons. When introducing Bill C-47 at second reading, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health, Joe Volpe explained the rationale for the ban 
on payment for egg donation, stating that if paid, an egg donor “will undergo invasive and 
painful medical interventions…[and] in exchange for the risk and burdens she will bear, she will 
go home probably about $2,000 richer but she will have taken unknown risks with her own 
health and her own future fertility.”295 The reason for the ban, following Volpe, was that egg 
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donors would undertake undue physiological risks for the sake of someone else, and would do so 
for pay. Following this logic, these risks were illegitimate when undertaken for compensation or 
payment of any kind. However, altruistic egg donation remained permissible. Given C-47’s 
explicit dedication to protecting women from “the risks to human health and safety” as outlined 
in its preamble,296 and the admission that egg donation is a risky procedure that women need not 
undergo, the permissibility of altruistic egg donation is relatively problematic despite the 
existence of the same risks. Either egg donation is a risky procedure that women should not 
undergo for someone else, or it is a legitimate procedure that women can undergo (although 
commercial donation could still be banned on the principle of non-commercialization). The 
equation of payment with risk and non-payment with safety inherent in Volpe’s argumentation 
came to characterize subsequent debate over commercial practices in egg donation and 
surrogacy. 
The conflation of the health risks of donation with commercialization (and exploitation) 
is an important shift in the language around egg donation and surrogacy used in public policy on 
assisted reproduction in Canada with important implications for reproductive citizenship. 
Whereas the Royal Commission report identified egg donation as inherently problematic because 
of the unnecessary health risks that women face for the sake of others,’ as well as because of 
potential commercialization, the voluntary moratorium and C-47’s banning of commercial egg 
donation enabled the continuation of egg donation, no matter the physiological consequences. 
Although egg donation was to be restricted in some ways through prohibitions on payment, egg 
donation was implicitly identified by C-47 as an appropriate, ethically sound procedure when 
payment did not occur, putting the onus on women to balance the risks of donation, and to make 
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the choice to proceed or not. The concerns about the risks to donors’ health in non-commercial 
or altruistic donation simply faded away in the debates around C-47, and access to egg donation 
(albeit altruistic/non-commercial/unpaid egg donation) could persist allowing, infertile people in 
need of eggs, and their doctors to continue to engage.  
The decision-making about whether egg donation should be occurring was thus 
downloaded from the state to potential egg donors, privatizing what the Royal Commission had 
clearly articulated as a matter of public health. What had been theorized as a public health risk to 
be managed by blanket restrictions on egg donation was replaced by an understanding of egg 
donation as an individual risk to be managed by the responsible, informed, self-sufficient would-
be egg donor. In this way, the recognition of the health of egg donors became less important to 
the discussion of egg donation than balancing non-commercialization and continued access to 
eggs. This worked to erase egg donors as important actors in the policy process whether or not 
they were consulted, as consulting donors may have meant addressing the physiological risks 
that egg donors face, and possibly impeding access to the eggs produced. The reproductive 
citizens deserving of care, here, were those needing access to eggs, rather than those providing 
them. In the context of a neoliberal citizenship regime, where limited governance gives way to 
market imperatives, and individuals are responsible for themselves, egg donors were required to 
weigh the little-known risks of donation against the benefits of participation, just as surrogates 
were left to make decisions about whether or not to engage in reproductive labour (with or 
without pay).  
Furthermore, the failure to consult with egg donors or surrogates or to provide any 
evidence of their exploitation (despite attempts to protect women from exploitative practices) 
represents a paternalistic norm about the nature of surrogacy arrangements and egg donation 
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long perpetuated by unsubstantiated fears about exploitation and the use of women’s bodies. 
Outright commercialization was widely held as immoral from the time of the Royal Commission, 
but the failure to engage with egg donors and surrogates meant that there was no opportunity to 
explore how ethical compensation might occur. The assumed exploitative nature of commercial 
surrogacy and gamete donation were taken up indiscriminately from the Royal Commission to 
the voluntary moratorium and C-47 without questioning the possibility of approaches other than 
the outright prohibition of commercial practices. Assuming exploitation in commercial practices 
worked from the outset to validate non-commercial surrogacy and egg donation thereby allowing 
the continuation of the practice in Canadian fertility clinics.  
This non-inclusion of egg donors and surrogates in the three-phase approach, and the 
prevalence of discourse on exploitation in the debates of the House of Commons on C-47 are 
particularly notable given the expansion of the infertility industry during the mid-1990s. In the 
absence of regulation (other than the voluntary moratorium) fertility clinics were appearing 
across the country and both egg donation and surrogacy were more prevalent than ever. 
Advertisements for egg donors and surrogates were appearing in university newspapers across 
the country, and physicians were openly admitting that they were continuing to arrange 
commercial surrogacy and egg donation arrangements. The concerns of potential exploitation 
were not unfounded, but they were unsubstantiated.  
 Overall, the non-inclusion of egg donors and surrogates in the three-phase approach 
resulted in a policy framework and proposed legislation that assumed exploitative experiences 
with little-to-no supporting data. Donors and surrogates were not seen in clinical settings to be 
the primary agents of infertility treatments, rather infertile patient-consumers were seen to be the 
subjects of infertility treatment. This understanding of the surrogate and donor as secondary in 
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the process of assisted reproduction minimized their legitimacy as potential policy actors, and 
consequently, interest in hearing their voices. Indeed, surrogacy and egg donation are often 
referred to as “third-party” reproduction insofar as it is assumed that a couple who represent the 
first and second party interests are assisted in their reproductive efforts by a third-party, that is a 
gamete donor or surrogate.  
Although donors and surrogates themselves did not organize or demand to participate in 
the consultative processes associated with the three-phase approach, this may be attributable to 
the ephemeral nature of both egg donation and (to a lesser extent) surrogacy, and to the patina of 
immorality and illegality acquired through public debate over these practices, in Parliament, and 
the popular press. Donors and surrogates themselves did not actively engage in the policy 
process; however, no research was conducted, no consultations were attempted, and 
consequently, the already secondary or tertiary status of donors and surrogates as reproductive 
citizens, that is to say, as non-actors, was maintained. The conflation of health concerns with 
assumed exploitation of donors worked to legitimate the continuation of egg donation, despite 
potential harms to women’s health, and to expand the discourse of exploitation opened up around 
surrogacy at the time of the Royal Commission, giving a nod to those concerned about 
commercialization while simultaneously allowing the fertility industry to continue its work. 
Although the status-quo of legal, commercial surrogacy and egg donation would continue when 
C-47 died on the Order Paper, the three-phase approach thus promoted the view that surrogates 
are not reproductive citizens in and of themselves, but rather are volunteers or labourers 
peripheral to the family building taking place in fertility clinics. The reproductive citizen entitled 
to care from this perspective is the citizen consumer, the neoliberal citizen subject, who has the 
financial capacity to seek out the family that they want without the help of the state, within the 
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parameters of the (assisted) reproductive marketplace. The reproductive citizen able to make 
well-informed, autonomous choices about their reproductive life is the paying intended parent(s) 
to the exclusion of others.  
 
Infertile Canadians 
Although Proceed with Care validated infertile Canadians as important, legitimate stakeholders 
in the governance of assisted human reproduction, Bill C-47’s criminalization of payment to 
gamete donors and surrogates was seen to be problematic by the most vocal advocates of 
infertile Canadians, namely IAAC. By the time of the three-phase approach, IAAC had expanded 
considerably, holding support groups across the country, and doing so with increased financial 
support from pharmaceutical companies, fertility clinics, and other beneficiaries of the 
commercial practices in assisted reproduction.297  
Although representatives of IAAC had participated in the Royal Commission and the 
organization had responded to its work, the organization only received its seed money in 1990, 
when it sought to establish a network of support groups for infertile people across Canada. By 
1994, however, IAAC was a relatively significant advocacy group speaking for infertile 
Canadians and its network of support groups was well-established. The Royal Commission had 
given the organization a chance to strongly articulate its position, and taken together with its 
federal funding, its organization of seminars (including seminars on adoption in 1993), the 
expansion of support groups, and media coverage of their activities, IAAC gained credibility as 
the national interest group representing infertile people in Canada.  
As discussed in chapter three, IAAC’s affiliation and cooperation with fertility specialists 
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(including the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society and the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists of Canada) was longstanding. Dr. Barwin (who was involved in and supported 
IAAC from the beginning) remained deeply involved with the organization, serving as the Chair 
of its Board of Directors, ensuring a continued relationship between IAAC and fertility 
specialists. But by the mid-1990s, there were new sponsorships and partnerships, both with the 
fertility clinics themselves, and with pharmaceutical companies manufacturing infertility drugs. 
Perhaps the most visible of these relationships has been between IAAC and Serono 
Canada, the leading manufacturer of fertility drugs for the Canadian market. Serono Canada (one 
division of a larger Swiss firm) was incorporated in 1990 at the time of the Royal Commission 
and has, from the outset, been an integral part of the development of public policy governing 
ARTs in Canada, largely through affiliations with physicians and patient groups. By the time of 
Proceed with Care’s publication in 1993, Serono was responsible for three-quarters of the 
market share in fertility drugs in Canada. In fact, Serono was so important a presence in the 
infertility industry that rather than partake in the Royal Commission consultations with the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada in October 1991, there was a separate 
session for Ares-Serono and Serono Canada Inc. held in Ottawa in February 1992.298 At this 
time, Serono had already established relationships with the Canadian Fertility and Andrology 
Society, providing $36,300 (U.S.) to establish a new, U.S. based registry to track IVF procedures 
                                                   
298 Another pharmaceutical company, Roussel-Uclaf also had its own private session with the Commission, in 
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and the use of relevant drugs.299 By the time that the Royal Commission’s report was issued in 
1993, Serono was deeply embedded in the Canadian community of physicians and advocates of 
ARTs.  
It is unclear when the relationship between Serono and IAAC began, but in 1994, Canada 
Newswire included an announcement of Serono’s “Miracle Program,” a project designed to 
increase access to fertility drugs for patient-consumers-intended parents through public education 
and proposals to provide public funding for relevant drugs. Together IAAC and the Demeter 
Quebec Fertility Association300 were engaged in Serono’s Miracle Program, which was at once a 
“public information service,” a means to “address the cost of fertility drugs and the limited 
access to these drugs through government reimbursement policies,” and a way to expand “the 
potential for including cost-effective reimbursements for fertility drugs in health benefit designs 
with employers, insurers and financial institutions.”301 In short, Serono, together with the partner 
organizations, was providing information about infertility, relevant surgical and pharmacological 
treatments, to both physicians and patients. In the case of direct-to-patient delivery, intended 
parents would be able to access information published by Serono and endorsed by IAAC. For 
information kits sent to physicians with information to be distributed to patients, the 
documentation would take on another level of legitimacy, seemingly endorsed by the clinics and 
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physicians doing the distribution. Essentially, the Miracle Program was an effective means of 
getting much-needed information to potential patients facing the challenging and very personal 
experience of undergoing infertility treatments. However, the implicit support of Serono by 
IAAC, Demeter, and relevant physicians built into the structure of the program might have left 
patients to feel like the interests of Serono, the physicians, and intended parents were one and the 
same. The partnership between IAAC and Serono continued, and soon, the funding structure of 
IAAC changed to reflect a model in which pharmaceutical companies, clinics and others 
benefiting from the use of reproductive technologies were, in conjunction with a number of 
smaller federal grants, underwriting the costs of running the organization.  
This is not to say that there is anything inherently problematic with patient groups 
accepting funding from private sources. Indeed, it is increasingly common for patient groups to 
be in some way sponsored by pharmaceutical, biotechnology firms, or other private sources, and 
it has been suggested that this funding need not be problematic if patient groups are upfront and 
transparent about where funding is coming from, how it is used, and ensure that it is given with 
“no strings attached.”302 When costs of research and advocacy work are high and subsidies low, 
patient groups have few places to look other than private funds. With a rise in “disease and 
consumer advocacy” since the 1990s and a rolling back of public funding to such groups, it is no 
surprise that advocates of infertile Canadians have looked to private funding.  
However, funding from any private source might influence the actions of patient groups, 
leading to support and advocacy for access to the drugs, biotechnologies, and services that 
pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology firms, and clinics respectively and collectively 
provide. IAAC has engaged with pharmaceutical companies in ways that suggest that there are 
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“strings attached,” with mail-outs from Serono going to their members, and advertisements for 
Serono and other sponsoring pharmaceutical firms appearing on the IAAC website. This 
cooperation of the private-for-profit actors and charitable organizations advocating for patients 
enables slippage between what is best for those financially benefiting from the use of ARTs, and 
infertile people themselves. It may not only result in conflicts of interest and the public 
representation of the interests of commercial actors and infertile people as the same, but it may 
also lead infertile people to understand their infertility as a medical issue to be treated through 
medical interventions, connected to the work of pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, and to 
the work of fertility clinics.303 In this way, IAACs emphasis on infertility as illness supported by 
their engagements with Serono and other commercial actors obscured the possibility for social 
understandings and for discussions about preventative care, instead presenting drugs and surgical 
interventions as the most important part of their advocacy, and as the correct and necessary way 
to address infertility. By 1995, and the establishment of the voluntary moratorium, IAAC was 
jointly funded by private sponsorships, donations, as well as its the initial starting grant from 
Health Canada. While it continued to facilitate infertility support groups, and to publish a 
bimonthly (and at times, monthly) newsletter, it was increasingly involved in advocacy work, 
fighting against the delisting of IVF in Ontario in 1994 and engaging in the consultations that 
preceded the three-phase approach.  
Bill C-47 was tabled and Setting Boundaries released in June of 1996 and by August, 
IAAC had formed a committee to respond to the proposed legislation and regulatory regime, 
reaching out to fertility clinics, the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, and 
the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society to “speak as a united force” to the Federal Minister 
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of Health. In a letter to the CFAS, Debra McNevin (Chair of the IAAC NRGT Response 
Committee) and Norman Barwin (Chair of the IAAC Board of Directors), proposed further 
collaboration between the CFAS and IAAC. The letter suggested both a “joint Press 
Conference”304 to address concerns about C-47, as well as sending designated members to one 
another’s committee meetings where responses on C-47 or Setting Boundaries was being drafted, 
ensuring alignment between the organizations’ written responses.305  
While IAAC had largely supported the work of the Royal Commission, its opposition to 
the three-phase approach was strong, and it released a report articulating “disappointment” with 
the “condescending, demeaning, and patronizing attitude reflected in the language and tone” of 
C-47 and Setting Boundaries.306 Its opposition was based on two key points. First, IAAC 
opposed Setting Boundaries’ prioritization of preventative infertility care, and its proposed 
hierarchy of care wherein invasive treatments were to be the last resort. Citing the 
ineffectiveness of non-invasive care for certain medical indications, IAAC suggested that leaving 
invasive care as a “last resort” was not a beneficial approach for all users of reproductive 
technologies and that it should be left to doctors, not to the state, to determine what is 
“appropriate treatment for individuals.” Second, IAAC opposed the prohibitions on payment for 
donors and surrogates, citing a potential decline in access to reproductive services, the potential 
use of “dangerous self-help methods” that might expose women to undue risks (i.e., self-
insemination), and the disproportionate nature of the proposed penalties in relation to the 
potential harms.307  
                                                   
304 Dr. Norman B. Barwin and Debra McNevin, Letter to Dr. Claude Gagnon (President, CFAS), “Re: New 
Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Legislation,” August 6, 1996. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Infertility Awareness Association of Canada, Inc., Response to Bill C-47 and “New Reproductive And Genetic 
Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health.” 
307 Ibid.  
!! ! !
148 
IAAC’s response to C-47 is particularly notable given its discussion of infertility as a 
medical issue. IAAC was originally established to coordinate and facilitate a network of support 
groups to help families experiencing infertility, with the additional intention to provide public 
education and engage in advocacy work. It had largely advertised itself as a support and 
educational organization working on behalf of infertile Canadians, but at the time of the 
announcement of the Miracle Program, it noted that this support and education was to be 
achieved…through the “provision of information and advocacy efforts, in partnership with health 
professionals, government, industry, and like organizations,” an evolution from the language of 
infertility support groups and peer education that had been its initial focus. Even while IAAC had 
never been divorced from industry, the early 1990s marked a shift from a focus on self-support 
and peer education that included adoption, to a medical-only model that relied on advocacy to 
access infertility treatments in conjunction with industry partnerships and funding from for-profit 
firms.  
The work of IAAC in the mid-1990s was bound up with rise of deference to medical 
authority and an understanding of pharmaceuticals and new biotechnologies as the desirable 
“cure” for infertility. Unlike patient advocacy groups and health social movements that had 
emerged in the 1980s to contest the nature of expertise and the closed networks of 
biomedicine,308 the work of infertility advocates in the mid-1990s sought to support the status 
quo. Whereas patient advocacy groups had long opposed the institutions of the medical 
establishment including “national biomedical research agendas and the organizational principles 
of clinical trials vis-à-vis access and inclusion,”309 IAAC’s conflation of an open market in 
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reproductive services and patients’ best interests worked to solidify the role of fertility clinics, 
pharmaceutical companies, and biotechnology firms in identifying the ways forward in fertility 
care. This dedication to a medical understanding of infertility and to reproductive technologies as 
a cure is exceptionally clear in IAAC’s discussion of “social infertility” and social solutions to 
infertility, where it is noted that: 
…encouraging adoption, counselling, fostering and other types of loving 
contact with children are good things, but they are not solutions for 
infertility. An approach which gives social ‘solutions’ priority to medical 
solutions is wrong-headed. We cannot support it. Medical interventions will 
enable many people to have children and we feel they should be given the 
opportunity to do so.310 
 
  
In addition to the embedding of biomedical interests in the advocacy of infertility work, 
there was another important development in infertility advocacy in Canada that occurred at the 
time of the three-phase approach. Diane Allen (who had co-founded IAAC’s Toronto chapter in 
1990 with Sherry Dale and the help of a number of other volunteers) created a new national 
advocacy group to help infertile people. The Toronto chapter of IAAC had always been 
particularly active, and in 1995 it branched out on its own, receiving charitable status in 1996. 
According to Allen, the move away from IAAC occurred in part due to the limited funds 
available to the Toronto chapter in relation to its rather substantive membership.311 The new 
organization, the Infertility Network, did not receive government grants and relied on personal 
and corporate donations to fund its increasingly ambitious work. Like IAAC, the Infertility 
Network received corporate grants from pharmaceutical companies, including Serono, especially 
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during its early years.312 
The founding of the Infertility Network is not itself of great note, but the organization 
would come, over the course of the next few years, to distinguish itself from its origins in IAAC. 
Allen herself is the central organizer of the Infertility Network, and while she was initially 
opposed to any restrictions on access to gametes or infertility treatments, her position and with it, 
the work of the Infertility Network would change over time. As will be discussed in chapter five, 
the Infertility Network came to present an alternative model of understanding infertility, focusing 
on sociality by forming a network of those interested in the interrelationships between infertile 
people, LGBTQ people, and donor-conceived families, emphasizing the best interests of children 
born of ARTs. The three-phase approach marked early days for the Infertility Network, but the 
medically-based approach advanced by IAAC, would in some ways be contested by the 
Infertility Network’s socio-ethical approach that emerged in the years-to-come. 
 Overall, the years between the Royal Commission and the death of C-47 on the Order 
Paper were, for those advocating on behalf of infertile Canadians and namely IAAC, marked by 
a shift in funding sources with more and more involvement with the private beneficiaries of 
assisted reproduction. The resulting tangle of clinics, physicians, infertile Canadians, 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies suggests both a great possibility for conflicts of 
interest, and for the conflation of the needs of infertile Canadians with those of commercial 
actors. What would emerge in the subsequent years is that by reinforcing of the interests of 
infertile Canadians as necessarily biomedical, other possible approaches are obscured including 
preventative care, or addressing the self-articulated interests of children conceived through 
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reproductive technologies. The reproductive citizenship of infertile Canadians was necessarily 
intertwined with a biological citizenship in which infertility qua infertile people came to mean a 
need for potential treatment through ARTs.  
 
Donor-conceived Families 
The expansion of advocacy on behalf of infertile Canadians occurred in tandem with the growth 
of the New Reproductive Alternatives Society. Following the Royal Commission, Shirley Pratten 
and the NRAS emerged even more significantly as important actors in the policy debates. The 
work of the organization continued to be part support, part advocacy, and Pratten continued to 
organize meetings of donor-conceived people and their families (including the yearly picnic), in 
addition to acting as spokesperson for the NRAS in consultations with the federal government 
leading to and during the three-phase approach.  
At this time, the policy preferences of the NRAS were broad and varied. The organization 
continued to work on behalf of donor-conceived families, again providing a balance between 
support and advocacy, and working to ensure that people could continue to use donor conception 
to build their families. The organization spoke on behalf of at least one sperm donor concerned 
about the implications of benefiting from the avails of paid donation, several families of donor-
conceived people wanting to discourage the widely held practice of keeping donor-conception a 
family secret, and others interested in legal reforms to ensure that the non-biological parent(s) of 
donor-conceived children had substantive parental rights.313 The organization would slowly 
come to focus more and more on the issue of donor anonymity, but at the time of the three-phase 
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approach, the NRAS was broadly engaged in providing support and protection to “other people 
who are wanting children this way,” as well as privileging the best interests of children 
conceived using donor gametes.314  
The interest of the NRAS in addressing the needs of both children conceived of donor 
gametes and those who had used to use donor gametes to conceive, is particularly notable given 
that the interests of intended parents and donor-conceived children (and their families) are 
sometimes seen as divergent. Although donor anonymity was not necessarily the primary issue 
of interest for the NRAS at the time of the three-phase approach, it was an important part of its 
work, and Shirley Pratten spoke about donor anonymity widely, asserting that children should 
have the option of knowing who their donor is, and proposing limits on anonymous gamete 
donation. She advocated for a system of open-donor identification in which children could 
choose to know their donor if desired. This stood in contrast to the position of IAAC and the 
professional organizations representing specialists of reproductive medicine, who advocated for 
a continuation of anonymous donation as it was believed that there would be a dearth of donors 
if they were forced to forego the protection from future parental claims and privacy that 
anonymous donation offered. Infertile Canadians likely to use donor gametes to build their 
families, as represented by IAAC, were concerned that their access to donor conception would be 
impeded by challenges to the existing system of anonymous, paid donation, and further, that 
eliminating anonymity would mean a breach of donors’ privacy. This would emerge more clearly 
in the hearings on AHRA, but the tension between the needs of intended parents, and donor-
conceived people was present both in the consultations that occurred throughout the three-phase 
approach, as well as in the various interests represented by the NRAS.  
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The NRAS was not afforded more opportunities to speak with government 
representatives than IAAC for example, however the policy documents and particularly Setting 
Boundaries, Enhancing Health suggest that the positions of the NRAS on addressing the 
interests of donor-conceived people had a significant influence on the government’s work on 
donor conception and specifically on the issue of donor anonymity. The Royal Commission had 
recommended that the practice of allowing gamete donors to remain anonymous should 
continue, although monitored by a registry so that medical information could be disclosed in 
cases of “serious medical need as determined by a court of law.”315 The Royal Commission 
noted concern about the access of donor-conceived people to medical information about their 
donors, and the need to protect anonymity to ensure that the supply of donor semen could 
continue.316 As noted above, Setting Boundaries took a different approach, noting that “the desire 
of infertile Canadians to have a biological child of their own was being given more attention than 
the health of children born from these technologies;”317 a problem to be remedied through 
regulations that put children first. This included enabling children to know their genetic origins, 
allegedly ensuring that they do not experience “negative psychological consequences” by being 
deprived of knowing “half of who they are.”318  
Setting Boundaries also proposed a donor registry system to ensure the centralization, 
protection, and availability of donor information in an ongoing way. The commitment of the 
NRAS to enabling donor-conceived people to have access to identifying information about their 
donors was therefore more prevalent in Setting Boundaries than it had been at the time of the 
                                                   
315 Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care, 483. Note that commissioner 
Suzanne Scorsone wrote a dissenting opinion on a number of the Commission’s recommendations, and on donor 
anonymity, she suggested that donor-conceived children should have a right to know their genetic origins. Scorsone 
in Proceed with Care, 1062–63. 
316 Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care, 441–50.  
317 Health Canada, New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health, 19. 
318 Ibid., 19–22. 
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Royal Commission. This shift followed the changing attitudes of the NRAS itself, which moved 
from asking for non-identifying information about donors with a registry to a system of open 
donation in which donor-conceived people should be entitled to know who their donors are, 
including but beyond their medical histories. According to Pratten, “when the New Reproductive 
Alternatives Society was formed…we had a belief that somehow we didn’t have a right to expect 
more than non-identifying [information] because that the way this was, and this had been done 
this way for so long. Somehow it was so deeply entrenched, and this had been done this way for 
so long.”319 By the mid-1990s, the NRAS was clearer about the interests of children born of 
ARTs, and asserted that there should be access to donor identities in a broader, more substantive 
way than had been previously articulated. Following Health Canada’s consultations with Pratten 
and her daughter Olivia in the kitchen of their Nanaimo home,320 as well as discussions with a 
number of other donor-conceived families, this position was included in Setting Boundaries, 
Enhancing Health. 
 The explicit articulation of the interests of donor-conceived people in Setting Boundaries 
did not result in any substantive policy change. When Bill C-47 died on the Order Paper, the 
potential regulatory framework set out by Setting Boundaries died too. Even if C-47 had passed, 
IAAC and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society, amongst other organizations, were 
adamant that eliminating anonymous donation would result in a dearth of eggs and sperm, and it 
is likely that had the regulatory proposals been pushed forward, they would not have passed.321 
What did occur, however, was recognition of the importance of donor-conceived people and 
                                                   
319 Interview with Shirley Pratten, March 21, 2012 
320 Interview with Shirley Pratten, March 21, 2012; Interview with Francince Manseau, December 8, 2011.  
321 This would ultimately occur when proposals for the elimination of donor anonymity occurred during the 
consideration of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act. See discussion in chapter six of this dissertation. See also 
Motluk, “Donor Anonymity in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act.”  
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their families as important actors in the governance of assisted human reproduction far beyond 
what had occurred at the time of the Royal Commission. In no small part due to the considerable 
efforts of the NRAS, donor-conceived people were understood to be central to the analysis of 
reproductive technologies.  
 
Summary: Boundaries Indeed 
On the one hand, the three-phase approach effectively identified Canadians as in need of 
“protection” from the adverse effects of ARTs, and without regulation or at least, regulations-to-
come, asserted a sweeping understanding of the public interest in this field. Legal scholars, 
medical professionals, scientists, and advocates of infertile Canadians argued that the outright 
banning of commercial surrogacy and gamete donation infringed on the capacity of infertile 
Canadians to use reproductive technologies, limited their perceived right to build their families 
or, limited the capacity of gamete donors and surrogates to consent to helping others do so.  
On the other hand, by making criminal law about reproductive technologies and 
relegating all other aspects of ARTs to future regulations and interventions-to-come, the attempts 
to govern in this period worked to reassert the biomedical understanding of infertility and 
assisted reproduction. Fertility preservation, judicial intervention in pregnancy, adoption, and 
other elements of the Royal Commission’s work that did not directly concern the use of 
reproductive technologies in the context of the laboratory or the clinic were not included in the 
federal government’s proposed interventions. The voluntary moratorium and C-47 explicitly 
focused on the need to criminalize the most ethically challenging of ARTs, addressing the most 
important and concerning practices in terms of their potential misuses. Ensuring access to 
contraception and providing social supports to enable women to have their children earlier in 
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life, for example, were not really taken up by the federal government at this time, and the broadly 
conceived area of study imagined for the Royal Commission and subsequent federal intervention 
was demonstrably narrowed to the use and practice of ARTs in a biomedical context. 
 Furthermore, by using the criminal law power (under s.91 (27) of the Constitution Act 
1867) and addressing ARTs as a matter of public health and safety, the federal government tried 
to establish a foothold in the governance of assisted reproduction as a means to circumvent the 
complicated jurisdictional politics of health care. Using the criminal law, however, meant that 
the federal government had to identify its engagement with ARTs as an issue of public health 
and safety, attaching sanctions to prohibitions. The advancement of individual reproductive 
autonomy and the capacity to choose reproductive technologies as a method of medical treatment 
were challenged by the proposed law, which took up some of the harshest elements of the 
Commission’s recommendations, and applied the criminal law. The proposed legislation, 
justified in the name of public health, safety, and human dignity, necessarily clashed with the 
desire to self-regulate articulated by physicians and scientists, and conflicted with infertility 
patients’ interests in medical self-regulation. While a biomedical imperative was apparent in the 
Royal Commission, the federal efforts to govern ARTs attempted to curb biomedical freedom in 
the name of “protection.” This tension between individually understood biomedical interests 
supported by infertile Canadians and medical professionals, and the broad criminal approach 
taken by the federal government was an important reason that Bill C-47 did not become law.  
At the same time, stakeholders were working to establish their own place and advance 
their own interests in the use of ARTs. For LGBTQ Canadians, and particularly lesbian mothers, 
concern about safe uses of donor sperm meant an increased desire to engage in insemination in 
clinical contexts, or at least to order semen from safe, typically anonymous sources through 
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physicians or sperm banks. The consequence was a medicalization of assisted insemination and 
new inroads to using ARTs in the context of fertility clinics. Through litigation, and namely 
Potter v Korn, fertility clinics opened more and more to LGBTQ patients, normalizing queer 
experiences of reproduction as occurring within clinical settings. For surrogates and donors, little 
changed in this period beyond a shift away from broad concerns about women’s health and 
towards unsubstantiated claims about exploitation. The reframing of third-party reproduction 
from a matter of health to a matter of exploitation refocused the debate to an issue of altruism 
versus commercialization, and made possible the continuation of unpaid egg donation—a 
relatively risky, and not-entirely-necessary procedure that is always done for the benefit of 
someone other than the donor. This period also saw an emphasis on the part of the federal 
government on the interests of donor-conceived people, including an explicit affirmation that at 
times, the needs of children born of ARTs should be put before those wanting to build their 
families. The inclusion of recommendations to eliminate donor anonymity in the three-phase 
approach, attributable to the efforts of the NRAS, amounted to little more than a discursive shift, 
but for the first time, donor-conceived people and their families were identified outright as 
important actors in the governance of assisted human reproduction in Canada. 
Infertile Canadians, particularly through the work of IAAC, were more and more 
wrapped up in the work of commercial and biomedical actors including professional medical 
associations, fertility clinics, and pharmaceutical firms. The diverse interests of infertile people 
and the potential for a wide variety of supports, treatments, and alternatives to reproductive 
technologies that might be of use to infertile people were largely discounted in favour of the 
expensive, and invasive use of ARTs. This is not to say that IAAC did not legitimately advocate 
for infertile people needing access to ARTs, or that clinicians, clinics, or others were not 
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providing good care to patients, but rather, that throughout the three-phase approach, the interests 
of infertile people were intertwined with the interests of a number of for-profit actors.  
  In short, throughout the mid-1990s, the Government of Canada largely reasserted the 
understandings of reproductive citizenship put forth by the Royal Commission. The advancement 
of an individual biomedical model of infertility care was held up as the primary site for 
legislative intervention at the federal level, exclusive of LGBTQ people as well as donors and 
surrogates who might be engaged in the use of reproductive technologies. The already-peripheral 
commitments of the Royal Commission to addressing preventative care, exposures to 
environmental chemicals, and sexual and reproductive health moved further and further down 
the government agenda as the criminalization and regulation of reproductive technologies 
themselves were prioritized. At the same time, several stakeholder groups were effective in 
identifying their opposition to the federal approach and working to ensure access on their own 
terms. Employing a variety of strategies including litigation, grassroots advocacy and lobbying 
work, educational campaigns, and partnerships with fertility clinics, pharmaceutical companies, 
and biotechnology firms, LGBTQ people, infertile Canadians, and donor-conceived people came 
to be understood as increasingly important to the governance of reproductive technologies in 
Canada.  
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Chapter Five: Stakeholders in the Breach 
The failure of the three-phase approach that occurred with the death of C-47 is often seen as the 
beginning of a four-year lull of federal action to govern ARTs in Canada.322 Existing texts on the 
development of the AHRA explore the period between 1997 and 2001 briefly, if at all. However, 
following the death of C-47, there were a number of important developments from a policy 
standpoint, including the establishment of a Canadian Biotechnology Strategy, the passage of 
new regulations governing the importation and use of donor semen, the creation of a framework 
for sexual and reproductive health, and a private member’s bill to address reproductive cloning. 
And although none of these developments alone signifies a major shift in the direction of the 
public policy following C-47, taken together, they demonstrate that assisted human reproduction 
was increasingly identified both as a private matter (wherein individuals are responsible for 
making choices about their health care) and a means of regulating family formation. The focus 
on ARTs as a matter of private choice and the expansion of infertility services throughout the 
late 1990s worked to undermine the understanding of ARTs as a matter of health, and 
particularly a matter of health with important implications for women as well as resulting 
children. Also, more than ever before, concerns about federal-provincial relations filtered into 
the federal government’s approach to governing ARTs given a new emphasis on consultation in 
social policy and attempts to diffuse tensions around federal interventions in health care.  
 While these federal interventions were incrementally moving the policy field forward, 
donor-conceived people, infertile people and LGBTQ Canadians were articulating their own 
                                                   
322 See for example Campbell, “A Place for Criminal Law in the Regulation of Reproductive Technologies”; 
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interests in diverse ways. These stakeholders participated in consultations and in some cases, 
refocused their efforts in the period following C-47. In the case of donor-conceived people, the 
New Reproductive Alternatives Society forged new alliances with infertile Canadians, 
establishing that donor anonymity is an important issue both for families who have donor-
conceived children and for those looking to build their families with donor gametes. This period 
was also marked by other important developments for infertile Canadians, most notably, the case 
of Cameron v Nova Scotia, which attempted (but failed) to increase access to IVF in Nova Scotia 
based on the argument that IVF is a medically necessary procedure. This case is of particular 
importance, given that in the absence of legislation governing ARTs, and a lack of access to the 
relevant technologies, Canadians began to look to the courts to have their perceived right to 
reproduce using IVF and other technologies recognized. The Cameron case provides an 
important example of the discourse surrounding access to and payment for IVF. Infertile 
Canadians have contested not the lack of regulation in a high-cost, privately provided field, but 
rather, that they had to pay for it themselves. For LGBTQ Canadians, the courts also provided a 
viable means for reproductive citizenship claims in the period after C-47, particularly when the 
regulations governing the use of donor semen impinged on the capacity of LGBTQ Canadians to 
access sperm. Further, in this period, Dykes Planning Tykes expanded considerably, offering 
much-needed information about conception options to LGBTQ people in Toronto, and the 
Lesbian Mothers’ Association of Quebec (LMA) emerged to do similar work in Quebec.  
 For egg donors and surrogates, things were quite different. While egg donors and 
surrogates remained far from visible as stakeholders after C-47 died on the Order Paper, 
throughout the late 1990s, there was a significant increase in surrogacy, as well as egg donation 
that accompanied the proliferation of ARTs in Canada. What emerged were a number of 
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brokerage agencies, led by former surrogates that at once organized the largely ad-hoc business 
of surrogacy and egg donation, and also, came to represent the voices of surrogates and, to a 
lesser extent, egg donors.  
 This chapter traces both federal government and stakeholder interventions that occurred 
in the period from 1997-2001. It identifies actions at the federal level that were not direct or 
immediate predecessors to the AHRA, but served to reinforce the idea that ARTs were a matter of 
individual, private, reproductive choice and, in the case of the semen regulations, choice 
accessible only to certain kinds of families. This chapter also addresses the ways in which 
community stakeholders, namely donor-conceived people, infertile people, LGBTQ Canadians, 
and egg donors and surrogates engaged with these interventions (where and when they did) and 
how they sought to articulate their interests outside of federal action. With or without legislation, 
there was still work to be done.  
 
Federal Initiatives in the Wake of C-47 
The failure of C-47 left the federal government reeling. As noted in chapter four, there had been 
much criticism of the three-phase approach for being hastily introduced, too-tentative, 
unenforceable, and a matter of provincial jurisdiction. It was clear that Ottawa would have to 
reconsider before trying again. A more comprehensive program was out of the question, largely 
due to the tenuous relationship between the federal and provincial governments,323 and there 
would need to be considerable intergovernmental consultations before any legislation could 
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proceed.324 Beyond comprehensive legislation, however, there were a number of other ways that 
progress was to be made in the governance of ARTs.  
 
Bill C-247 
In February 1997, just a month prior to C-47 being reviewed by the Standing Committee on 
Health, scientists from the United Kingdom announced they had successfully cloned the first 
mammal, Dolly the sheep. Parliament and media alike were swept up in renewed discussions 
about the need to regulate genetic technologies.325 This fervour was apparent in the committee 
debates regarding C-47, but with the legislation already under significant scrutiny and doomed to 
die on the Order Paper, there was little to be done.  
When the next parliamentary session began, Pauline Picard (a Member of Parliament for 
the Bloc Québécois who had been a member of the Standing Committee on Health’s 
subcommittee on C-47), introduced new legislation. Bill C-247 was a private member’s bill 
designed to criminalize genetic manipulation and cloning, effectively reintroducing the relevant 
clauses of C-47 as new amendments to the Criminal Code. Picard’s bill not only responded to the 
urgency to legislate raised by Dolly, but also to some of the critiques raised against C-47. Rather 
than address reproductive and genetic technologies in one bill, C-247 suggested simply taking 
action to criminalize certain genetic technologies, treating the commercialization of reproduction 
and advances in genetic research differently. Bill C-247 also took up one of the least contentious 
elements of C-47, as all parties had previously supported a ban on human cloning. Further, the 
Bloc Québécois had critiqued C-47 for developing new statutory legislation that would require 
                                                   
324 Nancy Miller Chenier, Intergovernmental Consultations on Health: Toward a National Framework on 
Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2002), 5. 
325 Gerlach et al., Becoming Biosubjects, 92. 
!! ! !
163 
federal coordination to implement and that would centralize responsibility for addressing 
breaches of the law. As C-247 would criminalize cloning and genetic manipulation by amending 
the Criminal Code, it would circumvent jurisdictional concerns by focusing not on matters of 
health, but rather on genetic technologies, putting “science fiction procedures” into the criminal 
law.326  
Although private members bills are rarely passed, and particularly when introduced by 
backbenchers belonging to parties that are not the government of the day, they also serve an 
important parliamentary function by keeping important issues on the Order Paper, providing a 
site for parliamentary debate on areas of public interest on which the government is not yet ready 
to take action.327 It was clear from the outset that the Liberal government would not support C-
247. At first reading, Joe Volpe, Secretary to the Minister of Health, stated frankly that the 
discussion should continue, but that omnibus legislation was soon to come.328 Nevertheless, C-
247, was passed through to second reading and committee stage—remaining on the Order Paper 
throughout the parliamentary session—and was considered a number of times during meetings of 
the Standing Committee on Health, when a number of amendments to the proposed bill were 
made. In a majority Liberal government, the Bill could have easily been made to fail at second 
reading, so it is notable that the debate over C-247 went on for an extended period, and was even 
considered in committee; the federal government allowed this debate to continue and for 
perspectives on the need to ban cloning to be heard. Although C-247 was destined to die on the 
Order Paper, it allowed the debate over cloning to continue as the federal government struggled 
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to develop more comprehensive legislation that would fulfill both the criminal and regulatory 
functions imagined by the Royal Commission and re-articulated in the three-phase approach.  
C-247, and its emphasis on genetic rather than reproductive technologies, was particularly 
important for the then-impending introduction of the AHRA. The Bill not only allowed for 
ongoing debate about assisted reproduction to take place in the House of Commons, but it also 
worked to reframe the legislation-to-come as a matter of rapidly developing genetic technologies 
as much as (or more than) assisted reproduction. For women’s health advocates and those 
engaged in the real-life use of reproductive technologies, this reframing of the impending 
legislation as a matter of genetics rather than reproduction was problematic insofar as it shifted 
concern away from the risks of reproductive technologies to women and the children thus 
conceived. The hype about Dolly was harnessed through the debate over C-247, and in the 
government’s responses in the House of Commons and in committee, it was clear that action on 
cloning was imminent. 
 
The Canadian Biotechnology Strategy 
When the new parliamentary session began in August 1997, the Speech from the Throne 
included the recognition of “biotechnology as one of the important knowledge-intensive sectors 
targeted for future jobs and growth.”329 The Canadian Biotechnology Strategy (CBS) was 
officially announced in August 1998, detailed in a policy document entitled The 1998 Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy: An Ongoing Renewal Process. As noted in this document, the CBS was  
                                                   
329 Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session Thirty-Sixth Parliament of Canada,” 1997.  
The establishment of the CBS is attributable in part, to the work of the Coalition of Biomedical and Health research, 
which had long been advocating for investment in biotechnology, arguing that “basic research in genetics yielded a 
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a policy framework coordinated within and across a number of federal line departments of the 
federal government to promote the advancement of biotechnology. This new strategy was, in 
fact, an attempt to redouble the efforts of the National Biotechnology Strategy which had, since 
1983, been a means to coordinate biotechnological projects across the federal government.330 A 
secretariat for the CBS was established within Industry Canada, and the department also chaired 
the CBS Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee. In total, eleven departments and 
agencies were represented.331 Although the CBS would eventually involve diverse projects and 
different attempts to garner investment in the Canadian biotechnology sector, it is particularly 
notable that the federal government provided significant funding to these projects, which from 
1998 to June 2007 involved total spending of approximately $450 million.332 
Critics of the CBS were concerned that the strategy would privilege the voices of 
industry, marginalize social, ethical, and health-related interests, and would require citizens to 
engage in self-protection from the harms of new biotechnologies (i.e., by educating themselves, 
by making the “right” choices in terms of the appropriate uses of technologies) in the name of 
expanded consumer choice.333 These critiques were not unfounded, as although the funding, 
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focus, and organizational structure of the CBS would evolve throughout its existence, it was 
primarily presented as a means to enable economic growth through the expansion of the 
biotechnology sector, and only secondarily in terms of the benefits and challenges to the lives of 
Canadians that might result. This is clear, for example, in the language of “producers” and 
“consumers” used to describe Canadians engaged with biotechnologies throughout the 1998 CBS 
document, even though most of the Canadian biotechnology industry at that time (approximately 
60%) focused on health care, 334 with consumers and patients theorized together.335 Despite the 
inclusion of social, ethical, and health-related concerns as part of the CBS and the organizations 
which grew out of it, overall, the policy documents and reports published in relation to the CBS 
“leave the reader with the unmistakable conclusion that the commercialization of this science 
and its resulting technological applications is the driving motivation.”336 For critics of the CBS, 
the problem was not the expansion of the biotechnology sector per se, but rather the privileging 
of economic expansion at the expense of social, ethical and health-related interests. 
 The CBS did not explicitly focus on women’s health, or assisted human reproduction, but 
reproductive technologies and genetic research were largely assumed to fall within its 
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purview.337 The CBS’ emphasis on the commercial uses of biotechnologies was particularly 
problematic for feminist scholars, given the absence of any discussion about the disproportionate 
use of reproductive biotechnologies on women’s bodies, as well as women’s engagement in 
managing decision-making about “health care, food, household products, medical devices, drugs, 
and other pharmaceuticals.”338  
Others critiqued the CBS for its emphasis on expanding the biotechnology sector, and 
with it women’s reproductive choices, insofar as the language of “choice” brings with it an 
understanding of individual risk management, and personal responsibility for mitigating harm.339 
In the context of a neoliberal citizenship regime, the commitment to choice above all may 
translate to a failure to recognize the ongoing importance of collective concerns. Rather than 
preventative care and a focus on ensuring no harm is done, the expansion of biotechnology 
couched in the language of choice often works to provide new solutions to newfound harms, 
rather than preventing problems in the first place. For example: 
[I]n response to demands for healthy pregnancies and healthy babies, women 
are offered a gamut of prenatal tests. In response to demands for safer, cleaner 
environments from which carcinogenic materials are removed to protect our 
health, we are offered costly procedures that will screen us for DNA patterns 
thought to be associated with an increased risk of developing breast cancer, as 
well as with ‘prophylactic’ mastectomies, or expensive drugs (of unproven 
safety) alleged to prevent breast cancer.340 
 
It follows that in response to demands to address rising rates of infertility, more reproductive 
choices, such as the use of IVF, donor eggs, or surrogacy, were made available and, through the 
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promotion of new investment in the biotechnology sector promoted by the CBS, could be made 
even more widely available. However, for many women, fewer biotechnological solutions might 
do more to enhance reproductive choice. Improved sexual health education, increased 
availability of obstetrical and gynaecological care, unpolluted environments, and increased 
supports for young mothers might have been more effective in heralding an expansion of 
reproductive choices in a way biotechnologies could not provide. 
In response to the CBS (and the simultaneous reorientation of Health Canada’s Health 
Protection Branch to emphasize industry self-regulation), Roxanne Mykitiuk has noted the 
discrepancy between the urgency given to industry-oriented initiatives and the relatively 
tentative, hesitant approach on the part of the federal government to introducing “legislation to 
regulate the health effects of the new reproductive and genetic technologies.”341 Bill C-47 died 
on the Order Paper in early 1997, and reports suggested that the Bill would soon be 
reintroduced.342 It was not until 2001, however, that any bill was brought to Parliament, and even 
then, it was presented as draft legislation. In contrast, the CBS was identified as a government 
priority in the 1997 Speech from the Throne, and within months, consultations, a secretariat, and 
funding were established.343 Although feminist actors and other critics had long advocated a 
cautious approach to developing biotechnology and a need to understand ethical, legal, and 
social implications, the CBS moved forward quickly, touted as a means to advance the Canadian 
economy and to bring Canada into the new millennium.344  
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The Semen Regulations 
As noted in chapter four, concerns about the use of fresh semen in donor insemination led to the 
introduction of the Semen Regulations (The Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted 
Conception Regulations) in 1996, requiring not only stringent testing of semen, but also going 
through a physician to acquire semen for insemination. This at once worked to medicalize and 
legitimize lesbian insemination through direct engagement with physicians (and oftentimes with 
fertility clinics), although it also somewhat limited the capacity of women seeking to order 
semen from the United States or to use a known donor to do so.  
In 1999, the restrictions were revised, presenting new, significant obstacles for LGBTQ 
Canadians using or donating semen. Following a reported case of chlamydia contracted from 
donor semen, Health Canada inspected a number of sperm banks in Canada, and found that there 
were “deficiencies in testing” and non-compliance with the 1996 regulations.345 Donor semen 
both domestic and imported was quarantined until compliance could be proven. During the 
quarantine, Health Canada collaborated with the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (and 
the Canadian Standards Association) to review the 1996 regulations to develop revisions.346 The 
revisions were issued in December 1999 as a Health Canada Directive called the Technical 
Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination, adding another element of regulation to the 
use and donation of donor semen. In addition to new testing requirements, the Directive 
stipulated who could donate. The exclusion criteria included (amongst others), donors employed 
by sperm banks, donors older than forty years of age, donors with a history of certain diseases, 
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and donors excluded from blood donation in Canada.347 This latter criterion—donors excluded 
from donating blood—notably included “men who have had sex with another man, even once, 
since 1977.”348 Additions to the Directive would allow exceptions “in exceptional circumstances, 
to donor semen that would otherwise be prohibited from distribution under the Semen 
Regulations,” that did allow men who have had sex with men to provide semen as donors if they 
received special dispensation from the federal Minister of Health.  
The 1999 revisions of the semen regulations had important implications for LGBTQ use 
of donor sperm. First, the ever-more stringent testing (which rightly sought to protect the health 
of women and those conceived) limited the number of sperm banks in Canada, as many were 
unable to uphold the new, high standards. Fewer choices were available to all women, although 
this was particularly important for lesbians whose access to queer-friendly sperm banks was 
already a significant challenge.349 Secondly, the 1999 updates to the semen regulations required 
that the semen of anyone who was not the sexual partner of the recipient be quarantined. This 
meant that only heterosexual sexual partners could avoid the six-month waiting period and the 
quarantine because of the presumption that if a woman was having intercourse with someone, 
she was already subject to the sexual health risks associated with insemination. Single women 
and lesbians would nearly always be subject to the regulations. However, as Epstein has 
suggested, a woman’s choice to be inseminated by a known donor and to undertake the risks of 
donation are her choice, and the risks of “being inseminated with the sperm of someone one is 
having sex with”350 are no different from being inseminated by a known donor that one chooses. 
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The concern is not that choice is unduly limited, but rather that the risks of a known donor are 
seen to be greater than those of sexual intercourse. From this view, one can autonomously 
choose the risks of intercourse, but not of using a known donor. Subjecting women who are not 
having sex with their donors to a waiting period (and to more stringent testing) places an undue 
burden on lesbians and single women and impedes their ability to reproduce. Finally, the 
restriction preventing men who have had sex with men from donating sperm, even in cases 
where they are known donors, without special dispensation, reflects a homophobic equation of 
gay identity with a risky body, and particularly with the HIV/AIDS virus. This not only 
discriminates against gay men, but also inhibits their ability to be donors or to engage in 
genetically related co-parenting relationships without undertaking a “different and costly process 
in order to get special permission from Health Canada.”351  
 LGBTQ Canadians would fight back against the new semen regulations, using the courts 
to assert that the capacity to use or donate sperm should not unnecessarily burden people on the 
basis of their sexual orientation. The provisions prohibiting men who have had sex with men 
from being sperm donors was the subject of an Ontario court case challenging the 1999 
Directive. This case was brought forward in 2003 by a woman who attempted to conceive using 
the semen of a known donor who was both gay and over the age of forty, and therefore not 
eligible to provide sperm without approval from the Minister of Health.352 The woman wanted to 
use artificial insemination in a clinic to improve the likelihood that the insemination would be 
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successful,353 but her donor did not want to apply for approval or even to have his semen 
quarantined and stored.354 He wanted fresh semen to be used to avoid the possibility that it would 
be held in storage facility and potentially misused. “Susan Doe” claimed that in preventing her 
from choosing her semen donor, the Directive infringed upon her equality rights and right to 
security of the person under s.15 and s.7 of the Charter and further, that in unjustly 
differentiating between her donor and other donors, it also infringed upon her donor’s equality 
rights. Egale Canada (formerly EGALE) served as an intervener in the case although it had not 
prioritized ARTs and queer parenting relative to other issues in its mandate, 355 and had not 
engaged in the policy debate during the three-phase approach. Nevertheless, the Susan Doe case 
was aligned with Egale Canada’s interest in Charter cases addressing discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, and the organization sought and won intervener status in the case. 
The Court, however, found that there was no discrimination against lesbians seeking out 
known donors on the basis of sexual orientation, because the Directive did not establish a scheme 
in which only the donor, single women, and lesbians are subject to scrutiny. Rather, Dambrot J 
argued that all donor semen is scrutinized, with the exception of women using the semen of her 
spouse or sexual partner as “there is little point in imposing the Regulations on a woman seeking 
assisted conception with the semen of her spouse or sexual partner, because she has already been 
exposed to any risk that exists.”356 Furthermore, the Court did not consider the claims that the 
Directive discriminated against Susan Doe’s donor on the basis of his sexual orientation because 
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he was not the plaintiff. The decision was upheld on appeal.357 
 The Directive, especially in consideration of the Susan Doe case, is indicative of how 
semen collection and distribution are regulated in ways that understand nuclear families and 
heterosexual couples as the “normal” users of assisted reproductive technologies, and all others 
as exceptions to the rule. The restrictions on both known donors and on gay donors fail to 
consider how single women and lesbians may rely on donors to build their families, and further 
perpetuates gay stereotypes about being “diseased with HIV unless a physician and the 
government state otherwise”358 As with the restrictions on blood donation from which the semen 
regulations were derived, there is a double standard of risk that is based on outmoded and 
problematic assumptions about the precarity and safety of gay men’s bodily fluids.359 It is clear 
that testing and quarantine are necessary and important when derived from an anonymous donor, 
or in cases where women do not know about or trust the safety of their donor’s semen. However, 
requiring women to delay insemination for at least six months to have the semen of a trusted, 
known donor tested and quarantined is an infringement on her capacity to reproduce, and creates 
a restriction on choice of donor that does not exist for heterosexual women using the semen of a 
sexual partner.360  
The limits on the use of known donors established by the semen regulations are 
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compounded when women choose a known gay donor, given the requirement of ministerial 
approval in such cases. This “permit to procreate scheme”361 suggests that semen of gay men is 
inherently problematic whereas the semen of men in a sexual relationship with the intended 
recipient of their donation is not. The specific restrictions on the use of semen provided by gay 
men unjustly limits the capacity of all women to use the semen of the donor they want to use, 
and moreover, establishes boundaries for gay men engaged in donation for others, or providing 
semen to conceive their own children. The semen regulations send a clear message about Health 
Canada’s understanding of legitimate participants in the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies that excludes gay men and perpetuates a heteronormative, singular (nuclear) model 
of the family that precludes the provision of semen from men who have sex with men. 
 
The Consultations on a Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health  
In 1998, following the failure of C-47, Health Canada took steps to implement a different set of 
recommendations from the Royal Commission, namely preventative approaches to sexual and 
reproductive health. The causes of infertility were an important aspect of the Royal 
Commission’s report, and while its recommendations focused largely on establishing a 
legislative and regulatory framework, some attention was given to the need to also engage in 
infertility prevention especially in relation to the transmission of sexually transmitted infections. 
Following the publication of the Commission’s report, there had been efforts to address sexual 
and reproductive health including the development of guidelines for sexual health education 
through the work of a federal-provincial-territorial working group,362 but a comprehensive 
national strategy as proposed by the Royal Commission was yet to occur.  
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Working to establish a “coordinated national approach for promoting sexual and 
reproductive health,”363 Health Canada officials led a consultation process that included other 
stakeholders, namely, “federal departments, provincial and territorial governments, and key 
national non-governmental organizations.”364 The purpose of the consultations was, broadly, to 
develop a strategic framework on improving the sexual and reproductive health of Canadians, 
directly addressing the Royal Commission’s recommendations.365 The resulting report titled 
(very literally) A Report from Consultations on a Framework for Sexual and Reproductive 
Health, provided a broad overview of some of the most significant concerns about the sexual and 
reproductive health of Canadians, providing “quite general” strategies that establish “a 
comprehensive yet flexible foundation for development of more specific actions by various 
partners.”366 
 The Report’s broad approach to sexual and reproductive health recognized the 
fundamental nature of sexuality to human experience, and explicitly explored issues of gender, 
socioeconomic status, ability, race and ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and health status. The 
Report also articulated some of the concerns of women’s health advocates about the rising use of 
reproductive technologies, suggesting that infertility prevention be prioritized rather than 
reproductive technologies. Ultimately, the Report provided eight ethical principles, six “strategic 
directions,” and a number of suggested “next steps,” to guide future actions discussed in the 
consultations. These next steps proved to be problematic as there was little uptake of the Report, 
and no real plans to develop specific future actions or a strategy for implementation. The vague 
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guiding principles, directions, and next steps were never more than words on a page.367 The 
consultation process and report stood alone as initiatives to address women’s reproductive and 
sexual health, but the national strategy envisioned by the Royal Commission and in the Report 
was never established.368 The commitment to protecting sexual and reproductive health, and 
particularly women’s reproductive health, that the Report was intended to address resulted in yet 
another exercise where the recommendations of the Royal Commission were considered and not 
implemented. The consultative approach was important to ensuring that stakeholders were 
listened to, but the vacuous promises of the Report pushed the possibility of decisive action on 
sexual and reproductive health too far down the federal agenda, and too far into the future for 
anything to tangibly occur.  
Taken together, C-247, the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy, the semen regulations, and 
the proposed framework for sexual and reproductive health, are indicative of the range of federal 
engagement with policymaking on reproductive technologies following the failure of Bill C-47. 
These attempts to govern assisted human reproduction set by advancing discussions of cloning, 
investing in biotechnologies, regulating queer families, and holding consultations on future 
sexual health initiatives, suggest that in the immediate wake of failed legislation, the federal 
government was engaging in the governance of assisted human reproduction outside of attempts 
to broadly legislate. These attempts prioritized the marketplace of biotechnology and 
biomedicine, while advancing understandings of the appropriate use of reproductive technologies 
as occurring in nuclear, heterosexual families, despite the advances made through cases like 
Potter v Korn in the mid-1990s. Although the consultations for a framework on sexual and 
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reproductive health did point to some potential movement towards the advancement of broader 
understandings of how infertility might be addressed, the investment in biotechnology and the 
decisive and discriminatory actions to restrict access to semen for LGBTQ people marked the 
overall continuation of the individual, biomedical, consumer-based model of reproductive 
citizenship advanced in earlier attempts at policymaking. 
 
Stakeholders in the (Unregulated) Marketplace 
As these developments occurred in Ottawa, Canadians continued to seek out and use of assisted 
reproductive technologies and, as in the Doe case, to try to overcome obstacles to building their 
families. Participation in the failed legislative process gave way to capacity-building projects and 
new strategies to advance the interests and positions of infertile Canadians, donor-conceived 
people, LGBTQ Canadians, and surrogates and egg donors.  
 
LGBTQ People 
The semen regulations had significant implications for LGBTQ people, but in addition to the 
restrictive regulations, there were additional obstacles posed by adoption and parentage law that 
largely failed to recognize queer families, and service providers that were not always welcoming. 
Reports suggested that, following Potter v Korn, access to fertility clinics in certain provinces 
was improved, but access was not widespread until well into the 2000s.369 In fact, a 2013 study 
of Canadian fertility clinics indicated that one clinic was still not providing access for lesbians, 
and three clinics (of thirty-four surveyed) had policies that restricted access to care in some 
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way.370 How to continue to create families inside and outside of fertility clinics, in spite of 
barriers to access and the heteronormative framework of federal interventions remained (and 
remains) an important area of concern.371 
As described in chapter four of this dissertation, Dykes Planning Tykes was developed in 
1997 in Toronto to inform and provide support for lesbians thinking about their family building 
options. Rachel Epstein and Kathie Duncan first held the course with sponsorship from the 
Centre for Lesbian and Gay Studies as a “community-education program” at the University of 
Toronto’s International Student Centre.372 After convening the group a few times, Epstein and 
Duncan began responding to inquiries about holding the course again; at a housing co-op, at the 
Toronto Women’s Bookstore, and later at the 519 Church Street Community Centre. Over time, 
Epstein took more responsibility for the course, and the course expanded to a twelve-week long 
program.373  
Dykes Planning Tykes was not focused solely on using self-insemination or going to 
fertility clinics to get pregnant; it was not really about ARTs. Rather it was about sharing 
information and offering a site for people to meet others in the same circumstances, to ask 
questions, and to sort out what kinds of options they had to build their families. The course, 
which continues to run at the time of writing,374 includes ARTs and biomedical understandings 
of conception as a small component of its curriculum, and as one of the many options available 
to LGBTQ people looking to build a family. The course aims to help prospective parents work 
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through diverse “practical, emotional, social, and legal issues” associated with conception, 
pregnancy, and parenting.375  
Nevertheless, Dykes Planning Tykes has been, from its inception, an important venue for 
lesbians to share information about family building and insemination in ways that harken back to 
self-insemination networks of the 1970s.376 It has been integral not only in providing support and 
resources to people thinking about starting their families, but also, it has been a site through 
which lesbian mothers and those interested in parenthood can learn more about the possibilities 
for building their families inside and outside of fertility clinics.  
A year after Dykes Planning Tykes began, the Lesbian Mothers’ Association was 
founded in Montreal. In 1997, Mona Greenbaum and Nicole Paquette called a fertility clinic to 
ask about an appointment and were told that they did not provide services to unmarried women, 
which effectively excluded many lesbians. Although the Canadian Medical Association (in 
response to the ruling in Potter v Korn) had revised their Code of Ethics in 1996 to address 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,377 after Greenbaum and Paquette contacted the 
clinics it was clear that there was no access to fertility clinics for lesbians in Montreal. 
Furthermore, as the 1996 semen regulations required that imported semen be sent to physicians’ 
offices, those wanting to use anonymous donors were required to involve a physician receptive 
to receiving imported donor semen to their office or clinic. With the concerns about the safety of 
known donor semen that led up to the establishment of the semen regulations, there was a gap 
between demand and access for women wanting procure “safe” sperm.378 
Greenbaum and Paquette found a way to navigate this gap; importing semen to 
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Paquette’s dermatology office and then banking it in their home. At first, they simply imported 
semen samples as needed when they were trying to conceive, but there were sometimes delays at 
the US-Canada border, and with the delays came concern that the samples would thaw prior to 
arrival or would fail to make it to their destination in time—insemination is a relatively time 
sensitive matter. They soon realized that the panic that ensued when semen samples were “stuck 
at the border” could be avoided by “order[ing] a bunch of samples at the same time” and storing 
them themselves; replacing the nitrogen, rather than the samples. They procured a liquid nitrogen 
tank to do so, and after Greenbaum got pregnant, they continued to store the remaining (extra) 
samples with the intention of using the same donor if and when they wanted to conceive again.379  
After their first son was born, Greenbaum and Paquette, together with another couple, 
decided to try to organize something with other lesbian mothers, mothers-to-be, and others 
thinking about conceiving.380 The first meeting of what would become the Lesbian Mothers’ 
Association381 (LMA) was held in October 1998 in Paquette and Greenbaum’s living room, with 
approximately forty women in attendance. It started off as a support group, “building 
community, doing educational work and sharing information about supportive doctors,”382 but 
pretty quickly Greenbaum and Paquette took on the role of facilitators of what was effectively a 
small, “lesbian mothers’ sperm bank.”383 The group knew of a few doctors who would order 
sperm, and some people asked Paquette to order it as well. They kept samples in the tank that 
Greenbaum and Paquette already had and came to get it as needed.  
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It was only a small number of people that used Paquette and Greenbaum’s liquid nitrogen 
tank,384 but the innovation in ordering the semen themselves and storing it at home (and for other 
people) is an important instance of community organizing and navigating obstacles to using 
reproductive technologies faced by LGBTQ Canadians. The 1996 semen regulations requirement 
that imported semen be ordered to a physician’s office compelled many women to seek out 
artificial insemination at a fertility clinic, including Greenbaum and Paquette. The regulations 
combined with the discriminatory policies of the clinics excluded lesbians in Montreal from 
access to the ART services available to others, based on an assumption about who could 
legitimately reproduce and raise children that was exclusive of lesbians and other unmarried 
women. Faced with these challenges, Greenbaum and Paquette found a way to circumvent 
fertility clinics, using Paquette’s capacity to order semen samples, and her knowledge about 
acquiring a liquid nitrogen tank to create the family that they wanted.  
 The liquid nitrogen is just one example of how Greenbaum, Paquette, and the LMA 
challenged limits put on the reproductive citizenship of lesbian mothers in the late 1990s and 
thereafter. Following the birth of their first son, and in the early days of the organization they 
sought recognition of Paquette’s parental rights, but no provisions for same-sex adoption had 
been put in place in Quebec. As with access to fertility clinics, Quebec lagged behind other 
provinces, including Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta in recognizing the 
rights of same-sex families, 385 despite legislation passed in 1999 that broadly extended rights 
recognition to same-sex couples.386 When Paquette and Greenbaum launched the first case to 
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recognize co-parenting rights of same-sex couples in Quebec,387 the LMA also launched a 
campaign for the recognition of same-sex parents in law, which meant an expansion of the  
then-proposed civil union legislation to include parentage rights for same-sex couples.388 The 
legislation proceeded more quickly than the court case, and ultimately, progressive same-sex 
adoption and relationship recognition provisions were included in Quebec’s civil-union 
legislation, which passed unanimously and without abstention in 2002.389 Between education 
programs, support groups, at-home sperm banking, and legal demands for parental rights, lesbian 
mothers (and would-be mothers) were negotiating the challenges of building their families in the 
late 1990s, at least as much as they did in the decades prior. Epstein, Greenbaum and Paquette 
are particularly visible examples, but LGBTQ people across Canada were finding ways to 
circumvent discriminatory clinic policies and to address legal ambiguities.390 
 In many ways, this self-sufficient, do-it-yourself approach to overcoming the numerous 
barriers to a robust reproductive citizenship for LGBTQ people speaks to the kinds of 
innovations needed to advance LGBTQ family building within the heteronormative framework 
of Canadian society. The absence of formal recognition of the needs of LGBTQ people to parent 
using ARTs has meant establishing new ways, new networks to make lives livable, to fulfill 
dreams of family building. At the same time, however, there is an underlying thread of neoliberal 
logic that permeates the focus on access to ARTs advanced by LGBTQ activism in the field. 
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Through engagement with the clinic and the broader spectrum of biomedicine there has been an 
understanding of the best way to contest family forms as occurring through consumer practices, 
that is, by undertaking a family building project that requires the consumption of 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnological interventions, and the larger framework of for-profit clinical 
engagement in order to create a genetically related child, or to engage in a pregnancy.  
At an individual level, it is challenging to fault those who simply seek entry into a 
fertility clinic as a means to build their families. However, following Laura Mamo, “[f]ertility 
biomedicine produces new subjectivities: lesbian mothers, gay fathers, and new family 
arrangements brought into being through consumption.”391 Mamo writes elsewhere that, “for 
many lesbians—buying sperm and all that sperm embodies—becomes a route not only to 
achieving parenthood, but also to realizing their imagined senses of self”392 that is, becoming a 
self-sufficient parent able to make individual choices about how to partake equally in the 
infertility industry. Longstanding concerns about the advancement of “good” sexual citizenship 
are relevant here as the demands of LGBTQ people seeking to build their families through 
fertility clinics have hinged largely on the demands of LGBTQ people to access private-for-
profit fertility clinics to create genetically related children. This model stands in contrast to 
broader historical critiques of the normalization of certain kinds of families and the 
socioeconomic advantages needed, at least in the context of clinic-based fertility treatments to 
create those family forms. The move to the clinic has created equal access to fertility treatments 
within a model of reproductive citizenship that is always already grounded in individual choice 
and economic privilege.  
                                                   
391 Laura Mamo, “Fertility Inc.,” in Biomedicalization: Technoscience, Health, and Illness in the U.S., ed. Adele 
Clarke et. al. (Durham and London, UK: Duke University Press, 2010), 176–177. 
392 Mamo, Queering Reproduction, 4; See also Mamo, “Fertility Inc.,” 177. 
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Egg Donors and Surrogates 
Although the three-phase approach had set out to ban commercial surrogacy and gamete 
donation, all that was left after the failure of C-47 was the voluntary moratorium, unenforced, 
and largely unenforceable. Both altruistic and commercial practices continued in the absence of 
legislation, even though the link between payment and exploitation made throughout the debate 
on C-47 seemed to lend a sense of greater legitimacy to “altruistic” arrangements, at least at first. 
As demand for egg donation and surrogacy expanded, so too did commercialization of these 
practices.  
 The proliferation of surrogacy was of particular concern in this period. The Ethics 
Committee of the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists issued clinical practice guidelines 
on “preconception arrangements” in April 1997 that identified the probability that surrogacy in 
Canada was on the rise. The committee identified that when fertility programs were surveyed in 
1991 for the research programme of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 
“only one hospital had participated in preconception arrangements, and…this hospital had only 
one child born to a gestational mother.”393 By 1997, six fertility clinics were listed by the 
Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society as offering surrogacy services.394 Additionally, one 
clinic, (IVF Canada), was reported to have performed six surrogacy arrangements in 1995 alone, 
                                                   
393 Ethics Committee of the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, SOGC Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: Preconception Arrangements (Ottawa: Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, 1997). 
The research conducted by Eichler and Poole for the Law Reform Commission of Canada in 1988 identified 
approximately 118 known instances of surrogacy that included at least one Canadian participant. It was unclear, 
however, to what extent physicians were involved in the process of conception (i.e., traditional rather than 
gestational surrogacy may have been used). Eichler and Poole, The Incidence of Preconception Contracts for the 
Production of Children Among Canadians. Regarding gestational and traditional surrogacy see, for example, Karen 
Busby and Delaney Vun, “Revisiting the Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on 
Surrogate Mothers,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 25, no. 2 (2013): 96–97; Glenn Rivard and Judy 
Hunter, The Law of Assisted Human Reproduction (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005), 8. 
394 Alanna Mitchell and Jane Coutts, “Making a Baby in a Petri Dish: There Are Things Going on in Fertility Clinics 
That Federal Authorities Know Nothing of,” The Globe and Mail, September 27, 1997, A1. 
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with two surrogates actively recruited.395  
 The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada’s guidelines are particularly 
notable because they articulate the position that both paid and unpaid surrogacy were “morally 
unacceptable” as “the potential for coercion of the gestational women in these arrangements is 
extremely high.”396 Despite the emphasis on exploitation only in paid surrogacy evident in 
committee testimony, parliamentary debates, and in Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health, the 
Society took a strong position against any and all surrogacy. If followed, these clinical practice 
guidelines should have eliminated the provision of surrogacy services by Canadian obstetricians 
and gynaecologists, and consequently, the provision of such services in Canadian fertility clinics.  
 This was not the case, however, and as an advocate for surrogates emerged, it became 
clearer that surrogacy was a booming business in Canada. This advocate, Joanne Wright, had 
been a surrogate twice, and eventually went “into the business of surrogacy full force.”397 After 
several years of brokering arrangements, Wright founded Canada’s first surrogacy agency, 
Canadian Surrogacy Options, matching intended parents and surrogates for a fee.398 As of 1999, 
she claimed to have helped in fifty surrogacy arrangements (one media report suggests that she 
was “liaising with 250 surrogates each year”).399 This was possible, perhaps because, as she 
asserted by 1999 “all the fertility clinics in Toronto are ‘surrogate friendly’” and “some clinics in 
                                                   
395 Andrew Duffy, “Couple Risks Prison to Hire Surrogate Mom; Coming Law Would Make $10,000 Deal a 
Crime,” Edmonton Journal, November 2, 1996, A3; Laura Pratt, “Womb Service: An Inside Look at Surrogate 
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396 Ethics Committee of the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, SOGC Clinical Practice 
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Toronto Star, February 16, 2001, 1). By 2007, the fees were reportedly $5,500 (Richmond, “Womb Mates”). Today, 
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Vancouver and Calgary are starting to do surrogacy work.”400 Articles about Wright appeared in 
newspapers across the country, presenting to Canadians the notion of a happy, healthy surrogate 
who enjoyed the experience of being a surrogate so much that she was willing to help others do 
the same. A few women had previously spoken to media about their positive experiences with 
surrogacy,401 but as both a two-time surrogate and a broker, Wright was a more palatable expert, 
and from 1999 onward she was often quoted and cited in media reports addressing ARTs. She 
quickly became the de facto spokesperson for surrogacy in Canada.  
 The emergence of a strong advocate of surrogacy, coupled with the increased availability 
of surrogacy services left the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists actively opposing a 
practice in which its constituent physicians were increasingly involved. While the Society had 
been unequivocal in its 1997 guidelines that Canadian obstetricians and gynaecologists should 
not enable surrogacy arrangements in any form, in 1999 it issued a joint statement with the 
Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society on ethical issues in the use of assisted human 
reproduction. The joint statement affirmed, like the 1997 clinical guidelines, that commercial 
surrogacy is “morally unacceptable” but left some room for unpaid surrogacy, asserting that “the 
committee was not unanimous in ruling out the potential that true altruism could exist in some 
cases of gestational arrangements.”402  
 Joanne Wright’s advocacy, and the shifting position of the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists of Canada marked a change in the public conversation about surrogacy heralded 
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401 See, for example Robert Matas, “Surrogate Mother Tells Her Opponents to Respect Decision,” The Globe and 
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by the debate over paid and altruistic surrogacy in the federal government’s three-phase 
approach. Debate over surrogacy had long been framed as a two-part question, asking first if 
surrogacy is permissible, and then, if so, what forms of surrogacy could ethically occur. By the 
mid-1990s, the question was different, taking for granted that altruistic surrogacy is 
permissible403 and that it could ethically occur, asking only how to prohibit or govern the tenuous 
reality of commercial surrogacy arrangements.  
The founding of Canadian Surrogacy Options, and other agencies soon thereafter,404 also 
represented an important moment for surrogacy in Canada in regards to how paid surrogacy 
would be understood. No matter their trajectories, other organizations that came to represent 
people engaged in or born of ARTs (i.e., IAAC, the Infertility Network, Dykes Planning Tykes, 
the Lesbians Mothers’ Association, and the New Reproductive Alternatives Society) emerged 
out of support groups. In the case of surrogacy, Joanne Wright had (and would continue to be) a 
surrogate, and had been involved in many surrogacy arrangements, but it was also her business. 
Her media commentary was at once a way to advocate for her position on surrogacy, and to 
increase the visibility and legitimacy of her business. The possibility emerged that regulated, 
paid (or compensated) surrogacy could be a viable option for Canadian families.  
As to egg donation, little occurred in the period following the three-phase approach. At 
the time that the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies conducted research on 
the provision of egg donation services in Canada, eight of fifteen IVF programs in Canada 
offered “either egg or embryo donation” with egg sharing being the most prevalent source of 
donor eggs. While the clinics did not provide data on the number of donations that were 
                                                   
403 Haase, “The Long Road to Regulation,” 68–69. 
404 A second agency, Surrogacy in Canada Online, was founded in 2001 (following the experience of owner Sally 
Rhoads-Heinrich as a surrogate to an American couple). In 2007, a third agency (Canadian Fertility Consultants) 
was established by Leia Picard, who has been both a surrogate and an egg donor.  
!! ! !
188 
occurring, the researchers concluded that “few such transfers are believed to occur” and that 
there was “no evidence that women are being recruited as donors.”405 After the failure of Bill C-
47, solicitation in campus newspapers for egg donors continued, as did the practice of egg 
sharing, and a number of media reports of egg donations occurring with American donors were 
published, suggesting that more than a few transfers were happening each year.406 By 2001, the 
Canadian Assisted Reproductive Technologies Register reported that 301 cycles of IVF with 
donor eggs occurred in Canadian IVF clinics.407 At the very least, the significant change between 
the data reported in the research of the Royal Commission and the data provided by the Canadian 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Register for 2001 suggests that there was an increase in the 
number of clinics offering egg donation in Canada, as well as a significant increase in the 
number of Canadians engaged in egg donation over the course of the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, no advocates emerged, and there was limited consideration of egg donation 
in media reports between 1997 and 2000. The few articles that were published lamented the lack 
of legislation, or the possibility that banning egg sharing and compensation for egg donors might 
result in a “shortage” in eggs in Canada and subsequently importation of eggs and egg donors 
from the United States.408 No egg donors were cited, but both Justine Espenant from IAAC, and 
Dr. Art Leader (past-president of the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society) were quoted as 
                                                   
405 Thomas Stephens et al., “Survey of Canadian Fertility Programs,” in Treatment of Infertility: Current Practices 
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supporting broadly conceived “reimbursement” for egg donors.409 The desire for intended 
parents to access gametes was carefully weighed in these articles, against the perceived 
immorality of paying for eggs. The 1999 joint statement on ethical issues in ARTs published by 
the Society of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians of Canada and the Canadian Fertility and 
Andrology Society articulated the same position presented by Leader and Espenant, that 
compensation for egg donors was both ethical and necessary to prevent a shortage in human 
eggs, as well as to keep Canadians from engaging in cross-border travel to buy eggs in a bigger, 
more ethically problematic, global market.410 The advertisements for egg donors in university 
newspapers were only one way that Canadians were finding egg donors; going to the United 
States to openly pay donors, or advertising online also became new alternatives.411  
The expansion of the market in eggs, and with it, the understanding that payment for 
gametes was an “entrenched practice”412 resulted in a situation where fertility specialists were at 
once advocating for their patients’ access to services (i.e., being able to acquire eggs in order to 
undergo IVF) and undermining the possible understanding that egg donors would be patients at 
risk of harm. The narrative presented was that the “shortage” in eggs impedes intended parents 
from becoming parents in the way that they desire, and consequently from exercising their 
capacity to be flourishing reproductive citizens. In this understanding of eggs as part of a free 
market, and subject to laws of supply and demand, a “shortage” in eggs means that intended 
parents might not have access to the menu of reproductive options that would otherwise be 
available to them, unless they circumvent inaccessibility by looking to a different marketplace. 
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The interests of egg donors themselves, including their future reproductive capacity, were rarely 
discussed, rather egg donors’ interests were reduced to a balance of risk and financial 
compensation with donors understood as little more than vessels of a reproductive resource to 
which others were (and are) entitled.  
  
Infertile Canadians/Donor-conceived Families 
By 1997, there were two distinct organizations representing infertile Canadians across Canada; 
IAAC and the Infertility Network. After C-47 died on the Order Paper, IAAC focused on 
building its organization, supporting its membership, creating a magazine to distribute to its 
membership (and to place in fertility clinic waiting rooms), and engaging with media as issues 
arose.413 Throughout this period, IAAC continued to operate under the leadership of Dr. Barwin, 
with a changing executive directorship, first under Marie Morrisey (one of the organization’s 
founders), and then under Justine Espenant. Compared with the significant advocacy work it had 
done around C-47, the activities of IAAC in this period seem relatively limited, perhaps a 
function of limited funding,414 or due to organizational burnout after the extensive work that had 
gone into fighting against C-47. 
 However, IAAC’s framing of infertility as an explicitly medical issue that was expressed 
throughout the three-phase approach was gaining some traction, and an important court case 
proceeded in this period that would reinforce the understanding of infertility as a disability, and 
the understanding of ARTs not only as a right, but as an entitlements under provincially funded 
health insurance programs. This case, Cameron v Nova Scotia, centered around Alex Cameron (a 
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lawyer) and his wife, Cheryl Smith (an obstetrician and gynaecologist), who had trouble 
conceiving due to “severe male factor infertility.”415 Because intracytoplasmic sperm injection416 
(ICSI) was not available in Halifax, they went out of province to seek care, first in Toronto and 
then in Calgary. Upon their return, they applied to the Nova Scotia Health Care Insurance Plan 
for reimbursement of the considerable costs of the medical services they had incurred out-of-
province, but they were informed that the costs of IVF (and ICSI) were not eligible for 
reimbursement.417  
Cameron and Smith turned to the courts to seek reimbursement of their medical costs, 
punitive damages, as well as “a declaration that IVF and ICSI are insured services”418 in Nova 
Scotia. They argued that infertility is a disability and the lack of funding under the provincial 
health insurance plan was a violation of their equality rights under s.15 of the Charter. At trial, 
Kennedy J., found that the provision of IVF and ICSI are not “medically necessary” in the terms 
of the Nova Scotia Health Services and Insurance Act, although they might be medically 
indicated and beneficial to some, the risks and still-experimental nature of the procedures did not 
“come within criteria necessary before a medical procedure is funded.”419 Recalling the 
arguments of the Royal Commission about IVF and bilateral fallopian tube blockage, Kennedy J. 
argued that experimental procedures fall outside of publicly funded health care programs. The 
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matter of infertility as disability did not therefore need to be addressed, as the denial of funding 
“is based on the nature of the treatment being sought, rather than the personal characteristics of 
those persons seeking funding, the infertile.”420 The judgment in favour of the province was 
upheld on appeal, but with different reasoning. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal ruled that 
infertility is indeed a disability under Section 15, but that the denial of funding within the 
provincial health insurance program is a reasonable limit in a health care system with scarce 
resources to be carefully allocated. Cameron and Smith sought leave for appeal with the 
Supreme Court, but it was not granted.421 
 Cameron and Smith did not receive any reimbursement, but nevertheless, their case 
marks an important juncture in advancing a medical model of infertility. Despite the 
advancement of a medical model of infertility in the work of the Royal Commission and 
thereafter, the appeal in Cameron v Nova Scotia marks the first time that infertility qua infertility 
was recognized in Canada as a disability and within the purview of the Charter. The medical 
model was taken for granted in Ontario’s provision of IVF services only to those with bilaterally 
blocked fallopian tubes, and in the proposed legislation, public debates, and media reports that 
had been put forth in the previous decade, but Cameron marked the first time that an equality 
rights claim was put forward, recognizing infertility as a disability.  
Not only was a medical model of infertility recognized in Cameron, but also the 
characterization of medically understood infertility that it put forth was exceptionally broad. 
Alex Cameron’s infertility required that his wife, Cheryl Smith undergo IVF, and although the 
treatment involved the use of his sperm (and the injection of his sperm into her eggs in ICSI), the 
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interventions would take place largely on Smith’s body. She would undertake the risky parts of 
these procedures and would be the one incurring the costs. As with others who cannot reproduce 
with their sexual partner, including LGBTQ Canadians, the infertility experienced in this case 
was not necessarily medical, but could also be understood as social. Alex Cameron certainly 
experienced infertility, but Cheryl Smith needed infertility care not because she was infertile, but 
because she was part of a couple that could not effectively reproduce biologically together.422  
The use of a disability rights claims to seek out recognition of infertility as a medical 
condition, and consequently, funding for reproductive services is especially notable, given its 
divergence with the history of disability rights claims related to medical care. Following Gilbert 
and Majury, there is a discord between the disability claims made in Cameron and the history of 
women with disabilities working hard to contest medical understandings of disability in order to 
promote social acceptance of physiological and psychological diversity. In Cameron, and in 
other cases where reproductive disabilities are claimed, the same discourses of discrimination 
and equality are used, but instead of contesting medicalization, a medical understanding of 
disability is actively adopted, “usually in order to gain access to medical technology.”423  
In the time that Cameron was proceeding, the Infertility Network (which again, had 
become a standalone organization in the mid-1990s) was engaged in capacity building, and 
establishing its own framework for advocating for infertile Canadians. Throughout the three-
phase approach, Executive Director and spokesperson Diane Allen had continued sending out 
newsletters, building the membership, facilitating support-groups, and holding the long running 
seminar series, in addition to a number of new initiatives.424 The focus of the seminars and a 
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series of conferences that began in 2000 reinforced some of the differences between the positions 
of the IAAC and the Infertility Network. Both IAAC and the Infertility Network had long been 
committed to advancing the interests of infertile Canadians, however, the Infertility Network had 
since started to embrace a nuanced perspective that also considered the self-articulated interests 
of donor-conceived people. The New Reproductive Alternatives Society, in addition to a number 
of donor-conceived people, their families, and relevant experts were included in seminars, and 
subsequent conferences. Donor insemination had been a part of the range of the Infertility 
Network’s seminar topics,425 but between 1996 and 1999, it held five different seminars on donor 
insemination, anonymity and disclosure,426 in addition to planning the first international 
conference of donor offspring (The Offspring Speak) held in the August of 2000.427  
It was through these seminars and conferences that the perspectives of members and 
organizers of the Infertility Network were heard together with those of donor-conceived families. 
This marked a turn in the conversation about donor anonymity, as the perspective of IAAC 
presented to the Standing Committee in testimony on C-47 had been that while donor-conceived 
people should be entitled to medical and non-identifying information, donor anonymity should 
continue, suggesting that eliminating donor anonymity would infringe on donors’ privacy rights. 
IAAC, had long argued that an end to anonymity would not only be a matter of privacy, but 
would reduce the supply of gametes, ultimately pitting the interests of infertile people wanting  
to have a child against the interests of donor-conceived people who seek to know their genetic 
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origins. Intended parents and donor-conceived families were seen to have competing interests 
vis-à-vis donor anonymity.428 
In contrast with IAAC, the Infertility Network seemed to resolve the apparent opposition 
between donor-conceived families and intended parents. The discussion at the August 2000 
seminar focused on the interests of donor offspring, and emphasized the position that interests of 
intended parents who are using donor conception should consider that their child(ren) yet-to-be 
conceived might one day want access to information about their genetic progenitor. According to 
Diane Allen, people who may seek out donor gametes in order to have their children may not 
have thought about what it might mean to the person yet-to-be-conceived until they are a living, 
breathing person with questions about their genetic origins.429 The conceptualization of the 
Infertility Network as an organization advocating for the interests of infertile people, not only in 
having children, but living thereafter with the implications of having used reproductive 
technologies was almost novel, and the response was strong. The NRAS responded to the 
invitations of the Infertility Network and the relationship-building that occurred between these 
organizations included other activists, and worked to create an increasingly unified voice among 
stakeholders in the “infertility community” (outside of IAAC) that the interests of infertile 
Canadians in the governance of assisted reproduction reached beyond simply creating a 
pregnancy and having children. The co-construction of the interests of infertile Canadians and 
donor-conceived people worked to challenge the idea that unfettered access to ARTs was the 
best model to meet the needs of infertile Canadians. 
  A sense of collegiality and like-mindedness thus emerged among the people who 
organized and participated in these seminars and conferences. Over coffee and conversation, a 
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group of stakeholders interested in ending donor anonymity was loosely established; the 
Coalition for an Open Model in Assisted Reproduction (COMAR). Many had met through other 
events—at government consultations and conferences, through research and other 
organizations430—but by the time of the August 2000 workshop, the loose coalition was 
beginning to come together. In addition to Diane Allen, and Shirley Pratten, a number of 
speakers at that conference came to be associated with COMAR. According to Catherine Clute, 
one of the group’s members, it was really an ad-hoc group that began to mobilize around their 
shared understanding of the numerous issues that face families trying to conceive using assisted 
reproduction, as well as the understanding that the range of stakeholders involved would not all 
be heard by the Standing Committee on Health when the AHRA was introduced.431 According to 
Shirley Pratten, COMAR:  
[W]as really established more in name only, more than anything else. To just 
show a united front as a coalition for an open model in assisted reproduction. 
[…] It was really a political move to push back [against] the incredible lobbying 
that was going on with the doctors, and we didn’t want to appear fragmented. I 
mean, we were stronger united as a group.432 
 
This organizing occurred largely through email, but was effective in bringing together and 
coordinating testimony to the Standing Committee on Health in 2001. 
 As to IAAC, the advancement of the medical model of infertility in Cameron suggested 
that access to ARTs are not merely a matter of choice, but also an entitlement. A biomedical 
understanding of infertility continued to be an important discursive frame used to advance the 
claims of infertile Canadians, particularly insofar as impediments to access were viewed as 
infringing on their rights to reproductive choice, and increasingly, to medical care. For IAAC, 
                                                   
430 Ibid.; Interview with Phyllis Creighton, November 30, 2011,  
431 Interview with Catherine Clute, December 2, 2011. 
432 Interview with Shirley Pratten, March 28, 2012. 
!! ! !
197 
infertile Canadians required unrestricted access to ARTs, meaning the continuation of 
compensated, anonymous gamete donation. In conjunction with the infertility industry (of 
clinicians, pharmaceutical firms, and biotechnology companies) that would stand to benefit from 
the expansion of access to fertility treatments, IAAC largely advanced a biomedical model of 
care. At the same time, however, the Infertility Network and the NRAS were coming together to 
contest the position that infertile Canadians should only be invested in access to medical care. 
When plans for new legislation were announced, and consultations started to occur, these two 
perspectives of these groups representing infertile Canadians would become more and more 
pronounced, with the Infertility Network seeking largely to protect the interests of donor-
conceived people and IAAC continuing to promote unfettered access to reproductive 
technologies.  
 The divergence between the kind of reproductive citizenship sought by infertile 
Canadians hinged then on an interest in strong government regulation of commercial practices 
bound up with concerns about donor privacy. Those interested in the continuation of donor 
anonymity, or in the provision of compensation or payment to gamete donors and surrogates, 
were advocating for non-regulation or at the very least, minimal regulation to ensure that access 
could continue.  
  
Summary 
The path between C-47 and the AHRA (that would be introduced in 2001) was indirect and 
circuitous. Canadians were impatient for clarity about how they could proceed with the use of 
ARTs, and for either regulation or criminalization (or both) to address technological 
advancements-to-come. In the meantime, consideration of Bill C-247 and A Report from 
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Consultations On a Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health acted as placeholders to 
demonstrate a federal commitment to eventually moving forward with the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission. Although Bill C-247 never passed and the sexual and reproductive health 
framework amounted to little more than the report itself, they were markers of an ongoing legacy 
of the Royal Commission report. 
More than merely inching towards new legislation, other developments following the 
failure of C-47 promoted the understanding of biotechnology as a site for potential economic 
growth. The rapid development of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy and the extent of 
relevant investment promoted “permissive policies on human biotechnology that were…deemed 
necessary if Canada wished to maintain its leading position in an increasingly competitive and 
international industry.”433 The emphasis on biotechnology as a matter of economic, rather than 
social, ethical, or health related concern evident in the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy, 
suggested that the regulation of assisted reproduction, slow as it was to come, would take place 
in ways that would primarily seek to protect the interests of the biotechnology sector (and 
ostensibly, the biomedical sector) rather than the interests of Canadians using these new 
technologies. In this framework, attempting to restrict the ever-expanding marketplace in 
reproductive technologies would be a Sisyphean task. The semen regulations were an important 
intervention that did work to regulate ARTs, but did so in in a way that was ultimately restricted 
the capacity of LGBTQ Canadians to provide or access donor semen. 
In the meantime, infertile Canadians, surrogates, LGBTQ Canadians, and donor-
conceived people were negotiating their interests and taking new steps towards having their 
concerns about the use and regulation of assisted reproduction recognized. The exclusion of 
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LGBTQ people from accessing semen as well as from fertility clinics worked to mobilize new 
stakeholders and to call for the increased recognition of LGBTQ people as potential consumers 
of reproductive services. Surrogates were increasingly viewed as potential actors in the 
reproductive marketplace, although concerns about the commercialization of the human body 
and of reproductive labour would remain. Infertile Canadians were increasingly divided in their 
positions on access, as the constituency of the Infertility Network was increasingly taking up the 
concerns of the NRAS to advance the interests of donor-conceived families, while IAAC 
continued its work calling for fewer restrictions and barriers to accessing treatment. Following 
the failure of C-47, and in the absence of clear and decisive federal action on ARTs, these groups 
were able to assert new positions on the governance of ARTs. With the long road to the AHRA 
about to move into the next, and final phase, there was a need to (re)define the reproductive 
citizenship of these stakeholder groups in order for their recognition to occur in the policy 
debates, and in the legislation-to-come. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!! ! !
200 
Chapter Six: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
The debate over Bill C-247 and the move towards a sexual and reproductive health framework 
served as stopgap measures that suggested some progress towards federal policy on infertility 
prevention and ARTs. Even so, it was clear that the intention of the federal government was to 
introduce comprehensive new legislation that would criminalize the practices addressed in the 
voluntary moratorium and establish a regulatory regime. This model would be an amalgam of 
both the Royal Commission’s recommendations and the three-phase approach.434 For the interest 
group actors examined in this dissertation—established or emerging—the period between 1997 
and 2000, as described in chapter five, was a time to build community, to create inroads for 
access, and to negotiate their place as stakeholders concerned with ARTs.  
By 1999, the federal government had issued a number of preliminary documents and 
conducted consultations, preparing for the introduction of draft legislation that would be put to 
Parliament in 2001. The exercise of finding and engaging with stakeholders that had occurred 
multiple times since the Royal Commission began all over again. This stage of policy 
development differed from previous iterations, as more than ever before there was a focus on the 
individual stories of individual actors, and particularly those whose personal lives and bodies 
would be directly affected by the governance of reproductive technologies. There was at least 
some consideration given to each of these groups in the debates that immediately preceded the 
passage of the AHRA, and some fared better than others.  
This chapter examines the extensive consultative and legislative process that culminated 
in the passage of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and what has happened since. It suggests 
that while the process of making the AHRA acknowledged a broader range of perspectives than 
                                                   
434 Canada, Health Canada, Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Overview Paper (Ottawa: Health Canada, 
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had occurred in previous attempts to legislate, those perspectives were only included in the final 
version of the legislation when they were not seen to interfere with the continuation of the 
operations of the fertility industry. The neoliberal citizenship regime that privileges the 
individual patient-consumer was particularly apparent in this period, as concern about protection 
and equality were eroded even further, replaced by concerns about improving access and 
enabling a broader range of choices in order to allow individuals to self-govern their interactions 
with assisted reproductive technologies. For example, this period saw the recognition of some of 
the interests of LGBTQ people, but only those aspects that would continue to expand access to 
medicalized fertility services.  
Further, while the AHRA included prohibitions on payment for surrogacy and gamete 
donation, the legislation as passed was written in such a way as to enable the continuation of 
commercial surrogacy and egg donation through loopholes, exceptions, and a lack of 
enforcement that would encourage the continuation of paid surrogacy and egg donation 
practices, abroad and underground (and increasingly with new endorsements from Health 
Canada, out in the open).435 In short, despite provisions that aimed to protect the potential 
interests of surrogates and donors and of donor-conceived people, what emerged was a 
framework that was a compromise from the failure of C-47, and enabled the maintenance of the 
existing market in ARTs. The last section of this chapter provides an overview of the 
developments since the passage of the AHRA outlining challenges to its validity and failures in 
implementation. 
 
 
                                                   
435 Françoise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie, and Dave Snow, “Fake It Till You Make It: Policymaking and Assisted 
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The Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
The policy process leading up to the passage of the AHRA is relatively well-documented, as far 
as Canadian legislation goes. One reason is that draft legislation was considered by the Standing 
Committee on Health prior to its tabling in the House of Commons, which resulted in hundreds 
of pages of witness testimony and a report from the committee that would not exist in the typical 
legislative process. Further, ongoing interest in ARTs resulted in nearly constant media reporting 
on legislative developments. What is particularly notable about this process, and what has also 
enabled a close tracking of how it took place, is the extent of the public consultations that 
occurred, and the resulting documentation reveals the lack of influence that these consultations 
had on the legislation that was eventually passed. This latter has been attributed in part to Health 
Canada’s strategy to “consult on a narrow question” 436 in the preliminary consultation processes, 
and subsequent decisions to simply consult with actors whose positions were already known. 
Small procedural elements of the draft legislation were altered prior to its passage (as well as the 
addition of a non-discrimination clause), but despite carefully conceived work by the Standing 
Committee on Health prior to the tabling of the Bill, little changed from draft to Royal Assent.  
 
Consulting Canadians (Again)  
The failure of C-47 left the Liberal government reeling. The planned one-two punch of 
criminalization followed by regulation advocated in the three-phase approach had failed, and 
there were concerns that the public and stakeholders would not accept anything similar to C-47 
so soon. As noted in chapter four, there had been much criticism of the three-phase approach—
for being hastily introduced, for stepping into provincial jurisdiction, and for too-limited periods 
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for policy consultations437—and it was apparent that more consultations were necessary before a 
new act could be introduced. As the “kicking and screaming”438 of physician experts had been a 
significant part of the failure of Bill C-47, the new legislation would need them on board to 
ensure a veneer of legitimacy. At the same time, the federal government’s commitment to 
governing through criminalization of some practices and regulation of others remained largely 
unchanged from C-47, and this approach would need to be reimagined. Rather than proposing 
criminalization and then regulation in succession, the new approach would be simultaneous, 
criminalization and a regulatory regime.  
The federal government requested that Health Canada conduct a new round of 
consultations in order to give the new bill the legitimacy with stakeholders that C-47 had 
lacked.439 These consultations took place in two distinct parts. First, Health Canada consulted 
both stakeholders and the public to determine whether there were strong objections to the general 
direction of the proposed policy framework. This process began with consultations on July 5, 
1999 when a group of approximately twenty-five stakeholders came together in Ottawa to 
discuss the regulatory framework.440 Although there were no strong objections, there have been 
claims that the process, at least at this early stage, was unfocused. In his research on stakeholders 
involved in public consultations on ARTs during this period, Eric Montpetit cites one participant 
as stating that the July stakeholder meeting was little more than a “cattle call,” in which “[y]ou 
have forty different groups for four to six hours being told at length what the legislation will be, 
and then you are asked ‘do you have any thoughts.’”441 There was a sense that the process of 
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legitimating the federal intervention in the field would require stakeholder support, and Health 
Canada sought to acquire validation by asking narrow questions prior to proceeding.  
In addition to stakeholder consultations, Health Canada commissioned a public opinion 
and marketing firm (POLLARA) to conduct research with the general public. Eight focus groups 
(two each in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax) were held in September of 1999, 
followed by a national telephone survey to assess “the awareness and knowledge levels”442 that 
Canadians had of ARTs.443 This commissioned research is rarely mentioned in the existing 
scholarship on ART policy in Canada, but it is important to note in the trajectory of the AHRA 
insofar as Health Canada’s consultations were not only with the self-identified stakeholders, but 
rather, with the public writ large. This exercise in citizen engagement, like the consultative 
exercises and polling that had occurred at the time of the Royal Commission, sought to engage a 
broader public in the policymaking process, incorporating the perspectives of individuals as well 
as interest groups. However, the consultation of a broader public prior to introduction of the Bill 
in this case may have been a means of testing the proposed policy framework. The views of 
stakeholders can be obscured by the views of a depoliticized public when policy is oriented or 
reoriented towards the needs of the “ordinary,” individual citizen, who is a consumer-client of 
the government. Policy that might be controversial, or challenging, but might work to advance 
the interests of stakeholders, and/or the interests of vulnerable actors may be dismissed in light of 
something more palatable. These sorts of consultations, as described in chapter one, work to 
advance a neoliberal model of participation in which the individual is the primary actor.444 
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The report from POLLARA to Health Canada provided support for the policy 
framework, stating that overall “Canadians would welcome the upcoming federal legislation.”445 
With the initial consultations complete and validation for its policy approach affirmed, the 
intention to go ahead with introducing federal legislation could occur. Health Canada released 
the Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Overview Paper in December 1999, noting the 
imminent introduction of legislation that “could include”446 criminal prohibitions. The Overview 
Paper also noted that while federal leadership on the issue was paramount, consultations would 
continue, jurisdictional boundaries would be respected, and that there would be potential for 
equivalency agreements for provinces uninterested in enforcing aspects of the federal legislation. 
The second round of consultations occurred with both stakeholders and the provinces and 
territories. The ongoing resistance of the Health Policy Division to “hearing ideas that would 
challenge their own,” led the Minister of Health to create “a special project division to conduct 
additional consultations with the provinces.”447 In February 2000, the new special project 
division within Health Canada circulated a Workbook that asked for input about the new 
direction of the legislation-to-come. Whereas the first round of consultations focused on the 
intention to legislate and the general policy direction, the Workbook asked for specific feedback 
on the plan to proceed with criminal prohibitions, regulation, and a regulatory body.448 Meetings 
were also held with “provincial colleagues as well as representatives of selected stakeholder 
organizations”449 in February and March 2000. The input on the Workbook must have come in 
                                                   
445 Canada, Health Canada, and POLLARA, Canadians’ Views of Reproductive & Genetic Technologies, 3. See also 
Leslie Papp, “Ottawa to Target Women in Bid to Sell Cloning Ban: Campaign Seeks Support for Genetic 
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quickly,450 as the contributions of respondents were summarized in a Feedback Report released 
in March 2000, which identified a general consensus amongst stakeholders (including provincial 
and territorial governments), that some level of federal leadership was needed in this area. As 
noted by one senior public servant, there was feedback, “caution” and “objection in principle” 
but it was insufficient to convince the federal government not to intercede.451According to the 
Feedback Report, however, respondents were clear that they wanted the federal government to 
make legislation prohibiting the most problematic technologies, although there was less support 
for a complimentary regulatory framework.452  
Taken together, the consultations that took place in 1999 and 2000 appear to be no more 
than a policy validation exercise, with Health Canada asking for feedback or affirmation of pre-
existing policy framework rather than substantive input about how to proceed. This did involve 
more consultation with the provinces than had occurred previously, but a still-minimal and 
directed approach to consultation. This is not surprising as there had been hesitancy, on the part 
of civil servants at Health Canada to consult at all given the numerous public consultations that 
they had already undertaken on ARTs. Officials from Health Canada had gone across the country 
in the early 1990s to confirm the findings of the Commission, in addition to considering input 
provided by the provincial-territorial working group, the Discussion Group on Embryo Research, 
                                                   
450 In a letter from the Canadian Bar Association’s National Health Law and Family Law Sections to Rhonda 
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and the Advisory Committee on Reproductive and Genetic Technologies, prior to the 
introduction of C-47. The general approach of the policy was nearly fixed from the time of the 
Royal Commission, and as there was no political will to stray from the criminalization/regulation 
framework, there was consultation fatigue on the part of both stakeholders and civil servants as 
both groups sensed that the consultations were a legitimacy exercise, occurring for its own 
sake.453  
This does not necessarily mean that there were no benefits to these consultations, 
or no room at all for the policy proposals to be altered. While the consultation process 
was “resistant to network opening” and had limited capacity to “listen or persuade civil 
society actors,”454 at the very least the consultations worked to legitimate the interests of 
a wide range of actors as relevant to the legislation-to-come. Further, close examination 
of the Overview and Feedback reports reveals that there were a few issues regarding 
which the policy preferences of Health Canada remained unclear and may have differed 
from the approach taken in C-47 (and from the legislation eventually passed). In the case 
of commercial surrogacy, for example, the Overview paper considered that coercion in 
surrogacy arrangements could occur not only in commercial arrangements, but in all 
cases where the “woman [is] in a dependent relationship with the contracting party.”455 
Further, the Feedback paper included more thoughtful and imaginative approaches about 
how to address surrogacy than in any government document on ARTs issued prior. More 
specifically, in the Feedback paper considerable space was allocated to a proposal for a 
“public registry of surrogates who would receive modest compensation for their services, 
                                                   
453 Montpetit, “Public Consultations in Policy Network Environments,” 107; Baylis and Herder, “Policy Design for 
Human Embryo Research in Canada: An Analysis (Part 2 of 2),” 356. 
454 Montpetit, “Public Consultations in Policy Network Environments,” 108. 
455 Canada, Health Canada, Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Overview Paper. 
!! ! !
208 
e.g., Employment Insurance rates,”456 as a means to provide equitable access to surrogacy 
services, and to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of surrogates themselves. The 
Overview and Feedback reports together suggested that the federal government was still 
exploring the extent to which Canadians would accept regulation of “altruistic” surrogacy 
and whether “modest compensation” for acting as a surrogate would be acceptable to the 
general public. In short, despite the fixed nature of the general approach and the intent to 
move forward with comprehensive legislation, some of the finer details were still being 
sorted. 
 
Considering the Draft Legislation 
On May 3, 2001, then-Health Minister Allan Rock released draft legislation to be considered by 
the Standing Committee on Health before its introduction in Parliament. The unprecedented 
move to have the draft legislation considered by a Standing Committee prior to being tabled, 
signaled a de facto third round of consultations. The Feedback Report had suggested that there 
was consensus around the need for criminal prohibitions, and for federal regulation of ARTs. 
However, Health Canada and the federal government anticipated that the legislation would be 
highly controversial. As it was an issue more “given to greys than black or white,”457 more input 
was needed. There were concerns that if introduced too early and without considerable public 
consultations, the proposed legislation would fall to the same fate as C-47.458 Early consideration 
of the draft legislation by the Standing Committee on Health was also optimistically seen as a 
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means to give Members of Parliament a “real opportunity to shape the issue, not just to vote it up 
or down,” although the draft legislation, as mentioned above, would remain largely unchanged 
throughout the legislative process.459  
 The draft legislation differed from the three-phase approach in a number of important 
ways. Most importantly, the draft legislation proposed a model in which criminalization and a 
regulatory framework would be part of the same Act, addressing the critique of C-47 that the 
criminal prohibitions would mean little without the simultaneous introduction of a regulatory 
regime. It also included a preamble that introduced a positive tone about reproductive 
technologies (addressing the critique of C-47 that it framed ARTs as inherently problematic), 
that identified the potential benefits of research and clinical uses of the technologies in addition 
to the need for caution in their use. The interests of the scientific and medical communities were 
thus acknowledged in the preamble, clearly validating biomedical actors as legitimate and 
important subjects of the legislation with interests to be protected. Also, for the first time, the 
reimbursement of expenses for surrogacy and gamete donation were included within the 
legislative framework. Whereas C-47 and Setting Boundaries were unequivocal in the exclusion 
of payment for surrogacy and for the reimbursement of expenses to donors, the draft legislation 
walked a finer line, criminalizing commercial gamete donation and surrogacy while providing 
for the reimbursement of expenditures under the regulations-to-come, and with a license. 
Furthermore, the draft legislation took a measured approach to donor anonymity, requiring that 
health reporting information from the donors be obtained, but not, as Setting Boundaries had 
advocated, moving toward “a more open system of information sharing in gamete and embryo 
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donation” including identifying information.460 
 The draft legislation thus presented a model of reproductive citizenship that differed only 
slightly from the three-phase approach. Through the possibility of reimbursing donors and 
surrogates for expenses, the draft legislation acknowledged that surrogates and donors are active 
participants in the use of ARTs, and not merely a dichotomous group of either exploited or 
altruistic women as had occurred during the debates on C-47. At the same time, it moved even 
further away from the recommendations against egg donation and surrogacy made by the Royal 
Commission, and the strong commitments to complete non-commercialization made by Setting 
Boundaries in 1997. As to donor conception, the tentative step away from outright anonymity to 
require the health reporting information of donors was less than the donor conception community 
had hoped for, providing a more restrained approach to the recognition of the self-articulated 
interests of donor-conceived people and their families than had occurred during the three-phase 
approach.  
The draft legislation was put to the Standing Committee in May 2001, and over the 
course of the following months, the Committee saw eighty-five witnesses461 including former 
Royal Commissioners, experts from the scientific, medical, and religious communities, disability 
rights advocates, activists from the infertility community, ethicists, and others, many of whom 
had been heard by the Standing Committee in relation to C-47 or by the Royal Commission. The 
usual suspects, including medical associations, IAAC, the Infertility Network, and the NRAS 
were well-represented, but other groups were also making their position on ARTs known to 
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federal policymakers for the first time.462 The Standing Committee listened to groups that were 
poorly represented in earlier consultations, including witnesses representing surrogates, LGBTQ 
people, and donor-conceived people (rather than just their families). The range of possible 
stakeholders on ARTs seemed to be expanding to include users of reproductive technologies that 
had not previously been included. 
 In December 2001, the Standing Committee released its report on the draft legislation. 
The report, Assisted Human Reproduction: Building Families, was a carefully drawn reflection 
on the positions of the Members of the Standing Committee on Health, the witnesses who 
testified, and written submissions, vis-à-vis the draft legislation. It largely provided support for 
the legislation, but also suggested four significant changes. First, it challenged the equal 
prioritization of key stakeholders in the preamble of the legislation. Whereas the draft legislation 
explicitly identified researchers and clinicians stakeholders with interests equal to those of 
others, Building Families identified three such groups in order of importance; children born of 
reproductive technologies, followed by adults using these technologies; and then researchers and 
clinicians.  
 Secondly, the Standing Committee suggested that given the “many moral, ethical, and 
social questions surrounding human embryo research and infertility treatment…an arm’s length 
agency would be more appropriate” than the Minister of Health to ensure the implementation of 
the Act was occurring and to manage its operations.463 This was not an entirely new 
consideration; the idea of an arms-length regulatory agency had been addressed in different 
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iterations in the Royal Commission’s Proceed with Care, in Setting Boundaries, Enhancing 
Health, and in the Feedback report. Its absence in the draft legislation was anomalous, and the 
Standing Committee suggested its inclusion. 
 Third, the Standing Committee recommended the elimination of provisions in the draft 
legislation that permitted reimbursement of expenses incurred by surrogates. Despite the 
emergence of surrogates as stakeholders articulating an interest in reimbursement or 
compensation, the Standing Committee took a position more aligned with the Royal Commission 
and the three-phase approach, suggesting that commercial surrogacy be banned (including 
compensation or reimbursement of expenses), and non-commercial or “altruistic” surrogacy be 
discouraged through the prohibition of payment to lawyers, brokers, and others involved in 
surrogacy arrangements464 (with the exception of health care professionals “who provide services 
necessary for the care of the pregnant woman”).465 The Standing Committee also recommended 
that the draft legislation be changed to eliminate provisions allowing for the reimbursement of 
expenses to gamete donors. 
Finally, the Standing Committee made a number of recommendations to extend the 
protections offered to donor-conceived people through the regulation of gamete donation. This 
included recommendations to limit the number of children conceived with the gametes of a 
single donor, the number of eggs that can be “harvested and fertilized,”466 and the mandatory 
provision of counseling to gamete donors. Perhaps the most important recommendation in this 
regard was the recommendation that gamete donors would have to consent to their identity being 
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disclosed to any offspring conceived, which would amount to a prohibition on anonymous 
gamete donation in Canada. According to Building Families, the Standing Committee believed 
that these matters were too important to leave to the discretion of a regulatory agency yet-to-be-
established.467 
On the whole, Building Families accepted the broad vision of the draft legislation; its 
recognition of the benefits and harms of ARTs, the need to simultaneously introduce criminal 
and regulatory provisions, and the ongoing need to promote human dignity by prohibiting 
commercialization. At the same time, the legitimacy accorded to the position of surrogates 
through the inclusion of the reimbursement of expenditures was erased in Building Families, 
without mention of the concerns articulated by surrogacy advocates about financial output, and 
compensation for risk.468 While the Standing Committee on Health committed to the non-
commercialization of surrogacy and egg donation, this position did not take seriously the 
possibility, articulated by Joanne Wright and others, that some women might be able to engage 
in receiving some compensation for the physiological, temporal, and psychological costs of 
engaging without coercion.469 The nuanced positions expressed in the Feedback Report and in 
the witness testimony were simply not mentioned at all, and the portrayal of surrogates in 
Building Families simply repeats the tropes of exploitation and payment apparent in the Royal 
Commission, and the three-phase approach. The failure to address the varied perspectives on 
surrogacy apparent throughout the legislative consultations, even if only in promoting another 
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option, is a notable absence that undermines the reproductive citizenship of surrogates, whose 
role in the policy debates was finally being recognized. Conversely, the prioritization of the 
interests of people conceived with the use of reproductive technologies, and the strong position 
taken by the Standing Committee on donor anonymity worked to legitimate the hard-fought 
position of donor-conceived people and their advocates. For surrogates, this meant largely 
symbolic representation in the policy process, while for donor-conceived people, Building 
Families was an important landmark, demonstrating that there was substantial support for the 
elimination of donor-anonymity. The importance of donor-conceived people as key actors in the 
governance of ARTs was clearer than ever, and their demand for an end to donor anonymity 
seemed, for the first time, likely to occur. 
 
Passing the Act 
Bill C-56 (the Assisted Human Reproduction Act) was tabled in the House of Commons on May 
9, 2002. Overall, it appeared as if Building Families had little effect on the legislation, as Bill C-
56 was a near-verbatim replica of the draft legislation with a few exceptions, the most significant 
of which was the creation of a regulatory agency.470 Additionally some clarifications about the 
creation of embryos were made, and the importance of research was asserted more clearly in the 
preamble. It passed first and second reading relatively quickly, and was sent back to the Standing 
Committee on Health by the end of May 2002.  
 Since the carefully conceived recommendations to change the draft legislation articulated 
in Building Families had, for the most part, not been addressed in the tabled bill, members of the 
Standing Committee took the government to task. Members asked why the government 
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“ignore[d] the committee recommendation” about donor anonymity, as well the matter of the 
reimbursement of expenses to surrogates. As to the matter of donor anonymity, officials from 
Health Canada responded by citing a potential shortage in gamete donors, stating that it was felt 
that “mandatory donor identification…would unduly affect the capacity or the ability of the 
infertile couples in Canada to be able to have children.”471 As to the inclusion of the provisions 
to permit reimbursement of expenditures to surrogates and gamete donors, the officials vaguely 
cited “Charter implications,” 472 explaining only that if women undergoing surrogacy or egg 
retrieval did not seek medical care (because reimbursement was not possible), it might endanger 
their security of the person under s.7 of the Charter.  
 The Standing Committee heard witnesses throughout the spring of 2002, and started 
again in the fall when Parliament reconvened for a new session and the legislation was 
reintroduced at committee stage (as C-13). This round of hearings was streamlined, as the 
Standing Committee had so recently heard the position of many interested stakeholders. The 
decision was made to only hear witnesses on issues where there had been discord between 
Building Families and the legislation tabled.473 In this round of hearings, for example, there was 
significantly more representation from infertile Canadians than there had been during the 
hearings on the draft legislation. Additionally, commercial sperm banks and clinicians were well-
represented, and both groups suggested that eliminating donor anonymity or restricting 
compensation to surrogates and egg donors would collectively cause a problematic shortage in 
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gamete donors and surrogates. Donor-conceived people and surrogacy advocates were heard 
once again, although this time in conjunction with the representatives of commercial sperm 
banks and fertility clinics, who had their own economic and professional stakes in the 
governance of ARTs and offered competing perspectives. 
 Following the witness testimony, the Bill underwent scrutiny by the committee in a 
clause-by-clause study, followed by the proposal of relevant amendments. There were a number 
of amendments that attempted to clarify what would constitute expenditures for surrogates and/or 
gamete donors but these were defeated, and the provisions on reimbursement remained in place. 
Further, while there seemed to be consensus on the need to require the proposed regulatory 
agency to disclose the identity of a donor to a person conceived with their gametes, an 
amendment addressing this matter was also defeated.474 Bill C-13 moved forward with clauses 
protecting donor anonymity and allowing reimbursement to gamete donors and surrogates.  
 One of the most interesting changes to the Bill throughout the legislative process 
occurred at this late hour, during the clause-by-clause. Réal Ménard, an MP for the Bloc 
Québécois proposed an amendment stating that people using ARTs must not be discriminated 
against on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status. This was an explicit response to the 
testimony of Mona Greenbaum (co-founder of the Lesbian Mothers’ Association) on the draft 
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legislation, as well as a follow-up meeting that Greenbaum had with Ménard. As an openly gay 
man from Quebec, Greenbaum “assumed he would understand…the issues,” or at the very least, 
have some sympathy for the exclusions that LGBTQ and single people were experiencing.475 
Ménard was indeed interested in addressing the concerns that Greenbaum raised. He had briefly 
raised the issue of LGBTQ inclusion in the Bill immediately after it came back to committee, 
asking Health Canada’s legal officials about the possibility of an amendment to address “sexual 
orientation and matrimonial status.”476 The matter was not discussed again, until he introduced 
the amendment at clause-by-clause, and his staunch defense that it be included ensured that the 
provision on sexual orientation and marital status made it into the Act.  
 Versions of what would become the AHRA had been winding their way through 
Parliament since 2001 when the draft legislation was considered, and in the interim a number of 
developments in federal politics had occurred which put pressure on the Liberal government to 
push it through before much longer. The resignation of long-sitting Prime Minister Jean Chrétien 
in December 2003, and the appointment of successor Paul Martin meant that an election was 
impending. Further, the Liberal Party was deeply embroiled in the corruption allegations of the 
sponsorship scandal, and it was unclear that a Martin government would be re-elected. Following 
more than a decade of consideration of how to govern ARTs following the Royal Commission, 
there was a lot at stake in the Senate hearings on the AHRA. The Bill was put before the Senate 
in October of 2003. It died on the Order Paper when Parliament was prorogued (beginning a new 
session with Martin as Prime Minister), but it was reintroduced as C-6 on February 11, 2004 and 
brought to the Senate at committee stage.477 
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 At the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, senators 
heard testimony from a range of interests over six meetings. Many of the same people who had 
been heard by the House Standing Committee on Health either at the time of the draft legislation 
or at committee stage testified once again. Some of those who testified in one important meeting 
included a representative from Repromed (a preeminent Canadian sperm bank), Joanne Wright 
from Canadian Surrogacy Options, Shirley and Olivia Pratten from the New Reproductive 
Alternatives Society, Diane Allen from the Infertility Network, and a number of other advocates 
of infertile Canadians and donor-conceived people. Bev Hanck, the representative of the 
Infertility Awareness Association of Canada appeared in a different meeting altogether.  
When the Senate Standing Committee brought the Bill back to the Senate, it proposed 
passing it without amendment. The looming election and waning public support for the 
governing Liberals raised concern that the long public policy process might be for naught, if and 
when the Bill died on the Order Paper once again.478 The Senate committee still had reservations 
about a number of matters, but rather than propose amendments that might delay the passage of 
the Bill, the Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Health, and Technology “took the 
opportunity to make the Senate aware of several issues.”479 One of these issues was donor 
anonymity, and the Senate committee noted that testimony from ethicists, donor-conceived 
people, and their families made compelling arguments about their entitlement to “identifying 
information regarding their biological origins.” On the other hand, the committee also 
acknowledged the challenges that eliminating anonymity might result in a dearth of gametes 
available to Canadians experiencing infertility. The committee recommended that this issue be 
addressed when the legislation was to come up for review three years after its passage. The 
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committee also acknowledged competing demands in compensation to gamete donors and 
surrogates, writing that it “supports the non-commercialization of the Bill but is nevertheless 
concerned about the effect this will have on donations.”480 The committee made additional 
observations about surrogacy, articulating that there was a need for greater study of surrogacy 
practices. Bill C-6, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, passed third reading with little debate, 
and received Royal Assent on March 29, 2004.  
 
Individual and Collective Understandings in the Road to the AHRA 
The consultative process leading to the AHRA included a number of groups and actors that had 
not been consulted in the three-phase approach. The voices of LGBTQ people, surrogates, and 
surrogacy advocates were included in the policy debates, and although their presence paled in 
comparison with those of religious groups, for example, or medical researchers, their inclusion 
did signal recognition of what was at stake for these communities. These groups emerged as new 
policy subjects with important interests at stake. What emerged in the case of these groups, as 
well as that of infertile Canadians and their advocates, was a growing endorsement of 
unrestricted access to ARTs, and an elimination of all clauses thought to cause a “shortage” in 
gamete donation or the provision of surrogacy services. Those concerned about the restriction on 
the reproductive choices of intended parents included (for the first time in the policy debates 
since the Royal Commission), LGBTQ people. For LGBTQ people, surrogates, and infertile 
Canadians, the best way to create equitable access to ARTs would be by supporting the status 
quo, and allowing an unrestricted market in infertility treatments to continue. The right to 
reproduce using reproductive technologies, without interference from the state, was gaining 
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legitimacy while the right of donor-conceived people to know their origins was losing traction. 
Considerations of the collective interest in protecting the vulnerable (namely those born of 
ARTs) fell away, and individual interest in pursuing the use of reproductive technologies 
prevailed.  
 Some change was in order as the Government of Canada was committed to limiting 
commercial practices, however this could be negotiated by altering its rhetorical approach to 
what constituted commerciality. A loosely defined “reimbursement of expenses” was used in 
place of “payment,” and concerns about commercialization were shelved, to be reconsidered in a 
review of the AHRA that was scheduled for three years following the passage of the Act 
(although no such review has ever occurred). The concerns of LGBTQ people and surrogates, as 
detailed below, were certainly more nuanced than a mere propagation of the existing market in 
services, but the elements of their positions taken up in the policy debates were those most 
aligned with the continuation of the provision of fertility treatments with few restrictions in 
private-for-profit settings. Donor-conceived people and their families who had been advocating 
for the elimination of donor anonymity saw their positions engaged with and recognized by 
policymakers, although in the end, the AHRA did little for the donor-conceived.  
 
LGBTQ People  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the rights of same-sex couples and adoptive families changed 
considerably to address the interests of LGBTQ families, both in legislation and in jurisprudence. 
New developments in case law, employment benefits programs, and provincial and federal 
legislation resulted in increased relationship recognition for LGBTQ people.481 For example, in 
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2005 the Civil Marriage Act was passed, legally permitting same-sex marriage across Canada. 
Further, provincial laws were expanding to extend adoption rights to LGBTQ parents, including 
same-sex couples.482 Some of these laws were changing in response to litigation from LGBTQ 
families, including LGBTQ families with donor-conceived children, making it clear that LGBTQ 
people had an important stake in the particular governance of ARTs, and in family building more 
broadly. The recognition of LGBTQ people as parents in adoption law, and the outcomes of 
debates over same-sex marriage that were taking place as the AHRA wove its way through 
Parliament meant that the hard-fought rights of LGBTQ families were fresh in the minds of 
parliamentarians as the AHRA was being considered.    
During the consideration of the AHRA, two key LGBTQ organizations participated in 
consultations on the Act: the Lesbian Mothers’ Association of Quebec submitted a policy brief 
on the draft legislation, with Mona Greenbaum testifying to the Standing Committee, and Egale 
Canada submitted a brief as well when the AHRA returned to the Standing Committee in 2002. 
The recommendations provided by the LMA and in Greenbaum’s testimony was the first 
provided by an LGBTQ identified group to the federal government in policy discussions on 
ARTs since the Royal Commission and it focused largely on making clear that lesbians did not 
have equal access to fertility services in Canada, and raising four key concerns. First, the LMA 
was most concerned that despite the judgment in Potter v Korn, fertility treatment providers were 
refusing women treatment on the basis of marital status or sexual orientation, and recommended 
that the proposed Act include provisions that prohibited discrimination on these bases. As 
Greenbaum noted in her testimony to the Standing Committee on Health in 2001, there were 
“some provinces, such as Ontario or British Columbia, that do provide access to single women 
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and lesbians, but in Quebec the policy of every single fertility clinic is to bar access not only to 
lesbians but to single heterosexual women as well.”483 Second, the submission and testimony 
suggested that as insemination is not a particularly complicated technique, “both clinics and 
individual private practitioners” should be allowed to apply for licenses to provide relevant 
services, although both should have to adhere to certain standards, including access “regardless 
of sexual orientation, marital status, or fertility status.”484 Under the proposed legislation, only 
licensed service providers would be able to engage in the “acquisition,” “storage,” and “transfer” 
of gametes “for the purposes of creating an embryo,” effectively criminalizing those attempting 
to conceive via self-insemination at home or elsewhere. The third recommendation made by the 
LMA was that any equivalency agreements that should be developed by relevant provinces be 
contingent on the basis that equal access be provided to all women. Finally, in order to address 
interest in non-anonymously provided semen, the LMA recommended that “sperm donors be 
given the choice to consent or not to having their identity revealed to any persons born of their 
donations.”485 
 Egale Canada also made a submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Health on the proposed AHRA. Spurred on by its work in the Susan Doe case, Egale Canada saw 
itself, according to its submission, as an important participant in the discussion given its standing 
in cases related to the governance of the family. The submission notes that as a community, 
LGBTQ people in Canada “have had our right and our ability to have and raise children, and to 
adopt the children of our partners, denied by discriminatory laws and regulations.”486 The 
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submission focused on a number of key issues including the proposed prohibitions on payment 
for sperm and ova, as well as surrogacy services, suggesting that the prohibitions might “lower 
people’s incentive” to partake, and would limit access to gametes and surrogacy services, which 
are often vital to the use of reproductive technologies by LGBTQ people. Egale Canada 
recommended to this end that the federal government consider the impacts of the prohibitions on 
LGBTQ people, and ensure that relevant regulations be drafted as soon as possible to ensure that 
reimbursement of expenditures, at the very least, could legally occur. The submission also 
addressed the semen regulations, “genetic selection and testing,” the criminalization of informal 
reproductive arrangements, and the need for equal access to ARTs.  
 The two submissions collectively worked to frame LGBTQ issues related to ARTs to the 
Standing Committee on Health, particularly as these issues had not been discussed in the three-
phase approach or in the preliminary policy consultations on the Act. The range of issues is 
noteworthy, including the need to address the discrimination inherent to the semen regulations 
and the legality of self-insemination. However, it was only those issues which did not conflict 
with an individual, biomedical, and market-based approach to fertility treatments that made it 
into the legislation. The payment/compensation of gamete donors and surrogates promoted by 
Egale Canada, the LMA’s endorsement of a gamete donor system in which anonymity is 
possible, and the need for equal access to ARTs supported by both groups aligned the interests of 
LGBTQ people with those of other Canadians seeking fertility treatments. Again, the 
submissions both present a wider range of issues, but the emphasis on access in both Egale 
Canada and the LMA’s interventions created a space for LGBTQ issues related to ARTs to be 
reduced to concerns of access alone.  
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 The ways in which the federal government would recognize LGBTQ people’s 
reproductive citizenship in the development of the AHRA only occurred where it was easy, not 
for example in the substantive reconsideration of the discriminatory semen regulations, or the 
rethinking of licensing regulations to recognize self-insemination. This model of reproductive 
citizenship that only recognizes the legitimacy of patient-consumers to make choices about their 
use of ARTs without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status, is 
reminiscent of early scholarship on sexual citizenship. These works argue that the use of equality 
rights as a means to attain a more robust experience of citizenship for LGBTQ people has been 
articulated as a strategy of “sameness” that works to invisibilize areas of difference that require 
addressing discrimination beyond formal equality rights and non-discrimination clauses.487 From 
this view, certain sexual minorities are often able to access certain social and legal rights when 
able to articulate their experiences as socially productive, non-descript workers, consumers, and 
taxpayers that contribute to the economic interests of the state without causing too much trouble.  
This strategy of “sameness” may not be a strategy at all, but rather a means to make the best of 
public policy which might otherwise be exclusionary. Indeed, recognition need not be 
revolutionary, sometimes it is a matter of compromise, or of getting access to the resources that 
might make one’s life more livable. 
In the context of the legislation, this access came to be understood as access to the range 
of fertility treatments available within a clinical setting without any undue restrictions on 
gametes or surrogacy services, rather than access to donor sperm from gay men or assurances 
that self-insemination would not be restricted under the new law. This is not to diminish the 
importance of the non-discrimination clause, indeed it was integral to ensuring that all fertility 
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clinics opened their doors to LGBTQ people.488 However, the emphasis on the non-
discrimination clause to the exclusion of other provisions that would have improved the capacity 
of LGBTQ people to use ARTs suggests that the legislation aimed only to include new 
provisions that would not alter the proposed legislative and regulatory framework, or impede on 
the market in infertility services. The ongoing concerns about the semen regulations, and the 
importance of clarifying the status of low-cost at-home inseminations were not addressed in the 
Act, and the reproductive citizenship afforded to LGBTQ people in the AHRA appeared to be one 
based on individual, unrestricted access to fertility treatments, within the largely private-for-
profit settings of Canadian clinics. The sense of belonging to the state by engaging in 
reproduction is articulated in the briefs of the LMA and Egale Canada in terms of creating access 
for all, but as taken up in the legislation, the emphasis is solely on access to those who can afford 
it in the context of the clinic.  
 
Egg Donors and Surrogates 
As described in chapters four and five, following the Royal Commission’s report, little had 
occurred vis-à-vis surrogacy in Canada. In the early 2000s, however, a number of court cases 
were heard that acknowledged the ongoing nature of surrogacy arrangements, and considered 
their legitimacy within contemporary models of family building. In 2000, a Manitoba court 
considered whether a declaration of parentage could be made prior to the birth of a child for 
purposes of establishing clear surrogacy arrangements, finding that it could not, although 
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following the recording of the birth as occurring by surrogate, the birth record could be 
changed.489 Further, in Alberta in 2002, a court “declared the genetic mother to be the mother of 
the child born via surrogate mother.”490 In JR v LH (2002), an Ontario court was asked to 
recognize that a child born via surrogate was legally the child of the intended parents (who had 
provided the gametes for conception). In this case, the intended parents were granted parental 
rights because they were the gamete providers, and therefore the biological parents of the 
child.491 These cases, occurring at the same time as the AHRA was being considered, worked to 
validate the use of surrogacy as a means to build one’s family. The courts were increasingly 
recognizing the reproductive citizenship of intended parents using surrogates, and surrogacy as a 
valid practice (although, as noted in JR v LH, only when payment was not involved). 
 Throughout the three-year process from the introduction of the draft legislation to the 
passage of the AHRA, article after article would be published in the popular press challenging the 
idea that surrogacy in Canada is exploitative, or that payment commercializes human life. These 
articles suggested that banning surrogacy would limit women’s reproductive choices,492 and 
further, that surrogacy should not be part of legislation seeking to govern “controversial—and 
frankly bizarre—practices” like cloning and the creation of animal-human hybrids.493 While the 
Standing Committee would ultimately uphold the ban on payment for surrogacy and leave 
regulation to the regulatory agency, there was some success in the inclusion of the possibility of 
reimbursement for expenditures, contrary to the recommendations in Building Families.  
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 The tempered recognition of surrogates as engaged actors in the policy debates is 
attributable to the appearances of Joanne Wright (as a surrogate and founder of Canadian 
Surrogacy Options) before parliamentary committees three times over the course of the 
consideration of the AHRA, each time noting that in her experience surrogates in Canada are not 
exploited or manipulated, and that surrogacy is a form of largely altruistic reproductive labour 
that warrants compensation for the time and emotional, physical effort involved. She carefully 
advocated for the regulation of compensation, rather than an outright ban, in order to ensure that 
infertile Canadians would continue to have access to surrogacy services. At her first appearance, 
speaking to the draft legislation, Wright appeared as a member of the Canadian Multi-
Disciplinary Assisted Reproduction Coalition. This coalition, drawn together in order to ensure 
representation of pro-surrogacy voices at the Standing Committee, represented “patients, 
lawyers, physicians, nurses, infertility clinics, surrogates and mental health professionals” 
advocating in favour of surrogacy.494 The voices of this organization at the Standing Committee 
included Wright as well as Sherry Levitan, a surrogacy lawyer whose practice was, by that time, 
well-established. Although she would only appear once before committee, Levitan stated clearly 
that surrogacy would continue in Canada regardless of the actions of Parliament, and that it was 
up to parliamentarians to regulate the practice to ensure that “screening, access to legal advice, 
and counseling”495 would continue, ensuring that people would use surrogacy services in non-
exploitative and effective ways. 
 What these surrogacy advocates ultimately wanted was to remove surrogacy from the 
criminal provisions of the legislation, and if necessary, for regulations to be established in order 
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to legitimize the business of surrogacy in the eyes of the Canadian public. This would include 
regulations establishing legitimate expenses, including lost wages, costs of pain and suffering, 
compensation for the health risks undertaken, as well as reimbursement of expenditures. The 
reliance on Wright and Levitan as the voices of and for Canadian surrogates (in addition to 
parents whose children were carried by surrogates) meant that the experiences came to represent 
the experience of surrogacy for the Standing Committee, repeated in subsequent consideration of 
the Bill.496 This is particularly notable given that although Wright and Levitan seemed well-
intentioned, and to legitimately view surrogacy with payment or compensation as benign, both 
also had ongoing financial interests in the proliferation of surrogacy, Wright as a broker of 
surrogacy arrangements, and Levitan as a lawyer. Wright’s testimony (echoed by Levitan) 
painted the picture of a maternal figure, gestating babies with love and care, in order to help 
others. The testimony suggested that surrogates would not need the money, but compensation 
would help, and would ease the difficulty of being pregnant and giving birth for the benefit of 
another family. Wright and Levitan’s testimony was closely aligned with the interests of infertile 
Canadians advocating for unencumbered access to surrogacy services; potentially limited by 
removing financial incentives for surrogates. The AHRA as passed did ban payment or 
compensation for surrogacy services, allowing only the reimbursement of expenditures in 
accordance with regulations yet-to-come. 
The inclusion of Wright and Levitan in committee hearings marked a more nuanced 
understanding of surrogacy presented within the policy debates and discussion leading to the 
AHRA, although what emerged was a very specific understanding of the agency of Canadian 
surrogates. The dangers of exploitation and commercialization that had pervaded the debate over 
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the three-phase approach were tempered somewhat by an understanding of surrogacy in Canada 
as relatively innocuous so long as it is conducted by middle-class women acting altruistically. 
Surrogacy itself was less offensive as a practice, but the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable practices lay with the ability to assert that surrogates were relatively well-off 
Canadian women, with their own children and more to give who were not engaging for the 
money. As such, the reproductive labour of surrogates was presented as pseudo-maternal, 
invaluable, with surrogates as engaging on their own accord; reproductive angels497 to the 
families that they assist. The potential for surrogacy as state-funded work that had appeared in 
the Feedback report was nowhere to be found in the AHRA as surrogates were constructed 
entirely in the debates on the proposed legislation (and implicitly in the proposed legislation 
itself) as maternal figures that could use (but did not need) compensation for their services.  
In the meantime, egg donors remained absent from the debates. There was, however, a 
small change in how egg donation was considered, namely a recognition that if egg donation was 
going to continue in Canada, consideration would have to be given to the tremendous 
physiological undertaking that it involves. Consideration of the harms of egg retrieval was given 
not only in regards to reproduction, but also, in regards to embryonic stem cell research, for the 
first time addressing that perhaps it was not only the moral status of the embryo that was of grave 
concern, but also the invasive surgical practices required to obtain the eggs from which the 
embryos could be created.498 Concern about the problematic nature of obtaining embryos for 
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research or otherwise was raised most prominently by Keith Martin, a physician and then-
Alliance Party Member of Parliament who suggested that it might be too much to ask women to 
undertake the risk of egg donation without some measure of compensation and that more than 
“bus fare to get down to the clinic” was warranted.499 The need to provide egg donors with some 
payment for undertaking significant risks also appears in the testimony of advocates of infertile 
people concerned about restrictions that might limit access to gametes. The idea of gamete 
shortage had appeared little during witness testimony on the draft legislation, but by the time the 
legislation arrived back at the Standing Committee after second reading, representatives from 
IAAC asserted that “few women will agree to undergo the painful egg-extraction procedure for 
free”500 and “there isn’t a woman alive who is going to do this for nothing,”501 arguing that 
compensation for egg donation (not to mention sperm donation) was needed to ensure an 
ongoing supply of gametes. The longstanding matter of a “shortage” in gametes would become a 
refrain amongst clinicians and advocates of infertile people in the last round of standing 
committee hearings and once the legislation was heard in the Senate Standing Committee on 
Science, Social Affairs, and Technology prior to its passage. As with surrogacy, the commitment 
to non-commercialization evident in Building Families would slowly fall away, with references 
to “reimbursement” rather than “compensation” or “payment” assuaging concerns about 
commodification and economic exploitation.  
The model of surrogacy and egg donation that was ultimately included in the AHRA 
allowed both practices to continue, but with criminal sanctions when either of these practices 
                                                   
499 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates February 27, 2003 (Keith Martin); Alana Cattapan, “Vulnerable 
Subjects: Agency, Authority, and Assisted Reproduction in Canada,” (paper presentation at Mothers and the 
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June 1, 2004. 
501 Kim Lunman, “Senate Passes ‘Historic’ Bill on Reproductive Technologies,” The Globe and Mail, March 12, 
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involved payment to the surrogate or donor. There was, in this way, an upholding of the 
principles of non-commercialization and non-commodification that had appeared in proposed 
legislation and policy documents since the Royal Commission; Canada would not allow an open 
market in assisted reproduction. The outright ban on paying surrogates and egg donors for these 
activities was, however, tempered by a desire to ensure that if these practices were to continue, 
there was a need to ensure that donors and surrogates would not be saddled with restrictive costs 
that would hinder them from engaging. What would comprise compensation or “reimbursement 
of expenditures” would be addressed in regulations-to-come, but until regulations were drafted it 
was unclear just what would be included. At the time of writing, more than ten years after the 
passage of the Act, regulations are yet to be drafted.  
What the criminal provisions of the Act ultimately did, and do, in relation to 
commercialization is offload the responsibility for the prevention of commercial practices and 
the commodification of reproduction to clinics, physicians, surrogacy agencies (which 
themselves are barred from engaging in commercial practices), lawyers, intended parents and 
others. In the absence of a substantive regulatory framework, as described below, the 
responsibility for ensuring that egg donation and surrogacy occur altruistically falls out of the 
purview of the state. While the inclusion of criminal provisions ensured that there was a public 
commitment on the part of the federal government to non-exploitative and non-commercial 
practices in the use of ARTs, without oversight and regulations there would be no enforcement, 
and the day-to-day functioning of surrogacy and egg donation arrangements are now governed 
only by those engaged in providing or using ARTs. Only the specter of illegality and individual 
commitments to ethical practices have worked to deter outright and open commodification. The 
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reproductive citizenship of egg donors and surrogates was affirmed, then, in terms of their role as 
freelance providers of reproductive services. 
 
Infertile Canadians/Donor-conceived Families 
Anonymous gamete donation and the federal government’s insistence that it remain possible to 
donate and use anonymously provided gametes would prove to be one of the most contentious 
matters debated as the AHRA weaved its way through Parliament. During the three-phase 
approach, the positions of the Infertility Network and the Infertility Awareness Association of 
Canada were similar, however, as noted in chapters four and five, throughout the late 1990s, the 
Infertility Network changed its position considerably. Although both IAAC and the Infertility 
Network continued to run support groups and provide resources to infertile people, politically, 
the Infertility Network came to advocate for infertile people in ways that reflected the interests of 
donor-conceived people as well, and thus was more and more aligned with the politics of the 
NRAS than those of IAAC. Once-patients were later parents, no longer concerned with getting 
access to gametes or surrogacy services and instead, concerned about the stories that they would 
tell to their children about their origins. IAAC continued to advocate for people seeking to use 
reproductive technologies to build their families, and argued against policy proposals that might 
encumber their access, namely restrictions on payment for gamete donation and surrogacy and 
the elimination of donor anonymity.502  
                                                   
502 Although she appeared in her capacity as a counselor at the London Health Science Centre throughout the 
hearings leading to the AHRA, social worker Jean Haase was a notable presence speaking on behalf of donor-
conceived families. Haase had established a support group in 1997 that brought together donor-conceived families in 
Southern Ontario twice yearly. The group had not been involved in activist pursuits, but Haase testified multiple 
times in hearings on various iterations of the AHRA prior to its passage. The interests of donor-conceived people 
were not only well-articulated by COMAR, then, but also by Haase, whose support of the elimination of donor 
anonymity was well-received by Bonnie Brown, herself a social worker, and Chair of the Standing Committee on 
Health at the time that the draft legislation was being considered. Interview with Jean Haase, December 3, 2011; 
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 When the draft legislation was put to the Standing Committee on Health, donor 
anonymity was a key issue in which the Committee could intervene in order to protect the best 
interests of the child. Committee Chair Bonnie Brown was a social worker, and her interventions 
were notable as she took an approach to the draft legislation that, from the outset, saw 
safeguarding vulnerable actors as paramount. In contrast to testimony that would emerge after 
the AHRA was tabled, there was almost no mention in witness testimony on the draft legislation 
of a potential shortage of gametes or a decline that might come with limitations on anonymity. In 
fact, this perspective was only articulated by Dr. Norman Barwin (of the Infertility Awareness 
Association of Canada), who vaguely mentioned that there might be reticence on the part of 
donors to participate in donation programs when they are concerned about being identified to 
resulting offspring.503 Instead, the elimination of donor anonymity was portrayed positively 
during this period, with witnesses attesting to the importance of protecting the best interests of 
the child. Perhaps the most important testimony on the interests of donor-conceived people 
during the consideration of the draft legislation was that of Olivia Pratten, as she spoke frankly 
of her experience as a donor-conceived person, calling the legislation “quite disgusting” for 
permitting donors to have their information destroyed, and “unconscionable” for the proposal of 
a dual system that would accommodate both open and anonymous donation.504 For several 
members of the committee, it was the first time that they had heard a donor-conceived person 
describe their experiences in their own words,505 and throughout the legislative process, MPs 
                                                   
Iinterview with Vince Londini, November 15, 2011. See also Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Health.  Evidence. Meeting No. 40, November 8, 2001. 
503 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Standing Committee on Health. Evidence. Meeting No. 40, November 
8, 2001. 
504 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Standing Committee on Health. Evidence. Meeting No. 35, October 25,  
2001. 
505 Other key actors would also identify the importance of eliminating donor anonymity, including Diane Allen of 
the Infertility Network and Irene Ryll, the coordinator of the Infertility Connection, a support group based in 
!! ! !
234 
would refer to the testimony to speak in favour of banning donor anonymity.506  
As noted above, the report issued by the Standing Committee on the draft legislation 
recommended eliminating donor anonymity in Canada, and ensuring that donor-conceived 
people could have access to identifying information about their donors. Building Families 
emphasized the importance of putting children conceived through ARTs first in any legislation 
or regulation, noting that “…children conceived through assisted human reproduction warrant 
even greater consideration than the adults seeking to build families or the physicians or 
researchers seeking new knowledge.”507 Concerns about the benefits of these technologies for 
infertile Canadians were secondary, in the committee’s opinion, to those of the donor offspring 
who would have to live with the consequences of the use of these technologies for their entire 
lives.  
When Bill C-56 was tabled in May 2002 (without the proposed amendments on donor 
anonymity), then-Health Minister Anne McLellan attempted to pre-empt objections from 
Standing Committee members by directly addressing the matter of “anonymity.” In her carefully 
worded speech to the House of Commons, McLellan at once asserted that “there will be no 
anonymous donors” given that donors would be required to provide personal health information 
under a proposed registry system, but that the practice of anonymous gamete donation (i.e., not 
providing donor information to donor-conceived people) would continue.”508 As noted above, 
when the Bill returned to the Standing Committee on Health following second reading, the 
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longstanding members of the Committee challenged the government for its failure to address key 
recommendations, and particularly the recommendation to abolish donor anonymity. It was at 
this time, following the committee report that representatives from Xytex Canada and Repromed 
(both sperm banks operating in Canada) as well as clinicians who had appeared numerous times 
before, appeared before the committee suggesting that eliminating anonymity and compensation 
would have a negative impact on the supply of gametes in Canada. To this end, the 
representative from Repromed stated clearly that the donors in their program required both 
anonymity and reimbursement to participate in sperm donation, stating that seventy-one percent 
“have stated that they will not continue to participate in our program without appropriate 
reimbursement.”509  
The eventual passage of the Bill without provisions to eliminate donor anonymity may be 
attributable, in part, to the changing composition of the Standing Committee on Health. The 
committee heard witnesses throughout the spring of 2002, and when they reconvened in the fall, 
the Bill was reintroduced at committee stage (as C-13). The membership of the committee 
changed slightly at this time, adding two physicians from the then-governing Liberal Party, 
Carolyn Bennett and Hedy Fry. As general practitioners, Bennett and Fry had experience with 
infertile patients and were concerned about what Bennett saw as “disdain for the infertile” on the 
part of committee members.510 The efforts of these MPs, including Bennett “telephon[ing] 
physicians to see if they could convince patients to speak,”511 led to more representation from 
infertile people and their advocates than had occurred in the pre-legislative consultations and in 
consideration of the draft legislation. Although there had been agreement to hear only witnesses 
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on issues where there was discord between the Bill and Building Families, Bennett and Fry’s 
advocacy may have contributed to an overrepresentation of those advocating for the continuation 
of donor anonymity. Consequently, it was not only the Infertility Network and IAAC that were 
represented, but so too were a number of individuals speaking on their experience of infertility 
and the use of donor gametes. These individuals spoke one after another in support of the 
reimbursement of expenses in gamete donation and surrogacy, and suggested that any 
prohibition of reimbursement would result in a situation where infertile couples would either be 
deprived of a chance at building their family, or forced to circumvent the law in ways that would 
likely put surrogates and donors at risk.512 Of those representing infertile Canadians in the 
committee hearings, only the representatives of the Infertility Network argued that the provisions 
about reimbursement of expenditures were a cause for concern insofar as they might serve as a 
means to “circumvent the ban on payment to donors and surrogates.”513  
Whereas Building Families had identified clear support for the elimination of donor 
anonymity, the near-consensus of the committee on that issue no longer existed in the later round 
of hearings. Many committee members remained concerned about the implications of 
anonymous gamete donation, but if they were indeed attempting to help Canadians create their 
families using ARTs, restrictions might be counterproductive. In a context of a government 
dedicated to the expansion of the biotechnology sector, and where the interests of clinics, many 
infertile Canadians, physicians, and sperm banks were suddenly articulated the same way—
concerned about a potential gamete shortage—it would prove difficult to put donor anonymity in 
the Bill and to keep reimbursements for gamete donation and surrogacy out of it. The expansion 
of the committee hearings to include sperm banks and more advocates of infertile Canadians 
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effectively tipped the balance away from those most concerned with the interests of the donor-
conceived. The interests of clinicians as well as intended parents making use of reproductive 
technologies were made even clearer than they had been before, and the idea that regulating 
reimbursement of expenses or anonymous gamete donation was identified again and again as 
potentially infringing on the capacity of Canadians to use reproductive technologies.  
The AHRA and the process of its formation, then, put forward a complex view of the 
reproductive citizenship of donor-conceived families. On the one hand, the inclusion of donor-
conceived people and their families at each stage of consultations and throughout the legislative 
process is notable. The impact of Olivia Pratten’s testimony cannot be understated, and Building 
Families’ unequivocal commitment to privileging the interests of people born of reproductive 
technologies, in part by eliminating donor anonymity points to a recognition of the interests of 
donor-conceived families, and the desire of many to ensure that donor-conceived people can 
obtain access to information about their genetic origins. Further, the guiding principles of the 
AHRA include that “the health and well-being of children born through the application of assisted 
reproductive technologies must be given priority in all decisions respecting their use,” implying 
that if eliminating donor anonymity serves the health and well-being of donor-conceived people, 
then it should be eliminated. At the same time, the AHRA does not include provisions to ensure 
that access to information about gamete donors is available to the donor-conceived. In the words 
of Shirley Pratten: 
in the preamble of the Bill, it said a priority of the Bill was to put the children of 
the technologies at the forefront. It said that is what mattered the most. It would 
say that in the Bill, and there was all this evidence and research to show that 
anonymity was harmful to the child, and yet, the Bill in the end, supported 
anonymity going through.514 
 
                                                   
514 Interview with Shirley Pratten, March 28, 2012. 
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If what donor-conceived people and their families really wanted, and what they felt would ensure 
their well-being, was to have access to information about their donors, then the principles of the 
Act to protect their well-being were, at best, unrealized.  
The failure to include provisions about the elimination of donor anonymity taken together 
with the ongoing inclusion of provisions to reimburse surrogates and gamete donors for 
“expenses,” suggests that those whose interests were best heard and incorporated into the AHRA 
were infertile people, their advocates, surrogates, and the clinicians and industry actors whose 
commitments to unrestricted access to fertility treatments persisted from the time of the Royal 
Commission through to the AHRA. The interests of these actors were presented similarly, in 
terms of the need for individuals to make choices about their fertility, and to ensure that the 
range of choices would be as widely drawn as possible regardless of the implications for the 
donor-conceived. In the federal government’s commitment to criminalization and regulation that 
had been in place since the time of the Royal Commission, the AHRA ultimately privileged the 
interests of those patient-consumers seeking to access fertility treatments as a means to have 
biologically related children through biomedical and pharmaceutical interventions in the context 
of a fertility clinic. The small measures taken to curb commercialization through making it 
illegal to “pay for” gametes or surrogacy services, were broadly conceived enough “to drive a 
truck through,”515 as what would be considered expenses was left to the regulations, although the 
regulations were never made. By seeking treatment or making payments abroad, or reimbursing 
a too-broad range of expenses (in the absence of regulation), commercial practices persisted, 
ultimately doing little to alter the long existing market in reproductive services and materials in 
Canada. The reproductive citizenship of infertile Canadians, again, often articulated in the same 
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terms as those of for-profit clinics and biomedical and biopharmaceutical firms, was unaltered, 
largely unrestricted, and reinforced in the AHRA.  
The road to the AHRA involved the recognition of LGBTQ Canadians, surrogates, donor-
conceived people, and infertile Canadians all as relevant stakeholders in the governance of 
assisted human reproduction in Canada. For LGBTQ people, who had not been expressly 
mentioned in policy debates since the time of the Royal Commission, the inclusion of provisions 
protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status was a means 
of recognizing that ARTs are a route to family building for people outside of the nuclear, 
heterosexual family framework. The limited inclusion of surrogates in the policy debates was a 
meager means of acknowledging their relevance to the policy outcomes, however, the voices of 
surrogates were not well-heard by policymakers (and the voices of egg donors remained absent). 
Donor-conceived people were well-heard by the Standing Committee on Health, but ultimately, 
their concerns about donor anonymity were not taken up in the legislation. Finally, infertile 
Canadians and others acting in their interest were well-represented in the policy debate, although 
the balance between criminal provisions and regulations-to-come resulted in potential access to 
altruistically provided gametes and surrogacy services and the subsequent emergence of a new 
grey market in surrogacy and gamete provision.  
The privileging of the interests of infertile people in the AHRA is indicative of a broader 
understanding of reproductive citizenship in the contemporary period. Donor-conceived families 
and surrogates experience a mediated and complex relationship with the state vis-à-vis 
reproduction, with their interests sometimes heard, sometimes recognized, and subsumed by the 
interests of infertile people and biomedical actors where conflicts exist. The most robust 
reproductive citizenship is reserved for would-be reproductive entrepreneurs, with the financial 
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resources to invest in building their families, and the financial and social security to take the 
risks necessary to do so. LGBTQ people engaged in the use of ARTs may exist in a liminal space 
between these two groups, sometimes able to invest in the use of ARTs in the context of the 
clinic, sometimes contesting their medicalization through self-insemination and alternate forms 
of family building, sometimes unable to engage in their desired practices of family building, 
priced out of the market. 
 
Governing Reproductive Technologies Since the AHRA 
 In Governing Molecules, a history of genetic engineering in Europe, Herbert Gottweis—political 
scientist and scholar of biotechnology—noted that narratives about biotechnology always “end in 
the middle of things.”516 The lengthy legislative process that culminated in the passage of the 
AHRA was indeed, an end of sorts in the middle of the story of the governance of reproductive 
technologies in Canada, as the governance of ARTs in Canada has continued to evolve since its 
passage. 
 
A Constitutional Challenge 
The AHRA received Royal Assent in March 2004, and by December of that year, the 
Government of Quebec brought forth a constitutional challenge.517 The challenge was largely 
concerned with whether the regulatory provisions of the Act infringed on provincial authority 
over health care, a matter which had been of concern throughout the policy debates leading to the 
passage of the AHRA. Concerns about the federal authority to intervene in an area of health care 
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were addressed in the first chapter of the Royal Commission’s report, in which federal 
interventions in the field were validated through references to the “peace, order, and good 
government power, as well as under the criminal law, trade and commerce, spending and other 
relevant federal constitutional powers.”518 Further, both at the time of C-47 and later, during the 
debate over the draft version of the AHRA, members of opposition parties (primarily the Bloc 
Québécois)519 and legal experts520 advised the federal government that the proposed legislation 
would be open to constitutional challenge due to what was perceived to be federal encroachment 
into the governance of health.521 Thus, while legal counsel for the federal government continued 
to advise that the government would be within its jurisdictional authority to regulate if the 
regulations were relevant to the use of the criminal law power,522 the constitutional challenge to 
the AHRA did not come as a surprise.523 In June 2008, the Quebec Court of Appeal found in 
favour of the Government of Quebec, ruling that despite the legitimacy of the criminal 
provisions of the Act, the medical aspects of reproductive technologies fall within the provincial 
power to regulate and deliver health care services.524 The Government of Canada appealed the 
decision, and finally, in a long-awaited and split judgment rendered in December 2010, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the Quebec Court of Appeal, effectively overturning a number of the 
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Act’s regulatory provisions.525  
 
The Rise and Fall of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada 
In 2004, however, the legislation was in force, and as the constitutional challenge would take a 
number of years to weave its way through the courts there was still work to be done. Amongst 
the most pressing concerns was the establishment of a regulatory agency, mandated by the Act to 
“promote and protect the health and safety, and the human dignity and human rights, of 
Canadians,” and “to foster the application of ethical principles.”526 More specifically, the 
regulatory agency—Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC or the Agency)—was to 
manage the licensing functions of the AHRA, advise the Minister of Health on ARTs, “monitor 
and evaluate” developments related to ARTs, “collect, analyse and manage health reporting 
information” relevant to the regulatory provisions of the Act, provide public education, and 
ensure the Act’s enforcement.527  
 From the outset, the Agency was mired in controversy. There were delays in establishing 
the agency, first due to the calling of the 2004 federal election less than two months after the 
AHRA received Royal Assent. Although steps were subsequently taken following the election to 
move forward with putting the agency in place (for example, Orders in Council were issued in 
2005,528 and the establishment of a process to appoint Board members took place that same 
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year),529 all was disrupted when yet another election was called, and the governing party changed 
in 2006. While the Liberal Party had formed government throughout the long process of the 
legislative development, following the 2006 election, implementation would be left to the newly 
elected Conservative Party of Canada with a well-known commitment to decentralization in 
health, and a lack of political will to openly engage in regulating reproduction. The appointments 
for the Board of the Agency were nearly complete when the 2006 writ was dropped, as “an 
independent expert selection committee” had made recommendations of twenty-five applicants 
to be considered for the Board. 530 However, once elected the Conservative Party accepted only 
two of these recommendations, instead putting forth a new list of candidates criticized widely for 
social conservatism and a failure to include key stakeholders.   
 The critiques that the Board was too socially conservative and excluded patients, fertility 
experts and stem-cell scientists, were soon compounded by criticisms of the agency’s inaction 
and allegations of mismanagement. Neither Health Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction 
Implementation Office (charged with the development of regulations), nor the Agency (with its 
mandate to implement the AHRA) developed a framework for licensing ARTs in the years after 
the Agency was established, and the regulatory regime promised by the AHRA never really 
emerged.531 The Agency cited that it lacked regulations from Health Canada to do the licensing 
and enforcing of the AHRA that it was mandated to do, while Health Canada identified that the 
regulations were delayed due to the impending decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal, and 
later, the Supreme Court of Canada. The Agency did do some work during this period, including 
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organizing an international conference on reproductive tourism, developing educational 
materials, and holding consultations on potential regulations, however given its broad mandate 
and substantial funding, it accomplished relatively little.532 This is not to say that the blame for 
inaction lies with the Agency alone, as Health Canada failed to make the regulations needed to 
proceed with much of its mandate,533 however, the Agency could have moved forward with the 
enforcement of criminal provisions of the AHRA without the development of such regulations.534 
The problems at the Agency went further, and in 2010, three Board members resigned, citing a 
lack of transparency in the Agency’s operations and spending, and an insular politics that kept 
certain Board members from fully participating in the Agency’s decision-making.535 It was clear 
that the Agency’s dysfunction ran deep. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the AHRA made, in some ways, the 
functioning of the Agency a moot point. As the primary tasks of the agency included the 
management of the regulatory functions of the AHRA, including its licensing scheme and 
information collection, following the judgment the Agency’s operations were restricted to 
education, and promoting enforcement of the law that remained (and the one set of regulations 
that had, in fact, been developed).536 In the 2012 federal budget, the Harper government 
announced that the AHRA would be amended to reflect the Supreme Court decision, including 
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closing the Agency, which ceased operations in March 2013.537 
 The changes announced in the federal budget were part of a controversial omnibus 
budget bill that made sweeping changes to AHRA reaching far beyond the provisions overturned 
by the Supreme Court.538 While media reports suggested that the changes to the Act made by the 
budget bill simply amended the Act to align with the Reference decision,539 in fact, the changes 
included the erasure of a provision requiring a review of the Act after three years, although no 
such review had ever occurred. The closure came as no surprise following the Supreme Court’s 
decision and the longstanding critiques of the agency’s composition and inaction, however 
proponents of the federal governance of assisted reproduction in Canada are left with little more 
at the time of writing than the rarely enforced criminal provisions.  
 
Addressing Donor Anonymity  
Frustrated with the slow going work of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada, Olivia Pratten 
wrote to its president to ensure that her donors’ records could not be destroyed while waiting for 
regulations to be made. In an essay about her experience, Pratten noted that “Health Canada 
promised that the new Assisted Reproduction Agency would protect past files,” but that the reply 
from the agency noted that it had “no jurisdiction to do so.”540 Without any protections in place, 
the files containing information about Pratten’s donor could be destroyed at any time. In order to 
                                                   
537 Canada, Department of Finance, “Budget 2012 - Budget Plan: Chapter 5 – Responsible Management to Return to 
Balanced Budgets,” March 29, 2010, 5.  
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539 Anne Kingston, “Assisted Human Reproduction Canada: The Budget Cut Everyone Missed,” Macleans.ca, April 
2, 2012. 
540 Olivia Pratten, “Attempting to Learn My Biological Father’s Identity,” in The Right to Know One’s Origins: 
Assisted Human Reproduction and the Best Interests of Children, eds. Juliet. R. Guichon, Ian Mitchell, and Michelle 
Giroux (Brussels: ASP, 2012), 54. 
!! ! !
246 
prevent this from happening, and to ensure that others would not have to seek out such 
protections, she launched a lawsuit to ensure that donor-conceived people could have access to 
records about the identity, medical, social, and cultural history of their donors. The battle for the 
inclusion of provisions regarding donor anonymity in the AHRA was being waged once again, 
this time inside a courtroom, rather than the halls of Parliament.  
 The case was launched in 2008, and despite significant delays, a judgment was rendered 
in 2011. The details of the case hinged on regulations protecting medical records in British 
Columbia, namely that at the time of Pratten’s conception the regulations required that patient 
records be kept for “more than six years from the last entry recorded.”541 As too much time had 
passed between Pratten’s conception and the time at which she sought out her donor’s records, 
there was no requirement to keep the records. Pratten argued that the Government of British 
Columbia failed to enact legislation that would provide donor-conceived people the same 
protections as adoptees, namely that information about their biological origins was “recorded and 
preserved” and “could be made available to them.”542 Pratten won her case at the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia, and the province was given fifteen months to amend adoption legislation to 
address the concerns of donor-conceived people. Further, the judgment included the granting of a 
“permanent injunction prohibiting the destruction, disposal or redaction of any and all Gamete 
Donor Records in British Columbia.”543 The Government of British Columbia won on appeal, 
however, overturning the earlier decision, arguing that donor-conceived people are more like 
children whose mothers do not know the identities of their fathers than like adoptees, and 
therefore there was no obligation for the donor records to be protected and/or available. Pratten’s 
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application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied in May 2013.  
 
(Non)Enforcement of the AHRA 
The failings of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada are not surprising given the simultaneous 
and egregious non-enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Act. The Act was passed in 
2004 and most of the criminal provisions (with the exception of s.8, which required regulations 
on consent for the use of gametes and embryos) came into effect in April of that year. As the 
provisions around matters like reimbursement of expenses were never developed, the absence of 
regulations was widely seen as a loophole to be used to continue to pay gamete donors and 
surrogates under the auspices of reimbursing expenses. There was at least one instance where it 
was made clear to Assisted Human Reproduction Canada that payment for eggs had occurred, 
and without the provision of any receipts or the premise of repayment for expenses. Although 
“according to records obtained through the Access to Information Act, the RCMP was already 
investigating the same clinic over similar allegations,”544 and the woman in question provided a 
cheque documenting the payment to the RCMP, no charges were laid.  
The only charges ever laid under the AHRA occurred in 2013—nearly ten years after the 
Act was passed. In that case, Leia Picard, the CEO of a surrogacy agency which matches 
surrogates with intended parents (she is also involved with an affiliate egg donor agency)—was 
charged with eleven violations of the AHRA, “five counts of buying or offering to buy sperm or 
eggs, three counts of buying or offering to buy the services of a surrogate mother, and three of 
taking money to arrange such services” in addition to forgery charges and charges laid against 
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Picard’s agency.545 According to the Agreed Statement of Facts for the case,546 the investigation 
began in 2011, after the Agency received information that Picard’s agency, Canadian Fertility 
Consultants was violating the terms of the AHRA, although the document focuses primarily on 
Picard’s relationship with Hillary Neiman, a US fertility lawyer who, together with two other 
lawyers, had been convicted of contracting surrogates under false pretenses without intended 
parents involved, and then brokering deals to arrange for couples to “adopt” the already-
contracted pregnancy, or effectively what amounted to a “baby-selling ring.” Picard has not been 
implicated in those crimes; however, the Agreed Statement of Facts makes note of payments 
made to Picard by Neiman, and amongst experts in the field, there has been much speculation 
that pressure was put on the RCMP by the FBI to prosecute Picard.547  
Picard pled guilty to three counts of violating the AHRA, namely the criminal provisions 
which prohibit paying surrogate mothers,548 arranging for the services of a surrogate mother,549 
and purchasing eggs from a donor.550 Although the penalties for violation of these criminal 
provisions of the AHRA are severe—up to $500,000 and/or a ten year jail sentence for an 
indictable offence, and up to $250,000 and/or a four year jail term for a summary conviction—
                                                   
545 Tom Blackwell, “Illegal Surrogacy; Rare Fertility Charges Expose Lax Oversight of Baby Making Industry,” 
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Picard was fined $60,000 total for the three counts. Considering the extraordinary amounts of 
money involved in surrogacy arrangements (Picard received $31,000 in “referral fees” for three 
referrals to Neiman),551 the fines do not represent a significant sum of money and this fine might 
simply be perceived as a “cost of doing business.”552 Suffice it to say that the strange 
circumstances of this charge, and the relatively small fine that it incurred, Picard’s case does not 
suggest a new appetite for prosecution in this field, or really that any more charges will be laid.  
In short, in the absence of regulations from Health Canada, and with a largely 
dysfunctional, now-defunct agency, much of the AHRA, as it was passed in 2004, was never  
implemented, or has since been overturned. While the criminal provisions of the Act remain in 
place, with the exception of the case against Leia Picard and Canadian Fertility Consultants, the 
long-debated, controversial criminal provisions of the Act have simply never been enforced. 
Without implementation of the Act, commercial practices related to ARTs in Canada have 
continued and although reports of the underground trade in human eggs and surrogacy services 
have been unable to chronicle the extent to which paid egg donors and surrogates are engaged in 
Canada, message boards, investigative journalism, and first-hand accounts alike suggest that the 
market is extensive and growing stronger all the time. Buttressed by new developments including 
the importation of frozen eggs from abroad and overseas travel packages that promise 
“extraordinary success rates, low prices, and treatment in a tropical paradise,”553 the rising tide of 
commercialization and commodification that the AHRA was intended to stem is little more than 
empty rhetoric.  
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Summary 
Overall, the AHRA is a complicated and multi-faceted piece of legislation that came about 
through the contestation of the recognition of different groups and different interests in 
consultation, at committee, and otherwise throughout the policy process. The federal 
government’s approach to the governance of ARTs changed little over this period, and the Act 
did little to curb commercial practices, or to protect the interests of donor-conceived people. 
While restrictions on commercial egg donation and surrogacy ostensibly address these concerns, 
commercial practices continue due to a lack of regulations and limited political will to enforce 
the Act. The AHRA enables individual Canadians seeking infertility services to continue to 
purchase them with few restrictions on the practice. Ultimately, the compromises that the AHRA 
represented, that is, the continuation of a free market in infertility with some restrictions on 
reimbursements for gametes and surrogacy services, has resulted in a perpetuation of the status 
quo. In short, commitments to a biomedical, evidence-based model of decision-making that 
privilege an individual, market-driven reproductive citizen continue. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
The AHRA marked the long-awaited end to the legislative process initiated by calls for a Royal 
Commission more than a decade prior. As argued in chapter six, the interests of a range of actors, 
namely LGBTQ people, donors and surrogates, donor-conceived people, and infertile people, 
were acknowledged in the legislative process and the Act that passed, although the AHRA 
privileged a biomedical, individually conceived, market-oriented model of assisted reproduction 
with permeable prohibitions on commercialization. LGBTQ people, egg donors, surrogates, 
infertile people, and donor-conceived families emerged in different ways, at different times, as 
subjects of the governance of ARTs, demonstrating the ways in which these groups were at once 
understood, and understood themselves to be reproductive citizens for a new age.  
This final chapter of this dissertation returns to the intersections of neoliberalism and 
reproductive citizenship to review the central findings of this dissertation and to suggest areas for 
future research. As to central contributions, this dissertation has provided a theoretical 
elucidation of “reproductive citizenship” in the context of a neoliberal citizenship regime and its 
applicability to the example of the governance of assisted reproduction in Canada. Further, it has 
made a substantive contribution to the scholarship on ARTs by providing a carefully drawn 
history of the AHRA and the first in-depth investigation of the experience of LGBTQ people, 
donor-conceived people, gamete donors and surrogates, and infertile Canadians in the long 
policy process leading to its passage. As to areas for further research, this chapter emphasizes 
two areas for investigation that are particularly relevant to the work done by this dissertation, 
namely the experiences of egg donors and surrogates, and the potential for future regulation and 
funding at the provincial level, as well as pointing to a number of other areas where a dearth of 
research raises challenges for moving forward with policy proscriptions. This chapter and the 
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dissertation conclude by reaffirming that federal policy has worked in varying ways to construct, 
contest, and recognize the interests of a range of stakeholders, privileging the reproductive 
citizenship of those aligned with a personal interest—financial or otherwise—in the ongoing 
non-regulation of ARTs in Canada. 
 
Neoliberalism, Reproductive Citizenship, and ARTs 
Governing ARTs in Canada 
From the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies to the passage of the AHRA, 
the history of public policy governing ARTs in Canada reveals much about how neoliberal 
imperatives have informed the policy process. During the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, commitments to evidence-based medicine ensured that reproductive 
technologies were constructed, from the outset, as matters of privately provided medical care, 
outside of the highly-scrutinized public health care system. Any possibility for publicly funded 
care was precluded by the understanding that infertility treatments were “experimental,” leaving 
them to be provided by private clinics. The medicalization of infertility and the validation of its 
private provision enabled by the Royal Commission’s recommendations worked to remove the 
sociality of reproduction, reconstructing both reproduction and possibilities for creating a 
pregnancy as matters of consumer choice available within the free market. The medicalization of 
infertility evident in the work of the Royal Commission also marked assisted reproduction as a 
site of medical (and not social) governance, limiting the kinds of actors and the kinds of 
regulation that were possible. As potential patients, the interests of intended parents were 
privileged, as were the interests of relevant clinics, clinicians, and other biomedical actors seen 
to be crucial to the provision of their “medical” care. Furthermore, the Commission’s reliance on 
!! ! !
253 
a biomedical understanding of infertility suggested from the first, that certain actors would be 
excluded from the policy process, including lesbians and others whose experience of infertility 
was not necessarily medical. At the same time, the extensive consultations of the Royal 
Commission allowed for an articulation of a range of positions on reproductive technologies, and 
the act of bringing stakeholders together worked to legitimate their voices.  
By the time of the three-phase approach, the expansion of fertility services meant that the 
market in infertility treatments was well-established, and opposition to government intervention 
was strong. The language of choice and of a right to reproductive services emerged strongly in 
this period, and the dominance of biomedical actors, including advocates of infertile Canadians 
that shared their views, challenged C-47, the proposed legislation which would seemingly curtail 
commercial egg donation and surrogacy by criminalizing these practices. The policy 
deliberations and consultations leading to the AHRA affirmed these commitments to the 
continuation of a market in infertility care. Extensive public hearings and a committee report that 
recommended important restrictions on commercial practices and donor anonymity did little to 
deter policymakers from proceeding with previous iterations of the policy framework. The 
consultations themselves, which focused on asking both “ordinary citizens” and stakeholders to 
respond to narrow questions about an already-established policy framework worked to uphold 
commitments to criminalization and regulation, and allowed for an easy dismissal of certain 
stakeholders as special interests. The recommendations to eliminate donor anonymity were 
ignored, and although some restrictions on egg donation and surrogacy were passed, the failure 
to make relevant regulations and to implement the law has meant that the provisions related to 
non-commercialization in the AHRA are ineffectual—without teeth. Despite the years of 
deliberations, policy consultations, and consideration of what to do about ARTs, the AHRA does 
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little to alter the open market in infertility services that had only grown since the time of the 
Royal Commission.  
There were moments when there might have been attempts to substantially intervene in 
the governance of reproduction in ways that would have protected vulnerable actors, and to 
address public health concerns. The understanding of egg donation as a matter of public health 
that emerged at the time of the Royal Commission, for example, offered a means for the federal 
government to ban the practice for healthy women who were not already undergoing ovarian 
stimulation or other invasive health interventions. However, the AHRA does not address egg 
donation as a matter of public health, but rather understands it as a private arrangement between 
a donor and intended parents in which individual egg donors must choose how and when it is 
appropriate to go forward with donation. Or, the federal government might have taken decisive 
action in the regulation of surrogacy, reframing surrogacy as a carefully regulated form of labour 
with rates and terms set by the state, as described in the 2000 Feedback Report. However, 
surrogacy emerges in the AHRA in ways similar to egg donation wherein the risks associated 
with surrogacy are largely left up to the surrogate and intended parents to address. Further, there 
were opportunities to make law that would ban donor anonymity, giving donor-conceived people 
the chance to know more about their genetic origins. However, the law as passed focused on the 
need of intended parents and clinics to have unfettered access to donor sperm, ignoring the 
positions of donor-conceived people who had clearly articulated that the ongoing practice of 
donor anonymity was unacceptable and harmful to their well-being. Despite the language of 
“protection” and of the prioritization of those born of reproductive technologies included in the 
principles of the AHRA, the Act reinforced longstanding commitments to the market-based 
provision of assisted reproductive services, and the assumption that individual Canadians are 
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best positioned to make decisions about the risks and benefits of their use. As described 
throughout this dissertation, the AHRA privileges the interests of intended parents and the 
biomedical actors that help them to access ARTs, leaving surrogates and donors, as well as 
donor-conceived people in largely the same position that they were prior to the calling of the 
Royal Commission, but now left to navigate a larger and more complex market in infertility 
services.   
The reflection of a neoliberal citizenship regime in the governance of assisted 
reproduction then, appears in many ways. The understanding that market participation 
legitimates citizenship entitlements is reflected in the governance of ARTs, as intended parents  
 (infertile people, LGBTQ people, and single people) came to be understood as market-based 
actors, and it is as potential consumers of privately-provided ART services that their interests are 
protected by the AHRA and its ongoing non-regulation and non-enforcement. With the ability to 
actively pursue having genetically related offspring and family building through consumption 
practices, the use of ARTs serves at once to validate the marketplace of reproductive services, 
and to do so in self-sufficient ways that replicate existing understandings of private and public 
life. 
  There are then, reasons to understand the AHRA as a slow march to a neoliberal approach 
to governing ARTs, but as noted in chapter one, neoliberalism is not consistent, “at times 
incoherent,” an incremental, pervasive, and at times unintelligible ideology informing 
governance in the contemporary period. The governance of assisted reproduction in Canada has 
not simply been a slow march to a totalizing neoliberal reproductive citizenship, but rather, a 
complex shift that has been diffuse and contested. There is something peculiar about the nature 
of neoliberal interventions into public policy, and specifically, public policy governing intimate 
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life, insofar as these interventions are not uniform, and not unified, and are contingent on the 
“contextual conditions and institutional arrangements,”554 that make a clean and direct trajectory 
from reproductive citizenship in a social citizenship regime to a neoliberal one untenable. For 
example, while the evidenced-based approach to governing reproduction and the privileging of a 
biomedical model are clear in the work of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, its report did include, as noted in chapter three, recommendations to engage in 
infertility prevention strategies and to prohibit commercial surrogacy and egg donation. 
Furthermore, in the late 1990s, the initial steps toward a comprehensive sexual and reproductive 
health framework (as chronicled by A Report from Consultations on a Framework for Sexual and 
Reproductive Health) suggest that there were, on some level, commitments to engage in 
preventative approaches to addressing infertility. Indeed, scholarship on the governance of ARTs 
refers to Canadian legislation as “one of the strictest frameworks in the world”555 in its sweeping 
approach to governing the field and restricting commercial activities. Again, attempts to govern 
ARTs in Canada have not been uniform or consistent in the embrace of a hands-off approach that 
requires individual citizens to take individual responsibility for their engagement with ARTs 
within the context of a free market in infertility services.  
 
The Emergence of New Reproductive Citizens 
The AHRA and its complex approach to continuing the marketization, privatization, and 
individualization of assisted reproduction in Canada were not the only outcomes of the long 
policy process. From the time of the Royal Commission through to the passage of the AHRA, 
new stakeholders emerged as relevant to the policy process that had not been heard previously by 
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the federal government. The emergence of ARTs and their inclusion in the public policy agenda 
put intended parents, donor-conceived people, LGBTQ Canadians interested in using ARTs, and 
surrogates and donors squarely into the purview of the federal government as new interests to be 
addressed.  
 The extent to which these actors were heard, and their concerns incorporated into 
policymaking, varied widely. Intended parents were represented most prominently by IAAC, and 
were exceptionally visible throughout the policy process, heard at every consultation. Access to 
services for those deemed medically infertile was critically important to policymakers, and the 
most contested provisions of proposed legislation were those that were seen to infringe upon the  
“choices” of intended parents. The positions taken by  advocates of infertile Canadians were 
supported, oftentimes financially, by biomedical actors including clinics, professional 
associations, pharmaceutical firms and others, making it difficult to discern where the lines 
between patients, physicians, and those with important financial interests in an expanding market 
in assisted reproduction might be drawn. Over the course of the long policy process, infertile 
Canadians went from a relatively small group beginning to establish an advocacy organization to 
a large, well-funded interest, lobbying and participating in policy debates to ensure ongoing, 
unrestricted access to ART services.  
 Donor-conceived people and their families were also well-heard throughout the policy 
process. The work of Shirley Pratten and the NRAS had already begun at the time of the Royal 
Commission, and the organization was able to establish itself early on as an important 
stakeholder in any policymaking process that would occur. The recommendation made by the 
Standing Committee on Health to ban donor anonymity was particularly important to the 
validation of the interests of donor-conceived people, it was a victory insofar as the voices of 
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donor-conceived people and their families were influencing the policy process, even though the 
recommendation was not incorporated into the AHRA. Nevertheless, the validation of donor-
conceived people and their families throughout the policy process worked to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of their claims. With the understanding that donor anonymity is an issue that should 
be addressed in public policy and law, and that the claims of donor-conceived people and their 
families should be recognized, Olivia Pratten brought her case before the courts. The 
reproductive citizenship of donor-conceived families, and the deep-rooted interest in ensuring 
that donor-conceived people can have access to information about their donors remains a site of 
struggle. 
 Those representing LGBTQ interests were incorporated very few times in the many 
consultations that occurred; only at the time of the Royal Commission and once during the lead-
up to the AHRA. However some lesbian mothers addressed concerns around access to donor 
sperm and to ART clinics by seeking change outside of federal lawmaking initiatives. Some 
brought forward court cases as in ter Neuzen v Korn, Potter v. Korn, and Susan Doe v Canada. 
Rachel Epstein and the Dykes Planning Tykes program have provided an educational program to 
address gaps in knowledge about reproductive possibilities and Mona Greenbaum and Nicole 
Paquette established the Lesbian Mothers’ Association of Quebec, developed a small-scale 
lesbian sperm bank out of their home, and fought for legislative change in Quebec to recognize 
same-sex adoption. The interventions on the part of Greenbaum and the Lesbian Mothers’ 
Association to incorporate a non-discrimination clause into the AHRA are particularly notable 
because they were not part of any long dialogical process between LGBTQ advocates and the 
federal government about how to address their interests in the governance of ARTs. Rather 
certain actors pursued one small change within the context of a policy that was already going 
!! ! !
259 
forward, and was relatively fixed. LGBTQ people have emerged as important reproductive 
citizens within and outside of the federal governance of assisted reproduction, addressing their 
interests in a wide variety of venues despite limited inclusion in formal policy consultations. 
 Finally, the interests of surrogates and egg donors were only marginally represented, 
though oft-talked about throughout the policy process leading to the AHRA. Joanne Wright was 
included in some of the later policy debates prior to the passage of the AHRA, and recently, there 
has been some mobilization by egg donors, but for the most part, egg donors and surrogates were 
described as potentially exploited subjects best off if they altruistically choose to engage (despite 
almost no evidence supporting these claims). The non-inclusion of egg donors and surrogates in 
the policy process, taken together with the well-heard position of infertile Canadians rendered 
egg donors and surrogates to the status of non-actors in the governance of ARTs. The recognition 
of infertile Canadians as reproductive citizens, and their ongoing access to fertility services 
including surrogacy and egg donation has left little space for the articulation of the position of 
donors and surrogates, themselves involved in the process of reproduction, reproductive citizens 
in their own right. Their roles in family building, in new conceptions of parenting, and in the 
governance of reproduction have, at times, been overwhelmed by the call for unrestricted access 
to reproductive technologies by intended parents, including those technologies that make use of 
the bodies of donors and surrogates. 
 The inclusion and exclusion of these groups in the policy debates and the extent to which 
these groups made their voices heard inside and outside the legislative process is informative 
about the way in which their reproductive citizenship was experienced. The recognition of 
infertile Canadians as potentially reproductive, and entitled to accessing ARTs if they had the 
financial capacity to do so, differs substantially from the understanding of egg donors and 
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surrogates not as reproductive, but as secondary to the use of ARTs, objects not subjects of 
reproduction. The recognition of these actors in the policy process marks their recognition as 
potential subjects of public policy—as potential reproductive citizens—though some experience 
a more robust reproductive citizenship than others.  
Ultimately, as argued in this dissertation, the governance of ARTs in Canada—from the 
Royal Commission to the AHRA—is a testament to the lauding of a new reproductive citizen, 
one who is self-sufficient, independent, and, where necessary, undertakes the physiological and 
financial risks necessary to conceive a child. The experiences of stakeholders, namely LGBTQ 
people, infertile people, surrogates and egg donors, and donor-conceived people, add another 
important dimension to this history, demonstrating the ways that reproductive citizenship is, and 
has been negotiated in relation to the governance of ARTs. The diverse experiences of these 
stakeholders demonstrate how individual and collective concerns, engagement with industry, the 
“protection” of women and children born of ARTs, and choice were navigated as these groups 
participated in (or in the case of egg donors, were excluded from) the policy process. 
 
Research Contributions 
On Reproductive Citizenship  
This dissertation began from the simple premise that recognition matters, and recognition does 
indeed matter. There is something fundamental about being included in the exchange of rights 
and entitlements between a state and its people that makes one feel like they are full members of 
a community, particularly when this exchange works to validate the role of individuals and 
groups as parents, free to reproduce and pass on their values, their experiences, and share their 
lives with the next generation of citizens. State provision of services to help people reproduce in 
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the ways that they want is important, as it allows people to feel secure both in their experience as 
citizens, and safe in raising their families within that state. 
 The theorization of “reproductive citizenship” that has occurred throughout this 
dissertation is rooted in Bryan S. Turner’s use of “reproductive citizenship” to describe how 
social supports provided to families (e.g., education and health care provision for children, baby 
bonuses, childcare subsidies, etc.) in the post-war welfare state were granted in exchange for the 
reproductive labour that parents provide in “reproducing the nation.” Extrapolating from Turner, 
and with the addition of the contributions of scholarship on gendered, sexual, and biological 
citizenship, reproductive citizenship comprises the rights and entitlements sought in relation to 
reproduction, the sense of identity that may accompany those rights, and the way that people 
have been grouped (e.g., as intended parents, as surrogates) as policy subjects and grouped 
themselves in order to make their interests known. Further, reproductive citizenship includes the 
understanding that the governance of reproduction can work to encourage the proliferation of 
certain kinds of citizens and family forms, resulting in the privileging of the reproductive 
experiences of some to the exclusion of others.  
Despite a long history of scholarship examining the relationships between citizenship, 
gender, and family life, the study of “reproductive citizenship,” is only now emerging as part of 
citizenship studies. Scholars of citizenship theory, and particularly since Marshall’s work on the 
social rights of citizenship, have investigated the ways that the accordance of particular rights 
and entitlements to certain groups can work to legitimate their place within the state, and to 
create a robust feeling of citizenship that can contribute to more full, more secure lives.556 And as 
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described in chapter two, these scholars have long been engaged in identifying and critiquing the 
ways that citizenship has been experienced, especially insofar as the recognition and dismissal of 
claims to citizenship are tied to evolving understandings of what constitutes a “good” 
reproductive citizen. Scholarship on gendered and sexual citizenship has challenged the 
legitimacy of Marshall’s work, based as it was on a particular, relatively exclusionary model of 
the citizen subject.557 More recent contributions of the literature on biological citizenship have 
challenged the Marshallian approach to citizenship theory in new ways still, interrogating how 
the relationship between citizens and the state may be read through embodied experiences, 
corporeal and genetic, by examining both how the state comes to govern its subjects and how 
citizens come to view and articulate their experiences in their own ways, on their own terms.558 It 
is only since Turner’s work in this field that reproductive citizenship qua reproductive 
citizenship has emerged as a site of study, and while new works continue to build on Turner’s 
work,559 this study is the first to provide an in-depth examination of the concept in the Canadian 
case.  
More clearly, reproductive citizenship offers a dedicated site to identify the ways in 
which citizenship rights and entitlements related to parenthood and reproduction have changed 
over time, in relation to changing citizenship regimes. As citizenship rights “remain the object of 
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political struggles to defend, reinterpret, and extend them,”560 the study of reproductive 
citizenship enables scholars to examine more closely the ways that these struggles occur in the 
governance of reproduction, and to identify the increasing understanding of parenting and 
parenthood as an individual rather than collective endeavour. As the family wage has fallen away 
and responsibility for childrearing remains largely within the bounds of the free market, 
reproductive citizenship allows for conceptual elucidation of how privatization, marketization, 
and individual choice (for those with the socioeconomic capacity) have emerged as key values in 
building families, particularly in families in which the children are genetically related to at least 
one of their parents. Further, with the proliferation of ARTs, entering a fertility clinic in hopes of 
having a child is one among many options presented to people seeking to parent. What 
reproductive citizenship offers as a concept, then, is a route to interrogate the changing nature of 
how reproduction itself is theorized, and the consequences for other aspects of our social lives. 
 
Shifting Citizenship Regimes  
This dissertation has demonstrated not only that reproductive citizenship is a fruitful way to 
study the relationship between parents and the state, but also that studying reproductive 
citizenship over time can demonstrate whether the exchange of rights and entitlements accorded 
to individuals and groups in relation to reproduction intersects with, reflects, or challenges 
broader trends in the governance of citizenship. The erosion of the social citizenship regime of 
the post-war welfare state has brought with it significant changes to programs like social 
insurance and unemployment insurance in ways that have rendered them unrecognizable. With 
time marching on, the weakening of the social safety net has replaced a passive model of social 
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rights-based citizenship with a new model tied to employment and participation in the market 
economy.  
The examination of reproductive citizenship over time, focusing on the governance of 
ARTs (in chapters three through six), demonstrates how engagements with assisted reproduction 
as a site of public policy have replicated the ideological pressures of a neoliberal citizenship 
regime. The understanding of infertility as a matter of private medical care, the failure of the 
federal government to restrict egg donation as a matter of public health, and the ongoing lack of 
implementation which allows the marketplace of infertility services to flourish are all indications 
of the ways that the governance of assisted reproduction in Canada is embedded in a neoliberal 
paradigm. With very few exceptions, there have been no substantive attempts to restrict the range 
of options available to intended parents and their clinicians on the part of the federal government.  
Far from the collective concerns about the implications of ARTs articulated by the feminist 
activists who called for a Royal Commission in the early 1980s, the governance of assisted 
reproduction in Canada has moved towards recognition of reproductive citizenship reliant on the 
language of choice and embedded in market-based provision of care. Rather than broad, social 
interventions to reduce infertility in the first place, or enabling flexible work arrangements or 
childcare programs to help women have children before age-related infertility might occur, the 
focus of the AHRA and the three-phase approach before it has been on creating the means for the 
ongoing use of highly-profitable ARTs, in order to build their families.  
The governance of assisted reproduction is deeply embedded in expanding the range of 
choices available to women and parents more broadly, without expanding meaningful choices, 
that is to say, reproductive autonomy. The availability of ARTs within private-for-profit clinics 
means that certain people will continue to be able to “make choices” about their fertility options, 
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but those same people might have been able to make decisions about their capacity to reproduce 
if they had been empowered to have children earlier in their careers, if there was support and 
widespread acceptance of forms of family building other than having genetically related 
children, or if prevention programs for sexually transmitted diseases and exposures to 
environmental toxicants were in place to prevent infertility in the first place. The increased 
reliance on ARTs as a reproductive choice and a means to “cure” infertility obscure the 
importance of broader social changes that might enable the exercise of substantive reproductive 
autonomy, changes that require rethinking that ARTs are a reproductive choice that should 
available to all.  
 
Interest Articulation and Emerging Policy Subject 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on political mobilization, particularly in a 
field of public policy that has received little attention in the Canadian context. Reproduction, the 
fundamental process of being born, has largely been absent in considerations of political science 
in Canada, but the very nature of citizenship and belonging is bound to the nature of birth, to 
whom, how, and where conception and birth occur. With a few exceptions561 limited attention 
has been paid to this most fundamental aspect of social and health policy, exploring the very 
ways that we come into being, and come into being as a citizen of the state. Each time new work 
on the governance of assisted reproduction is published, it seems as if the story is being told 
anew, this policy issue rarely recognized as a critical site of analysis.  
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 Perhaps this is so because, as described in chapter one of this dissertation, the research to 
date has largely focused on federalism, the judicialization of assisted reproduction, and the 
squeezing out of the interest groups long fundamental to policymaking, including feminist actors. 
The lack of research on contemporary interest groups and others with a vested, personal, familial 
interest in the governance of assisted reproduction and who continue to contribute to the policy 
debates has meant that much mobilization in this field has gone unstudied. As addressed in this 
dissertation, the emergence of new interest groups and social actors, and the ways in which they 
engaged with, and contested the policy framework put forth by the federal government is 
informative about how interest groups emerge and are recognized in new fields of public policy. 
In the context of consultative processes that included and excluded different actors at different 
times, and that often aimed to establish the legitimacy of a preconceived policy framework, there 
were few opportunities for contestation. However, some of the groups examined in this 
dissertation mitigated the lack of political opportunities within the formal legislative process by 
looking to the courts, by engaging in educational campaigns, by engaging with the media, and 
otherwise articulating their interests in ways that ultimately contributed to the discursive 
construction of the issues at hand.  
 
Areas for Future Research  
Exploitation, Egg Donation, and Surrogacy 
This dissertation reveals a number of gaps in existing knowledge about current practices in egg 
donation and surrogacy. First, despite a range of literature identifying that there may be 
exploitation and commercialization occurring in Canada, there is little information about the 
actual experiences of egg donors and surrogates. Like the policy process leading to the AHRA, 
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contemporary scholarship on the governance of egg donation and surrogacy is largely based on 
limited data about who egg donors and surrogates are, as well as the nature of their experiences. 
Claims of exploitation and commercialization persist, as do journalistic accounts of surrogacy 
arrangements gone awry and catastrophic illnesses following egg donation, but in terms of 
empirical study, the Canadian situation is little changed since the time of the Royal Commission. 
Regarding egg donation, freelance journalist Alison Motluk conducted a study of egg 
donors across Canada between 2010 and 2012. In the resulting articles she revealed not only that 
egg donors travel long distances and are paid varying amounts, but also that they report a higher 
incidence of severe side effects than identified in the medico-scientific literature. Eight of the 
eighteen women Motluk interviewed reported experiencing severe ovarian hyperstimulation562 to 
the point that they required “either hospitalization or abdominal draining,”563 although the risks 
of experiencing these effects are widely reported as being less than one percent. Motluk included 
a note about the possibility of selection bias in her study, that, “it could be that women who 
suffered injury are more likely to talk to a journalist, and are so over-represented. It could be a 
coincidence that I spoke to a disproportionate number of people who suffered ill effects.”564 But 
Motluk’s work provides initial empirical support for a phenomenon long suspected by scholars 
                                                   
562 Ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome is a result of the overstimulation of the ovaries which may occur in women 
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563 Alison Motluk, “Is Egg Donation Dangerous?,” Masonneuve 46 (2012). See also, Motluk, “The Human Egg 
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of women’s reproductive health and ARTs, namely that there may be a propensity among 
clinicians to push the limits of ovarian stimulation when women are seen as donors and not as 
patients.565 The one percent risk of severe ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome is the rate of 
incidence for women undergoing ovarian stimulation for IVF (which is the same as egg donation 
in its early stages), and Motluk’s work points to the ways that the risks of egg donation might be 
drastically different from those of IVF despite the similarity in medical protocol. Some advances 
have been occurring, most importantly a new advocacy group, We Are Egg Donors, was 
established in 2013 to create an international network of egg donors, and to make experiential 
information about egg donation widely available. However, scholarship in this field is still 
extraordinarily limited and there is no empirical evidence of how egg donation in Canada takes 
place beyond Motluk’s study. As to surrogacy in Canada, since Eichler and Poole’s 1985 study 
of surrogacy in Canada there have been two relevant empirical studies, both Master’s theses 
which have included interviews with eight or fewer surrogates in each case.566 In order to move 
forward with analyses and (perhaps) policy that addresses the potential for exploitation, 
commercialization, and altruism, more research is needed, engaging with the real life 
experiences of surrogates and egg donors in Canada (including their mobilization through groups 
like We Are Egg Donors), both to support and recognize the articulation of the position of egg 
donors and surrogates on their own terms.567  
Outside of empirical research, what scholarship does exist on egg donation and surrogacy 
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567 See discussion in Angela Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions about Surrogacy against the Backdrop of Social 
Science,” Ottawa Law Review 43, no. 29 (2012); Cattapan, “Risky Business.” 
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in Canada has evolved out of a dichotomous trajectory of scholarship on ARTs that describes the 
technologies as either beneficial or problematic. Here, the threat of exploitation and concerns 
about the commercialization of human life are contrasted with demands for women’s 
reproductive autonomy to participate in fertility services within a free market. The shift in 
rhetorical strategy that took place during the debate on C-47 to allow only altruistic surrogacy 
and egg donation in Canada is an important example of this either/or model of theorizing 
exploitation in the governance of assisted reproduction, wherein concerns about exploitation and 
commercialization have been seen as significant enough to prohibit women from engaging in egg 
donation or surrogacy for pay. This remains the case under the criminal provisions of the AHRA, 
although the lack of regulations and enforcement mean that payment is likely occurring under the 
guise of the reimbursement of expenses.  
These two options, altruism (freely chosen) versus commercialization (with related 
exploitation), are extremes too-often viewed as the only options available to govern egg donation 
and surrogacy. There are other potential strategies that might allow a theorization of third party 
reproduction as aligned with other practices that can be viewed as both exploitative and 
empowering, or autonomously chosen with parameters coerced. As suggested in Health 
Canada’s 2000 Feedback Report on consultations prior to the tabling of the draft AHRA, there 
might be support for alternative models of governing surrogacy and egg donation. This report 
included, as described in chapter six, suggestions about the provision of public funding to 
surrogates through a program like Employment Insurance, to ensure that there would not be 
barriers to access to surrogacy, or undue inducement.568 Even if public funding is not possible, 
the suggestion raised in the Feedback Report points to the thinking about egg donation and 
                                                   
568 Canada, Health Canada, Feedback Report: Submissions and Written Comments on Proposed Federal RGTs 
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surrogacy as labour might both enable surrogacy to take place and to enable regulation of 
problematic practices.569 Models of theorizing egg donation and surrogacy beyond the 
altruism/commercialization dichotomy may provide innovative policy strategies that could move 
this policy field forward. Regardless of how this field proceeds, the recognition of surrogates and 
donors as legitimate actors in the policy process—through newly formed interest groups or 
otherwise—is integral to recognizing their critical role in the use of ARTs.  
 
Provincial Interventions 
Following the overturning of the regulatory provisions of the AHRA, the demise of Assisted 
Human Reproduction Canada, and relevant litigation, “Canadians are worse off now than they 
were before the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies recommended national 
oversight of assisted human reproduction.”570 What remains in the wreckage of the largely 
unimplemented criminal provisions of the AHRA and a federal government uninterested in 
enacting the regulatory provisions that remain, is a void in the governance of ARTs that falls to 
the provinces. Some jurisdictions, Quebec most prominently, have engaged in regulation of the 
technologies independent of the federal government, and a new framework for legislating in the 
field is emerging. We are embarking on a new phase of the governance of ARTs, bound up in 
calls for provincial funding and related regulation. 
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 In Ontario, a program had once existed to broadly fund three cycles of IVF, but since 
1993 (following the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies’ emphasis on 
evidence-based medicine), the funding has been restricted to only those women with bilateral 
fallopian tube blockages. Between 1993 and 2000, the provinces engaged little in the governance 
of ARTs, except in consultation with the federal government in its attempts to legislate and 
regulate. In 2000, however, the Government of Quebec announced a tax credit for up to 25% (or 
up to $15 000) for eligible fertility treatments. This was raised to 30% (or up to $20 000) in 2001 
and again in 2007 to 50%. In 2009, Quebec implemented a comprehensive program of 
regulations under Bill 89 and an increase in funding provisions,571 through its public health 
insurance program, effectively covering most fertility services in the province.572 The provision 
of public funding in Quebec was attached to a public health campaign to reduce the number of 
high-risk multiple births in the province (i.e., twins, triplets, etc.) through the use of single 
embryo transfer in IVF.573 Recent data has suggested that although the program has been much 
more costly than anticipated, the number of multiple births in the province has decreased 
substantially since the program’s implementation.574 In 2015, legislation was introduced to cut 
back the program and to limit access to ARTs through Quebec’s provincial health insurance 
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program. As of June 2015, the proposed legislation (Bill 20) is in committee hearings in 
Quebec’s Assemblée nationale.  
Other provinces have since established their own programs. In 2009, Manitoba 
implemented a 40% infertility tax credit (up to $8000), although this was not tied to any 
regulatory provisions. In March 2014, the Government of Ontario announced that it would help 
couples and reduce multiple births by providing funding for one round of IVF, although it is 
unclear that this program will result in the reduction of multiple births.575 Furthermore, in July 
2014, the Government of New Brunswick announced one-time grants to fund 50% of certain 
fertility treatments (up to $5000) without relevant regulatory provisions. Announcements in 
Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador suggest that similar funding is forthcoming in these 
provinces.576 
While the establishment of the public funding program in Quebec has been attributed to 
the advocacy of high-profile individuals (and the interest groups that they supported), policy 
framing that made infertility an important medical issue, and the failure of the federal 
government to provide substantive regulation of ARTs,577 the rapid expansion of public funding 
initiatives suggests that something broader is occurring. One explanation lies with the number of 
interest groups lobbying provincial governments for IVF funding. The work of these interest 
groups has, for the most part, been received uncritically,578 however there are potential conflicts 
                                                   
575 There has been significant critique about this approach to funding IVF and its potential to address multiple births. 
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of interest manifest in the strong financial relationships between these groups and the 
pharmaceutical companies poised to benefit from the increased accessibility of IVF. In Ontario, 
for example, inquiries to the provincial lobbyist registry reveal that the lobbying efforts of one 
such patient group were paid for directly by EMD (the parent company of Serono), the market 
firm that controls most of the Canadian market share for infertility medications, and a long time 
supporter of IAAC.   
Pharmaceutical industry funding of patient groups is nothing new. Within medical 
sociology, scholars including Sharon Batt and Barbara Mintzes have examined the extent to 
which such financial relationships may compromise and undermine the capacity of patient 
groups to act in the best interests of those they represent.579 There may also be good reason to 
take private funds, as patient groups may be able to maintain arms-length relationships and may 
want to “get something back” from the pharmaceutical companies that profit from their 
treatment(s). Despite the importance of these relationships, however, scholarship on reproductive 
technologies in Canada has largely ignored the implications of industry funding, with scholarship 
limited to a few studies on commercial interests in the work of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies in the early 1990s. Without an understanding of the ongoing 
relationships between private interests and patient groups advocating for the public funding of 
IVF, it is unclear to what extent the policy initiatives are reflecting the interests of the public, 
patients, and/or industry and further, the possibility for alternatives to address infertility beyond 
the public funding programs favoured by industry and industry-funded patient groups.  
Given what this dissertation has demonstrated about the ongoing advancement of the 
interests of consumer-patients and industry in the governance of ARTs, there is reason to believe 
                                                   
579 Sharon Batt, “Marching to Different Drummers”; Barbara Mintzes, Blurring the Boundaries: New Trends in 
Drug Promotion (Amsterdam: HAI-Europe, Health Action International, 1998). 
!! ! !
274 
that the public funding of IVF may work to advance the reproductive citizenship of the already-
privileged infertile, private-for-profit clinics, and the infertility industry more broadly, 
overlooking the implications for the reproductive citizenship of others who draw on provincial 
health insurance programs for care. In a context where services like IVF are funded under 
provincial health insurance programs, rural women remain far from birthing centres, and access 
to abortion is far from universal, the limits of reproductive citizenship become clear. This reality 
was particularly stark when the announcement for public funding of infertility treatments in New 
Brunswick came the same week that the only abortion clinic in the province closed.580 An 
important area for future research in this field, then, are the ongoing intersections of patient 
advocacy, industry engagement, and provincial initiatives to fund infertility treatments in the 
provinces. Following the Supreme Court judgment and the continued decentralization of ART 
policy, scholars will do well to remain vigilant to the ways in which the interactions between 
market actors, provincial governments, and others shape this policy field. 
 
Other Initiatives 
The governance of infertility and assisted reproduction in Canada reaches far beyond the scope 
of the areas for future research identified above. The emergence of research on the potential 
reproductive effects of exposures to household chemicals on reproductive health, for example, 
raises issues about the ongoing emphasis on reproductive technologies as a solution to infertility, 
and the near-absence of preventative care.581 Further, the unenforced provisions of the AHRA 
                                                   
580 “Morgentaler Clinic in Fredericton Performs Last Abortions before Closure,” CBC News New Brunswick, July 
18, 2014., http://www.cbc.ca/1.2710909; Rachael Johnstone, “Privileging Infertility over Abortion in New 
Brunswick,” Impact Ethics (blog), August 6, 2014, impactethics.ca/2014/08/06/privileging-infertility-over-abortion-
in-new-brunswick;  Johnstone, “The Politics of Abortion in Canada After Morgentaler Women’s Rights as 
Citizenship Rights.” 
581 Dayna Scott, “‘Gender-Benders’: Sex and Law in the Constitution of Polluted Bodies,” Feminist Legal Studies 
17, no. 3 (2009); Alana Cattapan, Roxanne Mykitiuk, and Mark Pioro, “Notions of Harm in Canadian Law: 
!! ! !
275 
vis-à-vis commercial surrogacy and egg donation have resulted in an influx in transnational 
reproductive travel, an area currently receiving some attention, but that requires more systematic 
and in-depth research.582 This field is particularly important given that it is amongst certain 
economically privileged groups (including a disproportionate number of gay men) who have 
been seeking out transnational surrogacy,583 and there are concerns about legal citizenship that 
emerge as reproductive tissues move across borders.584 Additionally, there are a number of 
changes to regulation and family law that would improve the capacity of LGBTQ people to use 
ARTs. These include, for example, changes to the semen regulations, as well as family law 
provisions to better protect lesbian-led families and donor-conceived families where only one 
parent is genetically related to their child(ren).585 Finally, new technologies continue to emerge 
each year, such as egg vitrification,586 mitochondrial replacement,587 and uterine 
transplantation,588 each raising new concerns about the ethical and legal limits of controlling 
conception through biomedicine.  
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Summary 
This dissertation, then, has demonstrated that there is a compelling story in the experiences of 
those who are personally invested in the use of these technologies as surrogates, donors, intended 
parents, or as people conceived through their use. This story points to the ways that the 
experiences of those with a familial and/or corporeal interest in the governance of ARTs have 
intersected with government action and inaction, shaping the terms in which people can access 
reproductive technologies. More compelling still are the ways that the interests and experiences 
of these actors correspond to broader trends in governance, namely the ascendency of a 
neoliberal governing ideology. By exploring the simultaneous practices of a federal government 
attempting to make law and public policy on ARTs, and the experiences of those invested in the 
uses of these technologies in their personal lives, this dissertation has worked to reconcile the 
space between historical concerns about the impacts of ARTs with more recent work on interest 
group participation in the governance of ARTs in Canada. It has demonstrated how interest 
articulation and the governance of ARTs in Canada have long been bound up in a neoliberal 
logic that affirms and contests the legitimacy of certain policy subjects in relation to their 
position as citizen-consumers in the market in reproductive services. Both the policy process 
itself and the experiences of interest group actors point to the ways that the processes of 
medicalization, individualization, and commercialization have defined how certain interests were 
articulated, recognized, and prioritized in the resulting policy.  
If the state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation and maintains a stronghold in its 
nurseries, what it means to reproduce and to be a desirable reproductive subject is tied to the 
governing ideology of the day, and in the case of the period examined in this dissertation, a 
neoliberal citizenship regime. Reproductive citizenship in 21st century Canada is rife with 
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manifestations of citizenship as duty; contemporary pronatalism subtly appears in the discursive 
practices of provincial governments and political laments about our declining population. As 
explored throughout this dissertation, assisted reproduction policy in Canada has worked to reify 
longstanding notions of who is a desirable citizen, enabling a free market in reproductive 
services that understands infertile, middle-to-upper class individuals as its ideal subject.  
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
 
 
Public Servants 
 
Anonymous senior public servant, Telephone Interview, December 16, 2011 
Manseau, Francine, Personal Interview, December 8, 2011 
Hatcher Roberts, Jan, December 15, 2011 
 
 
Interest Group Leaders/Staff/Volunteers 
 
Allen, Diane, Personal Interview, January 20, 2012 
Boodram, Chris, Telephone Interview, December 10, 2011 
Boscoe, Madeline, Telephone Interview, December 13 and 20, 2011 
Clute, Catherine, Telephone Interview, December 2, 2011 
Creighton, Phyllis, Personal Interview, November 30, 2011 
Dale, Sherry, Personal Interview, December 20, 2011 
Epstein, Rachel, Personal Interview, December 14, 2011 
Greenbaum, Mona, Personal Interview, December 7, 2011 
Hanck, Beverly, Personal Interview, December 7, 2011 
Haase, Jean, Skype Interview, December 3, 2011 
Londini, Vince, Telephone Interview, November 15, 2011 
Pratten, Shirley, Telephone Interview, March 13, 21, 28, 2012 
 
 
Experts/Academics 
 
Achilles, Rona, Personal Interview, February 9, 2012 
Baylis, Françoise, Personal Interview, February 15, 2012 
Lippman, Abby, Personal Interview, December 7, 2011 
!! ! !
314 
Appendix B: Consent Forms/Script 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Study Name: Controlling Conception:  Reproductive Citizenship in Canada, 1988-2009 
 
Researcher: Alana Cattapan 
Department of Political Science, York University 
  XXXXXXXX@XXXXX.XX 
     
This document is intended to inform you as to what this research project is about, and to ensure 
that as a potential participant, you understand enough about any potential risks or benefits 
related to this study to make an informed decision about your participation.  The form also 
describes your right to withdraw from the study at any time, as well as your right to decline to 
answer any questions that you may be uncomfortable answering.  If, at any time in this process, 
you require further information, please feel free to ask.  You will receive a copy of this form for 
your own records and reference. 
 
 
Purpose of the Research:  
The main goal of this research is to study public policy on assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs).  This research will culminate in a book-length dissertation and may also result in a 
number of shorter article-length papers and relevant research presentations.  The works resulting 
from this research may be published as a dissertation, as a scholarly book, in academic journals, 
or presented at academic conferences. 
 
What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research:  
The interview process to which you may consent by signing this form involves one interview 
that should last no longer than ninety minutes.  This interview can take place over the phone, or 
in person.  In either case, the interview will consist of a series of open-ended questions pertaining 
to your work or volunteer experiences related to assisted human reproduction (through advocacy, 
research, self-help counseling, organizing, etc.).   
 
Risks and Benefits of the Research: 
As someone with a great understanding of assisted reproductive technologies as they have used 
in Canada, your participation is an asset to this research.  Hopefully, you will benefit from this 
research as well, as the information provided may be useful to you in analyzing the effects of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, the non-regulation that has followed, and how this relates to 
the lives of those using ARTs.  I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in 
the research.   
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal from the Study: 
You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason. Your decision to stop 
participating, or not to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with me, 
York University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from 
the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible. Please 
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know that your participation in the study is completely voluntary, and that your decision not to 
engage with any part of the research process will remain confidential. 
 
Confidentiality:  
All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and unless you 
specifically indicate your consent, your name and the name of your organization will not appear 
in any report or publication of the research.  Your data will be safely stored in a locked facility 
and only research staff will have access to this information. Confidentiality will be provided to 
the fullest extent possible by law. After five years, your data will be destroyed. 
 
Please indicate if you wish to be interviewed anonymously (Circle one): 
 
Yes          No 
 
Please indicate if you wish part of the interview to be conducted anonymously (Circle one). [In 
this case, please indicate when you wish to go “off the record” in the interview and this will be 
noted when the recording is transcribed for use in research]. 
 
Yes          No 
 
Please indicate if I may use your name, the name of your organization, and the information you 
provide in publications stemming from this project (Circle one): 
 
Yes          No 
 
 
Please note that you may change your mind regarding these options at any point during the 
interview by amending your choices on this form.  
 
Questions? 
 
If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel 
free to contact me at any time at XXXXX@XXXXX.XX, or XXX-XXX-XXXX. You may also 
contact XXXXX.  If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a 
participant in the study, please contact XXXXX.  Please note that this research has been 
reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s 
Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics 
guidelines. 
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Legal Rights and Signatures: 
For Participant 
 
I,  _______________________, consent to participate in Controlling Conception:  Reproductive 
Citizenship in Canada, 1988-2009 conducted by Alana Cattapan.  I understand that I will 
participate in an interview, from which I may withdraw at any time without explanation.  I have 
had the opportunity to discuss my participation in this study and my questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction.    I understand the nature of this project and wish to participate. I 
understand that I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature 
below indicates my consent. 
 
Signature:  ________________________________________  
Date:  ________________________________________ 
 
 
I ___________________________, consent to having my interview audio recorded and 
transcribed.  I understand that any recordings will remain confidential and will be used for 
research purposes only.  
 
Participant Signature:  ________________________________________  
Date:  ________________________________________ 
 
 
For Researcher 
 
I confirm that I have explained the nature and purpose of the study to the subject named above.  I 
have answered all questions.   I have provided a copy of this document for the participant’s own 
records. 
 
Researcher:  ________________________________________ 
Signature:  ________________________________________  
Date:  ________________________________________
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Informed Consent Script (For Telephone Interviews) 
 
Before we begin, I need to inform you what this research project is about, and to ensure that as a 
potential participant, you understand enough about any potential risks or benefits related to this 
study to make an informed decision about your participation.  I also want to review your right to 
withdraw from the study at any time, as well as your right to decline to answer any questions that 
you may be uncomfortable answering.  If, at any time in this process, you require further 
information, please feel free to ask.  You will receive a copy of this form for your own records 
and reference. 
 
This research is intended to study public policy on assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). 
The works resulting from this research may be published as a dissertation, as a scholarly book, in 
academic journals, or presented at academic conferences. 
 
The interview process involves just this one interview that should last no longer than ninety 
minutes.  It will consist of a series of open-ended questions pertaining to your work or volunteer 
experiences related to assisted human reproduction (through advocacy, research, self-help 
counseling, organizing, etc.).   
 
As someone with a great understanding of assisted reproductive technologies as they have used 
in Canada, your participation is an asset to this research.  Hopefully, you will benefit from this 
research as well, as the information provided may be useful to you in analyzing the effects of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, and how this relates to the lives of those using ARTs.  I do 
not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in the research.   
 
You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason. Your decision to stop 
participating, or not to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with me, 
York University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from 
the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible. Please 
know that your participation in the study is completely voluntary, and that your decision not to 
engage with any part of the research process will remain confidential. 
 
All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and unless you 
specifically indicate your consent, your name and the name of your organization will not appear 
in any report or publication of the research.  The interview will be recorded and the data will be 
safely stored in a locked facility and only research staff will have access to this information. 
Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. After five years, your data 
will be destroyed. 
 
I now need to ask a few questions about how you want to participate.  Do you want to participate 
anonymously? Or, would you prefer that part of this interview be conducted anonymously?   
Note that you can indicate at any time when you would like to go “off the record” and this will 
be noted when the recording is transcribed for use in research.  
 
May I use the name, the name of your organization, and the information you provide in 
publications stemming from this project? 
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Please note that you may change your mind regarding these options at any point during the 
interview by stating that you wish to change your options. 
 
If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel 
free to contact me at any time at XXXXX@XXXXX.XX, or XXX-XXX-XXXX. You may also 
contact XXXXX.  If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a 
participant in the study, please contact XXXXX.  Please note that this research has been 
reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s 
Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics 
guidelines. 
  
 
Do you have any questions about this research before I confirm your consent? 
 
By consenting, you are stating that you understand that you will participate in an interview, from 
which you may withdraw at any time without explanation.  You are also stating that you have 
had the opportunity to discuss my participation in this study and that any questions that you may 
have, have been answered to your satisfaction.    Further, you are stating that you understand the 
nature of this project and wish to participate.  Note that you are not waiving any of your legal 
rights by consenting to this research. 
 
Do you consent to participating in this interview? 
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Appendix C: Timeline of Key Events 
 
 
1983 Infertility Self-Help Support Group is founded in Ottawa   
 
 
1987  The New Reproductive Alternatives Society is established 
 
 
1989 (April) Throne Speech announcing the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies 
 
 (October) Order-in-Council establishing the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies 
 
 
1990 Infertility Self-Help Support Group becomes the Infertility Awareness 
Association of Canada, and receives $450,000 in federal funding from Health 
Canada’s Health Promotion Directorate 
 
(June) Royal Commission “Search Conference” on New Reproductive 
Technologies  
 
 (September-November) Public Hearings of the Royal Commission 
 
 
1993    (December) The report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive  
Technologies, Proceed with Care, is published 
 
 Health Canada establishes a federal/provincial/territorial working group on  
reproductive and genetic technologies (1993-1996) 
 
 
1994    (April) Following December announcement of the re-evaluation of the program, 
the Government of Ontario ceases funding for IVF (except in cases of complete 
bilateral fallopian tube blockage) 
 
Health Canada engages in consultations with approximately fifty key stakeholders 
to confirm the findings of the Royal Commission 
 
 
1995  (February) Budget announcement that provincial health and social transfer 
programs would be changing considerably 
 
(April) Health Canada establishes a Discussion Group on embryo research with a 
one-year mandate to provide a report on the status of the embryo 
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(July) Health Minister Diane Marleau announces a voluntary moratorium on nine 
of the technologies deemed most reprehensible by the Royal Commission 
 
 
1996 (January) Health Canada establishes an advisory committee on the voluntary 
(interim) moratorium (1996-2002) 
 
 (April) Supreme Court of Canada rules in Potter v. Korn  
 
(May) Health Canada introduces first iteration of the regulations for the  
processing and distribution of semen for assisted conception  
 
(June) Health Minister David Dingwall announces the three-phase approach (i.e., 
the already-announced voluntary moratorium, C-47, and a subsequent regulatory 
regime). At this time, Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health is published and C-
47 is tabled  
 
(September) IAAC releases Response to Bill C-47 and “New Reproductive and 
Genetic Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health” 
 
 
1997  (March-April) Witness testimony on C-47 is heard by the Standing Committee  
on Health subcommittee on C-47 
 
(April) C-47 dies on the Order Paper 
 
Rachel Epstein and Kathie Duncan run Dykes Planning Tykes for the first time in 
Toronto 
 
  (November) Bill C-247 is introduced 
 
 
1998  (August) Canadian Biotechnology Strategy is announced (1998-2007) 
 
(October) Lesbian Mothers’ Association of Quebec holds its first meeting 
 
 
1999 (July) Health Canada holds consultations with stakeholders (one-day workshop)  
 
 (September) Bill C-247 dies on the Order Paper 
 
(September) Health Canada commissioned research (focus groups and telephone 
surveys) is conducted 
 
!! ! !
321 
(September) Judgment is rendered in Cameron v. Nova Scotia. At appeal it is 
determined that infertility is a “disability,” but that the Government of Nova  
Scotia does not have to fund infertility services. 
 
(September) Federal-Provincial-Territorial Health Ministers’ meeting includes 
ARTs policy on the agenda 
 
(December) Health Canada releases its Overview Paper articulating intent to 
legislate and the general direction of the legislation-to-come  
 
(December) Health Canada updates semen regulations to extend donor exclusion 
criteria (i.e., men who have sex with men) through the Technical Requirements 
for Therapeutic Donor Insemination 
 
 
2000 (February) Health Canada circulates a Workbook to facilitate stakeholder and 
federal/provincial consultations 
 
 (February and March) Health Canada holds consultations with stakeholders and 
provincial and territorial officials.  
 
(March) Feedback Report is published. 
 
Government of Quebec introduces its first infertility tax credit 
 
 
2001 (May) Draft legislation governing assisted human reproduction put before the 
Standing Committee on Health for consideration 
 
 (May; October-December) The Standing Committee on Health hears a wide range 
of witnesses on the draft legislation 
 
 (December) The Standing Committee on Health tables Assisted Human 
Reproduction: Building Families 
 
 
2002 (May) Bill C-56, The Assisted Human Reproduction Act is tabled in the House of 
Commons, passes first and second reading; sent to committee. 
 
 (June) Witness testimony on C-56 heard by the Standing Committee on Health 
 
 (October) Bill C-56 reintroduced in new session of Parliament as C-13 
 
 (November-December) Witness testimony on C-13 heard by the Standing 
Committee on Health 
 
!! ! !
322 
 (December) Amendment to eliminate anonymous gamete donation fails in 
committee; amendment to include provisions on sexual orientation and marital 
status incorporated into the Bill  
 
 
2003 (October) Bill C-13 passes third reading, sent to Senate 
 
 
2004 (February) Bill C-13 reintroduced as C-6 in the Senate 
 
 (February-March) Witness testimony heard in the Senate Committee on Social 
Affairs, Science, and Technology 
 
 (March) AHRA receives Royal Assent 
 
 (April) Most of the provisions of the AHRA come into force 
 
(December) Government of Quebec files a constitutional challenge to the AHRA 
 
 
2005   (May) Orders-in-Council issued to establish Assisted Human Reproduction  
Canada  
 
 
2006 (January) Judgment in the Susan Doe case rendered (initial case heard in 2003, 
appeal heard in 2007), upholding the semen regulations  
 
 (December) Board of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada appointed 
 
 
2007 (April) Deadline for three-year parliamentary review of the AHRA passes without 
review occurring 
 
 (June) AHRA guidelines on consent-to-use (s.8) come into force  
 
 
2008 (June) Quebec Court of Appeal finds certain provisions of the AHRA to be 
unconstitutional 
 
 
2009 Manitoba introduces an infertility tax credit 
 
 Government of Quebec implements comprehensive public funding for IVF and 
other ARTs under Bill 89 
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2010  (Spring) Three board members of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada resign 
due to a lack of transparency in operations 
 
 (November) Parliamentary Hearings (Standing Committee on Health) on the 
resignation of the AHRC Board members 
 
(December) Supreme Court of Canada upholds much of the judgment of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, overturning the regulatory provisions of the AHRA   
  
 
2011  (May) Superior Court of British Columbia finds (in Pratten v British  
Columbia) that the Government of British Columbia should (as in adoption), 
protect the records of donor-conceived people  
 
 
2012  (June) Omnibus budget bill significantly amends the AHRA including (and  
beyond) the changes germane to the Supreme Court judgment in Reference Re: 
AHRA  
 
(November) British Columbia Court of Appeal overturns the lower court decision  
decision in Pratten and finds that there is no obligation for government to  
provide or protect information about the genetic origins of donor-conceived 
people  
 
  
2013  (February) First charges laid under the AHRA (following a raid on the offices of  
Canadian Fertility Consultants in February 2012) (fined in December 2013) 
 
(March) Assisted Human Reproduction Canada closes  
 
(May) Pratten case refused leave to appeal at the Supreme Court 
 
 
2014  (April) Government of Ontario announces IVF funding 
   
  (July) Government of New Brunswick announced new IVF funding 
 
(November) Government of Quebec introduces Bill 20 to limit existing IVF 
funding program 
   
 
